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Culture of Violence:  
Livestock, Honor, and Feuding in 
the Scottish Borders
Clint Alley
A popular bit in blue-collar comedian Jeff Foxworthy’s routine holds that 
any burglar worth his salt knows best which homes to rob and which to 
avoid. If a thief, says Foxworthy, is presented with “two houses, and one 
of them has a manicured lawn with daisies growing in the flowerpot,” 
the thief will probably consider that house to be “easy pickins.’” But if the 
thief comes to “a house where the grass is…tall and there’s a dog chained 
to the clothesline and a motor swinging from a tree” he will avoid trying 
to rob that house because “that’s a house where a gun lives.”1
 Foxworthy’s humorous observations about the relationship 
between poverty and violence have entertained audiences for many years. 
But there is much truth between the laughs. Poverty, perhaps more than 
any other human condition, has the potential to foster violence, especially 
where it exists with other external stressors such as instability in the home 
or political instability in the surrounding area. Teachers have observed this 
phenomenon among inner-city minority children for years. The Handbook 
of Bullying in Schools notes that “insofar as poverty begets violence…
children in poor areas may be more likely to be aggressive as a normative, 
adaptive response to environmental risks.”2
 A poverty of natural resources can afflict a region in the same 
way that monetary poverty can afflict a household. In pre-industrial 
1  P.T. Elliot and E.M. Lowery, Cracker Ingenuity: Tips from the Trailer Park for the Chronically 
Broke (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2003), 62.
2  Shane R. Jimerson, Susan M. Swearer, and Dorothy L. Espelage, eds. Handbook of Bullying 
in Schools: An International Perspective (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2010), 127.
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societies which cannot develop economies of crop-growing due to poor 
land, an economy of herding is often developed as a necessity; and this 
economy of herding is connected directly to a culture of honor, pride, 
and—ultimately—violence. A prime example of this chain of events is 
the border region of Scotland in the late middle ages. This paper will 
demonstrate that the poverty of resources in that area and the subsequent 
culture of herding—paired with the volatile political nature of the region 
between the years of 1296 and 1603—was responsible for the culture of 
violence which immersed the region at that time.
 The story of the Scottish borders is a story of contained chaos. It is 
one of anarchy surrounded by law, of scarcity bounded by plenty, and of 
violence encompassed by peace. Like a maelstrom in a pond enclosed by 
fields of plenty, the Borders were once a region of consummate bloodshed 
and lawlessness, a place where the art of feuding was perfected and 
practiced by true masters of calamity. 
During the three-century stretch between the first War of 
Independence and the Union of the Crowns, royal blood and national 
allegiance meant little to the inhabitants of this dangerous land, who 
proved time and again that survival was their only watchword. In such an 
atmosphere, it was natural that the inhabitants relied heavily on family 
ties for protection. This, coupled with their strong sense of personal 
honor—a trait derived quite literally and probably quite accidentally 
from the land, itself—made the medieval border region the world’s most 
natural laboratory for the practice of feuding.
 The land, itself, was the borderers’ first great enemy. Rocky and 
barren, the medieval borderers could grow few crops, even in times of 
peace. Agricultural experts and novices alike have long lamented the 
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poor quality of the border region’s soil. Noted ethnologist John Gray of 
Adelaide University calls the small neck of the borders a place of “rural 
river valleys and bleak hills,” of “hardy sheep and…marginal land.”3 That 
marginality is manifested in hundreds of thousands of acres of steep hills 
and craggy valleys, everywhere scattered with an abundance of ancient, 
volcanic rock. A study sponsored by Coventry University in 2006 said that 
“large parts [of the border region] have poor quality agricultural land and 
are typified by upland, low-intensity livestock farming, notably beef and 
lamb.”4 
Rural by nature, the border cannot produce any cereal crops in 
great quantity, a reality that—along with the below-average household 
income of the region—has caused the European Union to designate the 
borders as an Objective 2 area in the past decade; an area in need of 
special subsidies to help counteract the lagging local economy.5  It was—
and remains—useless for growing any staple crops in great proportion. 
Its greatest asset was an abundance of coal and iron-ore, which was 
exhausted in the region’s early industrial period but which, to the pre-
industrial society of 1296-1603, was virtually useless. 
It was for this reason that, in a nation of growers, the borderers 
early developed an economy of herding. Livestock was the bread and 
butter of the borders. John Lesley, Bishop of Ross from 1567 to 1592, 
observed the link between the violence of the border region and the lack of 
agriculture, noting that the borderers as a people were 
more turbulent and lawless than any of the other natives of 
Scotland—in times of peace despising husbandry; in times of 
3  John Gray, “Open Spaces and Dwelling Places: Being at Home on Hill Farms in the 
Scottish Borders,” American Ethnologist 26, no. 2 (1999): 440-441.
4  B. Ilbery, and D. Maye, “Retailing Local Food in the Scottish-English Borders: A Supply-
Chain Perspective,” Geoforum 37, no. 3 (2006): 354.
5  Ilbry and Maye, 354.
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war reduced to great poverty by daily incursions of the enemy. 
Living on flesh, milk and curds, boiled barley, they have little 
acquaintance with bread, or with good beer or wine; neither do 
they take much pleasure in them when they get them.6 
This carnivorous lifestyle owes as much to the impoverished land 
on which the borderers lived as it did to the frequent warfare of either 
side. Lesley notes that grain products were scarce on the border, as well 
as products grown from the vine. Instead, the region was one of prolific 
livestock ownership. The people of the border invested heavily in their 
livestock, particularly the patriarch of a border clan, whose “superior 
wealth,” Sir Walter Scott said, “consisted in his extensive herds and 
flocks” of cattle and sheep, respectively.7 The reason for this, Scott goes on 
to explain, is that “however extensive his territories were, he could use no 
part of them for his own peculiar profit, excepting just so much as he was 
able…to stock with sheep and black cattle.”8
 The net result of this culture of prolific livestock ownership was a 
society where a great deal of the wealth was portable, and therefore could 
be easily stolen; a problem made worse in the borders by the incessant 
armed incursions of hungry soldiers from both sides during times of 
war. In the legal vacuum produced by three centuries of warfare, the 
only recourse for recovery of stolen property was often for an individual 
to personally recover that stolen property. This combination of portable 
wealth and weak central authority produced a breed of people whose 
natural inclination was toward both punitive and preemptive violence.
 This culture of violence demanded that the men be able to 
defend their own property and, consequently, prove their worth and 
ability to hold and keep wealth to the community. This consciousness of 
6  Gilbert J. Minto, Border Sketches (1870), 22-23.
7  Walter Scott, The Border Antiquities of England and Scotland, vol. 1 (1814), xlvi.
8  Scott, xlv.
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community standing, self-worth and pride in being able to defend ones 
possessions constitutes a most basic definition of personal honor. The 
implications of an entire population endowed with this heightened sense 
of personal honor are that violence on the border was not simply brutal, 
but also frequent and commonplace. Clashes between individuals often 
revolved around livestock, and those clashes often sparked small-scale 
‘private wars’ to defend the honor of the offended person. 
For the border reivers—men of the warrior-class who specialized 
in the stealing of livestock—the concept of personal honor extended 
beyond the ability just to defend their own holdings and included taking 
pride in their ability to steal the livestock of another without being caught. 
In the sixteenth century, Lesley says that as soon as the reivers 
have seized upon the booty, they, in like manner, return 
home in the night through blind ways, and fetching many 
a compass. The more skilful any captain is to pass through 
those wild deserts, crooked turnings, and deep precipices, 
in the thickest mists and darkness, his reputation is the 
greater, and he is looked upon as a man of an excellent 
head.9
 A sense of one’s standing in his community was a vital part of 
border life. Lesley implies that the reivers saw livestock theft not only as 
a means of livelihood and of improving their standing in the community, 
but as great sport. Like a star high school quarterback, reivers were local 
celebrities. They practiced their technique and refined their accoutrements 
to give them the greatest advantages for their illicit game, even going so 
far as to teach their horses to crawl through swamps on their knees to keep 
from being caught if they were chased.10 
Horses were a precious commodity in all of Scotland, but nowhere 
were they so prevalent—or so desired—as in the border region, where 
9  Minto, 24.
10  Minto, 23.
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infantry units were scarce during times of war and every man, from 
the highest nobleman to the lowest peasant, rode into battle. English 
embargoes on transporting horses to Scotland did little but whet the 
borderers’ appetites and increase the profitability of cross-border equine 
theft.11 Perhaps more than in any other part of Scotland, honor and 
livestock were inherently intertwined in the border region.
 But in the tinderbox that was the border region, honor was not 
just a personal priority. It also acted as an umbrella-institution wherein 
many individuals of the same clan had a shared sense of family honor. 
This shared sense of honor probably originated as a defensive technique. 
As is seen in many developing nations where central authority is either 
weak or nonexistent, the first line of defense is often the family unit. In 
the borders, family was often the only line of defense. Border clans of this 
period were typically organized around the edicts of a strong paternal 
figure, whose power was upheld by an intricate network of extended 
family members and feudal dependents. 
According to Sir Walter Scott, whose early interest in border 
history fueled his literary career and left us with many primary accounts 
which have otherwise been lost to time, the absolute power of a border 
chieftain was never questioned by his family. Due to the martial nature 
of their existence, border clans often had no choice but to submit 
unswervingly to the dominant male member of the clan. The survival of 
the clan and its honor depended on this devotion to such a degree that 
as soldiers, they felt the necessity of submitting absolutely 
to their leader, while he exerted his authority with 
tolerable moderation; and, as commanding soldiers, the 
chief must have felt the hazard of pushing discipline into 
tyranny…He was not only the legislator and captain and 
11  George M. Fraser, The Steel Bonnets, 5th ed. (Trowbridge, Wiltshire, United Kingdom: 
Redwood Books, 1995), 85.
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father of his tribe, but it was to him that each individual 
of the name looked up for advice, subsistence, protection, 
and revenge.12
 The Scottish clan, contrary to popular belief, was not composed 
completely of blood relatives. Instead, each clan contained a network 
of relatives at its nucleus, who operated with the support of non-family 
dependents, who did agricultural work and provided military service to 
the dominant family in exchange for protection and sustenance. These 
dependents frequently took on the surname of the family they served. 
Scotland was riddled with a patchwork of these local fiefdoms. As with 
everything else in the Borders during the medieval period, the protective 
nature of clan society was magnified due to the constant threat of invasion. 
An important aspect of border honor was faithfulness to the clan 
to which one had sworn allegiance. Borderers time and again proved that 
they held their chiefs in higher esteem than the kings of Scotland, even 
going so far as to engage royal soldiers in direct combat if the chief or the 
honor of the clan was threatened by the king. In fact, loyalty to the head of 
border clans was so fierce among the inhabitants of the region that James I 
of England (James VI of Scotland) focused on “justlie punisheing the maist 
perversed and rebellious ring leaderis (whais amendement wes disperate) 
and transporting otheris of them furth of this isle” in his 1609 campaign to 
bring stability to the border.13
This strong sense of honor was not isolated to the border region. 
During this time, armed struggle to defend individual and corporate 
honor was not uncommon. What was exemplary about the sense of honor 
displayed on the border was the rapidness with which confrontations over 
offended honor ballooned into fierce private wars. 
12  Scott, xliv.
13  University of St Andrews, Records of the Parliaments of Scotland to 1707, 12 April 1609.
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One such example of a “private war” in the border region began 
in 1526. The clans of Kerr and Scott were two of the most powerful 
families on the border, and they often contested each other for the office 
of Warden of the Middle March—a coveted position for reiver families 
because it guaranteed virtual immunity to punishment for the warden’s 
family during his term in office. The contest for the office of warden, 
however, was a sideshow to the true rivalry between the two clans. This 
rivalry began with the desires of a fourteen-year-old king.14 
The adolescent James V of Scotland despised the oppressive 
regency of his stepfather, Archibald Douglas, the 6th Earl of Angus. After 
a year of virtual imprisonment by Angus, the young king secretly enlisted 
the aid of Sir Walter Scott, 3rd Knight of Buccleuch to help him escape—an 
arrangement which no doubt was made based on Scott’s lifelong devotion 
to James IV, the young king’s late father, who had knighted Scott on 
the field after his service in the Battle of Flodden. On 25 July, with six-
hundred lances at his command, Scott waylaid the king’s retinue at the 
town of Melrose. The retinue, composed primarily of Kerrs under Andrew 
Kerr, Lord Cessford (the chief of one half of the Kerr clan), repulsed the 
attack, inflicting some 16% fatalities on the Scotts in the process. The Kerrs, 
led by their chief, gave chase to the retreating Scotts. At a crucial point 
in the engagement, one of the riders under Scott turned (at a place in the 
road still known as “Turn Again”) and lanced Cessford to death before 
continuing his flight.15
The battle was described to parliament by seventeen men on 21 
November 1526 and recorded in a “Declaration of Innocence.” According 
to the seventeen (consisting of Angus and several Kerrs, among others) 
14  Fraser, 182.
15  Fraser, 183.
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Scott attacked the party with “ane greite multitude of brokin men” on 
the road to Edinburgh in order to draw the young king “to thar inutile 
[guidance] and evill wais.”16 
This incident touched off a brutal feud between the two 
clans—two of the most powerful families in the border region—which 
lasted for almost three decades and resulted in the deaths of numerous 
hundreds of people on both sides. Scott was found guilty of treason by 
Angus’ government and forced into exile after paying a fine of £10,000. 
However, two years later, when James V was finally free of Angus’ power, 
Parliament—at the king’s behest—acquitted Scott, declaring him “innocent 
of all crymes imputt to him therthrow, and of the summondis of tresoune 
aganis him rasit and all punctis contenit tharintill.”17
However, the Cessford Kerrs’ honor had been insulted, and their 
chief had been slain. The incident was enough to draw the two wings of 
the Kerr clan—themselves prone to frequent feuding between each other—
together to avenge the disgrace to their family name. Despite an attempt 
to end the feud by the intermarriage of Scott to Janet Kerr, the daughter 
of Andrew Kerr of Ferniehurst,18 the fighting continued sporadically and 
viciously wherever members of the opposing factions happened to meet—
in open fields, forests, marketplaces, side streets, and hundreds of other 
places that have no doubt been lost to history. 
The Kerrs finally got their revenge on Scott, himself, in October 
1552, twenty-six years after the battle at Melrose. While strolling on 
High Street in Edinburgh one evening, Scott was ambushed by a party of 
Kerrs—possibly including some of the sons of Andrew Kerr of Cessford—
lead by John Hume of Coldenknowes, who made the first strike at Scott, 
16  Records of the Parliament of Scotland, 21 Nov 1526.
17  Records of the Parliament of Scotland, 5 Sep 1528.
18  Scott’s own mother had been a Kerr, as well—of the Cessford branch.
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shouting to the Kerrs, “Stike! Ane straik for thy father’s sake!”19
Scott’s death was the culmination of the feud between Kerrs 
and Scotts. The gang responsible for his murder was outlawed, and 
official treaties of reconciliation were drawn up between the two sides, 
followed by further intermarriages.20 But this episode in border history 
was indicative of many aspects of border culture. Central authority was 
weak, which is evident given the uncertain situation of the young king’s 
custody (a problem which was unfortunately frequent in Scottish history, 
and probably added greatly to the lawless character of the border). That 
authority was considered subjective and was often ignored, as when Scott 
attacked the forces of the regent because the king had schemed with him 
to do so; and Scott no doubt felt that he, himself, would be a better regent 
than Angus. 
The role of honor in the Kerr-Scott feud was almost as central as 
that of family connections. Wounded family honor escalated the conflict 
exponentially. But this bent toward rapid escalation also owes much to 
the deteriorated political climate of the border region during these three 
key centuries, when the border region was one of the most dangerous 
places in Europe. Three hundred years of frequent warfare between the 
kings of England and the kings of Scotland meant that the border region 
changed hands often. The border, itself, was—and remains—a narrow 
one. Bounded on two sides by ocean, the narrow neck of land that makes 
up the Scottish Borders is just a scant few miles longer than the length 
of Rhode Island’s western border. These close quarters amplified and 
intensified the culture of violence practiced by the inhabitants. 
In addition to the geography of the border region, the politics of 
19  Fraser, 183.
20  Ibid., 184.
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living on the front lines of a centuries-old struggle played a vital role in 
shaping the culture of the people who dwelt in the Scottish Borders. With 
armed incursions frequent and invasion a constant threat, the borderers 
were often left in a political vacuum. In this state of limbo, the borderers 
acted not only as the chief protectors of their own families and possessions 
but also as Scotland’s first responders. Part warning whistle, part guard 
dog, the borderers were the first to know when an invasion had been 
launched from the south. 
It is perhaps for this reason that royal forces made only weak 
efforts to curb the lawlessness of the border people until the Union of 
the Crowns. In extant records of the Scottish parliaments between the 
First War for Independence and the Union of the Crowns, a dirth of 
knowledge of the border’s culture of violence is available. In fact, almost 
every parliamentary record which mentions the word “border” in these 
early days also contains a combination of the words “lawlessness,” 
“death,” “plunder,” “rob,” “fugitive,” “rebellious,” “theft,” “slaughter,” 
“hostility,” “offence,” “disobedience,” “murder,” “outlaw,” “notorious,” 
and “fugitive.” The lawless acts of the borderers were well-known, but 
these records also display that very little effort was made on the part of 
any king’s government to curb the chaos on the border—even in those rare 
instances when the monarchy was strong enough to offer aid.  
To the same degree that it is advantageous for a family living in 
a bad neighborhood to keep a vicious dog chained near the front door, 
it was greatly advantageous for the king of Scotland to have such rough 
and violent people living at the hostile southern border of his kingdom. 
Indeed, the method of combat practiced and passed down through 
generations of borderers was more successful at slowing and eluding an 
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enemy than in defeating him in open combat. 
For a Scottish king to gather his forces and prepare for war in 
central and highland Scotland, he would need the precious time that 
could be bought by allowing the borderers to do to his enemies what 
they did best: engage them in guerilla warfare, disrupt their supply lines, 
and damage enemy morale—actions they would perform for the sake of 
protecting their own property and families, whether they held any loyalty 
to the king or not. In effect, it can be said that, by allowing the lawlessness 
of the reivers to continue virtually unchecked, the kings of Scotland held 
the borderers hostage to their own depravations, perhaps with the hope of 
creating an immense minefield of guerilla fighters which would, in return, 
play a great part in deterring an enemy invasion. 
However, if this was, indeed, the tactic of the Scottish kings 
during this three hundred year period, it must be noted that it backfired 
on numerous occasions. A lack of royal authority preceded a lack of 
respect for royal power. The borderers often held their own chiefs in 
higher esteem than the kings of Scotland, and one cannot blame them. 
From the chiefs they received protection, stability, and sustenance. 
From the king they received very little. Even in times of impending war, 
when the king knew that the English would likely invade, the borderers 
received little more than promises. One such example is seen in a 
parliamentary record of 19 October 1456, which says
Item as to the secunde artikill tuichande the supple of 
the bordouris, the provisione of the defence of the realme 
agane the summyr sesone etc., the thre estatis thinkis at 
the bordouraris mysteris nocht sa mekill supple as thai 
dyde in the tyme that this matir was lade to the king, and 
at thai may this yere, Gode be lowyt, defende thame self 
better than fernyear be cause first thai ar bettir cornyt 
than thai war fernyere and thar innemys war cornyt, 
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secundly thai haif specialte at the lest at the twa bordouris 
quhill candilmess. On the west bordoure the wyntir dois 
sindry skaithe, ande the clergy presumys thar may be 
specialte gottin to thame and it be desiryt, and thai throw 
the Inglismen will alsueill consent till a specialte fra 
candilmess to weddirdais as thai dide now to candilmess. 
Considerande alse that the Inglismen has hade this somir 
bygane and traistis to haif this somir to this surfet, cost 
and travell ande thai be nocht suppleit be the wyntir 
weire and be redy to the soumir weire. And all thing 
considerit thai haif maide mekill mair travell and chargis 
of the weyr in this somir bigane than our bordouraris 
hade, tharfor thai think the bordouraris sulde be content 
at this tyme. And quhen ony gret ourset is lik to cum on 
the bordouraris we think the inlandis men sulde be redy 
in thar supple.21
 The Scots had good reason to busy themselves with the 
“defence of the realme” in the fall of 1456. Earlier that year, the 
young James II of Scotland had ordered an ill-fated invasion of 
the Isle of Man to press his questionable rights to that territory, 
which, at the time, was controlled by the English crown. Fears 
of English retribution drove the Scots to make preparations for 
war; preparations which, curiously, included denying essential 
supplies of grain (“cornyt”) to the borderers. 
The Scots parliament (“the thre estatis”) denied the borderers’ 
request for supplies and reinforcements in the face of imminent invasion 
on the grounds that the borderers not only had more grain at that time 
compared to the amount they had had during a previous invasion, but 
also that due to a “specialty” or agreement with the English, the borderers 
had had all summer to lay up a larger store of grain to prepare for the 
coming invasion, but had squandered it, unlike their English counterparts, 
who had grown enough grain to last until the following winter. In short, 
parliament told the borderers that, due to their own idleness, they would 
21  Records of the Parliament of Scotland, 19 Oct 1456.
18 Articles 
just have to “make do” with what they had in the face of invasion, with 
a passing promise that the “inlandis men” would be ready to help the 
borderers if they were overcome.
 This act of parliament gives a salient glance into the political and 
economic situation of the borders during the High Middle Ages. The lack 
of grain grown by the borderers is not surprising given the poor condition 
of border soil. And parliament’s ambivalent attitude toward the borderers’ 
hunger in time of war is telling of their overall attitude toward the border 
region, itself. The preservation of law and order in the borders during this 
period was clearly not a priority for the king or for parliament. According 
to further legislation, the position of “warden of the west border” was not 
created until 1484, many years after the creation of similar positions in 
other parts of Scotland.22
But this ambivalence ran both ways. The borderers, perhaps 
because of their hung-out-to-dry treatment by the central authorities, 
rarely heeded royal writ or authority. Lesley states that “the approach of 
royal forces, if sent against them, seems to them a game; for they are so 
protected by the nature of the country, that if driven from the woods they 
take refuge in the mountains, and if disturbed there, they retreat to the 
mosses and morasses, where scarcely men on foot can follow them, and 
no horses save their own, trained to go through the bogs on their knees.”23 
Lesley also records that there was no more-lawless part of the nation in his 
time than the border region.
No king’s government did more to quiet the borders than that 
of James VI of Scotland (James I of England). Starting with a flurry 
of parliamentary activity in the late 1590s, James sought to end the 
22  Records of the Parliament of Scotland, 24 Feb 1484.
23  Minto, 23.
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“barbarous crueltie, wickednes and incivilitie” that reigned on the 
border.24 Part of the reason for this lies in James’s personality. Perhaps 
more than any king before him, James put teeth to his belief that God had 
ordained him to personally rule as king. His philosophy toward monarchy 
held that a king’s kingdom was his own personal property, and that 
dissension of any type was not to be tolerated.
Another reason for this sudden crack-down on border violence 
in the late 1590s was James’s impending inheritance. With the death of 
Elizabeth I in 1603, James inherited the throne of England, uniting the two 
nations in the Union of the Crowns. As the sovereign of both nations, a 
savage border became a liability for James. Also, with authority on both 
sides of the border, James became the first king with the power necessary 
to subdue the border from England and Scotland. 
These acts of parliament were aimed directly at snuffing out the 
favorite activities of the border reivers. In 1599, the Scottish Parliament 
issued an “Act regarding border thefts,” which allowed for execution of 
thieves on the spot, repealing an earlier legal tradition which held that the 
goods of captured thieves were merely to be remitted to their victims and 
little else done to the thieves. Furthermore, the Act punished those who 
harbored thieves almost as harshly, declaring that the king’s wardens had 
the authority to burn their homes and publicly humiliate their wives and 
children at the “cross market of the shire.” Indeed, the act said specifically 
that the wives and children of those who harbored thieves were to be 
considered just as guilty of the crime as the homeowner.25
But the coup de gras of the border reivers and their way of life came 
in 1609. The “Act regarding fugitive persons of the borders to the inland” 
24  Records of the Parliament of Scotland, 31 July 1599.
25  Ibid.
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forced law and order down the throats of the borderers in a way that no 
previous act or royal edict had dared. It went beyond the border region to 
every corner of the kingdom. Salient parts of the act read:
Forsamekle as the kingis majestie is resolved to purge the 
mydele schyres of this isle, heirtofoir callit the bordouris 
of Scotland and England, of that barbarous crueltie, 
wickednes and incivilitie whilk be inveterat custome 
almaist wes become naturall to mony of the inhabitantis 
thairof, and to reduce thame to the knawlege, love 
and fear of God, reverence of his majesteis authoritie, 
obedience of his lawes and duetie to thair neighbouris, 
for accomplisheing of that maist royall designe maid 
chouse [of ane] to be commissionar in these boundis 
whome by mony assurede prouffis, former imploymentis 
of greatest consequence, his majestie knew [to] be indewit 
with all qualiteis necessair for sa weichtie a charge, 
wha following preciselie the rules of his majesties maist 
prudent directionis and useing all possibill diligence 
and dexteritie in prosecutioun thairof, maid sa happie 
progress in that good course as justlie punisheing the 
maist perversed and rebellious ring leaderis (whais 
amendement wes disperate) and transporting otheris of 
them furth of this isle, the rest wer brocht to verie setled 
quietnes and obedience of his majesteis lawes, a verie 
few number of outlawes onlie exceptit, wha being sa 
earnestlie searched and perseivit in these boundis as all 
hope of escaping and langer impunitie wes takin frome 
them, they have by maist subtile and craftie meanis by 
changeing thair names and dissembling the place of 
their nativitie convoyed thame selffis in the incountries 
of this realme and insinuated them selffis in service 
with noble men and others of good qualitie, not onlie 
theirby eschewing thair deserved punishement, bot also 
abuseing and harmeing his majesteis good subjectis by 
thair darnit stouthes in the incountrie, transported, ressait 
and quietlie sold in the boundis of the laite bordouris, 
and agane steilling geir furth thairof and out of the 
boundis of these middle shyres and outting and selling 
the same in the incountries, besyd that otheres of the 
saidis outlawis had bene allured and had ressait and 
oversicht in the incountries by some men of rank and 
pouer, to be instrumentis and executouris of sic revenge 
and mischeif aganis these to quhome they beir malice, 
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grudge or querrell, whilk for fear of his majesteis lawes 
and authoritie they durst not attempt by them selffis; for 
remede whereof, his majestie, with advyse and consent 
of the estaittis of parliament, statutis and ordanis that 
na man shall heireftir either ressave or retene ony man 
borne or lang habituat in the lait bordouris in his service 
or company or upoun his landis unless he have certane 
knawledge or a trew and authentik testimoniall of his 
majesteis great commissionar of the late bordouris or 
his deputtis of the said bordour mannis trew name and 
surname, place of his nativitie and reporte of his treuth 
and lautie, and that he is na knawin malefactour bot 
repute a duetefull and obedient subject, under the paine 
to incur the danger and to be maid answerable, civilie and 
criminalie, to his majestie and all his lauchfull subjectis for 
all actionis and crymes whilk micht be onywayes layed 
to the charge of the saidis broken men for ony cause or 
occasioun either preceding or during the tyme of thair 
ressaveing or retening thame in thair service, company or 
upoun thair landis as gif the ressaitter had committit the 
saidis faultis thame selffis.26
The crux of this act states that, due to the harsh punishments 
meted out by the 1599 “Border thefts” act, many of the most dangerous 
“ringleaders” of the reivers had changed their surnames and fled inland 
to be employed (presumably as “strong-men”) by the inland nobility. The 
1609 act rooted out these fugitive reivers by threatening inlanders that, 
if they hired a borderer of ill repute, they themselves would “be maid 
answerable, civilie and criminalie…for all actionis and crymes whilk micht 
be onywayes layed to the charge of the saidis broken men for ony cause 
or occasioun either preceding or during the tyme of thair ressaveing or 
retening thame in thair service.”27 By this act, Parliament made the hiring 
of border reivers just as much a crime as the act of reiving, itself. 
No doubt the resulting prejudice against hiring anyone who spoke 
with a border accent or carried a border surname created great economic 
26  Records of the Parliament of Scotland, 12 April 1609.
27  Ibid.
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strain on law-abiding border citizens, economic strain which served in 
large part to make the practice of reiving, once and for all, fall from favor 
at home. 
 Whatever the king’s motives, the acts of 1599 and 1609 finally 
subdued the border. The king destroyed the culture of violence in the 
borders by virtually declaring war on the families of the reivers. By a 
combination of chance (James gaining control of both sides of the border, 
eliminating the necessity of a vicious, “advanced-guard” border society) 
and force, (deporting, executing, and publicly humiliating the most 
violent elements of border society), James created a tipping point in the 
borders. 
Deportation (most often to Ulster, where James was also asserting 
his royal authority at this time) played an especially important role in 
cleansing the border of its violent heritage. Since the borderers’ honor—
and thus their violent nature—was entwined with their family identity, 
James’s forces very keenly broke apart and humiliated the families of 
the most active reivers, and by extending punishment to those who gave 
them any type of comfort or support within the entire realm, he gave the 
reivers nowhere to turn. Everything about the “cleansing” of the border 
region had to do with the forced separation of the family unit; be it by 
deportation, execution, or the act of fugitives changing their surnames 
and vacating the region. 
With the destruction of the most violent border families as an 
example, the delicate system of honor that had reigned for many years in 
the borders was forever unbalanced, and the culture of violence that had 
torn through the region unwound in the borders, even while it was being 
transplanted to other regions. As Scott said, “protection was the most 
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sacred duty of a chief to his followers, and this he was expected to extend 
in all forms and under almost all circumstances. If one of the clan chanced 
either to slay a man, or commit any similar aggression, the chief was 
expected to defend him by all means, legal or illegal.”28 When the border 
chieftains could no longer resist royal authority and provide protection 
to their own outlawed kin, the balance of power effectively shifted in the 
region, and within a generation, the borders were no longer the no-man’s-
land of lawlessness that they had been for the previous three centuries.
However, the culture of violence begotten from the herding 
economy, tribal mentality, and universal sense of honor in the Scottish 
borders did not die completely with the edicts of James I. The borderers’ 
bent toward herding, intense pride, family loyalty and honor continued 
to remain a strong force in the societal structure of their descendants. 
Wherever border culture was transplanted, sporadic feuding and violence 
was still prone to break out in times of great civil strife for generations 
after the Ulster Plantation. 
In Ulster, the descendants of the most volatile reiver families 
continued to work masterpieces of lawlessness against both the native 
Irish and their counterpart English transplants. It is a cultural pattern that 
remained homogenous and potent when many of their descendants quit 
Ulster a century later for the rugged southern Appalachian Mountains 
of the New World. The Appalachians continue to provide a fascinating 
laboratory for sociologists. The isolation of the mountains has not only 
preserved some border dialects, surnames, and folk culture, but the 
rocky soil has also preserved the border tradition of herding, and the 
accompanying cultural emphasis on family honor and distrust of central 
authority in many mountain communities. And, especially in periods 
28  Scott, xlvi.
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when central authority has been weak or nonexistent, violent feuds have 
rocked mountain communities sporadically over the past four centuries.
Understanding the border of Scotland during the High Middle 
Ages is to understand the connection between a people and their 
geography, their politics, and their collective sense of morality. The 
connection between the culture of violence and livestock in the medieval 
border region is undeniable. Had the border between England and 
Scotland been a place suitable for growing large quantities of cereal crops, 
the violence and instability which plagued the area during Scotland’s 
precarious centuries would probably not have existed. Likewise, if there 
had been stronger central authority in the region—as there was in the 
years after the Union of the Crowns—there would have been little reason 
for the herding borderers to develop such strong and sensitive customs 
of pride and honor. As it was, all of these things combined like a perfect 
storm at one place and point in time to create a distinctive culture of 
violence.
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La Morte de la Culture Populaire 
Française
Sam Burcham
Rois ivres de sang et d’orgueil;
Le peuple souverain s’avance,
Tyrans descendez au cercueil.
--Thomas Rousseau, L’âme du peuple du soldat
On the 14th of July, 1790, a sopping company of national guardsmen and 
citizens stood in a rain-flooded field with their eyes transfixed upon 
that which had been “transformed into huge elliptic arena in the center 
of which rose a huge altar to the patrie [to the state, the nation itself],” 
known as the Champ de Mars.1 It was here that a great festival would soon 
begin. And it was this newly built altar, perhaps, that characterized the 
very nature of the festival. Inscribed upon it was a message defining the 
nation. It read:
 The Nation, the Law, and the King. 
 The Nation is you, the Law is also you.
 The King is the guardian of the Law.2
This, of course, was what the celebration was all about; the people were to 
celebrate the fact that they were the very law that governed the nation of 
France. All eyes would be diverted from the altar’s inscription, however, 
as the Sacrament of Holy Mass began. Yet this Mass would bear quite an 
unusual mark—it would be “said on the altar of the patrie, not on the 
altar of Christ,” in which case “it seemed that the sovereignty of man and 
1  Emmet Kennedy, A Cultural History of the French Revolution (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1989), 330.
2  Ibid., 331.
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nation rather than that of God was being celebrated.”3 This unique reading 
of the Mass was quite unlike anything that had ever happened at any 
other French festival or celebration. In fact, it was almost as if it were not 
French at all. The pouring rain, it seems, was symbolically washing away 
the sovereignty that God and his divinely-appointed king had once had in 
France. The people would now define new sovereigns—the nation and its 
people.
 The celebration outlined above is that of the Festival of Federation. 
While there is evidence to support the idea that this was still a Christian 
celebration, the reading of the Mass on altar of the patrie and not that 
of Christ, as well as the fact that the king’s chair was on the same level 
as that of the president of the National Assembly (the king’s chair was 
customarily elevated above all others), suggests otherwise. The Festival 
of Federation, then, serves as a precursor to the coming dechristianization 
movement that would hit its stride in 1793 and in which the people would 
transfer sovereignty from God, his Son, and King Louis XVI to themselves. 
Therefore, the Revolution that would begin in 1789 would also be a 
religious reformation. And it would be a reformation of the most extreme 
sort since it sought a complete doctrinal change; it sought a complete 
removal of the Christian God from France. This extreme reformation is 
evident in the way in which a predominately Christian themed popular 
culture would come to promote a shift in sovereignty from God and 
king, to the nation and its people. In a country where Catholicism 
fundamentally defined all that the French were, and subsequently 
what popular culture was, all would be undone. As Timothy Tackett 
states, seventeenth- and early-eighteenth-century France was a nation 
in which “the parish clergyman was first and foremost director of souls, 
3  Ibid.
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the essential link with rural world between man and the supernatural, 
man and his salvation.”4 Therefore, the patrie and Christianity were 
intrinsically linked. But with Christianity’s removal amidst the Revolution 
and its concurrent reformation, could the nation still be considered 
France? I suggest that it could not. In this Nation of Revolution, then, the 
newly-sovereign people would have to alter their forms of popular culture 
to promote the nation and themselves as divine authority—they would 
create a culture that was decidedly non-French. This article will analyze 
the role the Catholic Church played in France before dechristianization, 
before looking at the way non-Christian forms of popular culture—
particularly songs, art, and festivals—would transfer divinity from God 
and king to the nation and its people. Ultimately, we will see that popular 
culture during the Revolution could not be considered French at all.
 To fully understand the impact that this transfer of sovereignty 
had on destroying what was French popular culture, one must first 
understand the role that the Catholic Church played in the nation before 
the Revolution. We will first look at the rural parish. According to Georges 
Lefebvre, “the church…was above all the center of collective life.”5 This 
was especially the case in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. 
The people in the countryside were often illiterate and work oriented, 
and they depended upon the rural parish to meet a great many of their 
needs. But perhaps most importantly, the Church would give such 
harsh lifestyles deeper meaning. The teachings of the Catholic Church 
would suggest that there was something more, something better than 
the lives they plodded so determinedly through on earth. Ultimately, the 
Church provided these persons with hope for salvation. But while such 
4  Timothy Tackett, Priest & Parish in Eighteenth-Century France: A Social and Political Study of 
the Curés in a Diocese of Dauphiné, 1750-1791 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 152.
5  Kennedy, 28.
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a fundamental human need should not be discounted, the seventeenth- 
and eighteenth-century parish would provide people with more than 
this. The Church would be the arbiter of the most important parts of 
rural human experience—baptism, marriage, and burial. And the Church 
would also play a role in the everyday lives of such parishioners, for 
even the church bells “marked off with great emotional force the hours of 
work and worship, the processions, the feast days of the liturgical year, 
[and] the passing events of life and death.”6 The priest would also serve 
as a source of news for the rural community since “the pulpit provided 
the only means of publicizing government policies to a largely illiterate 
mass audience.”7 Because their days were spent working, Sundays 
provided a means for men and women to learn the latest news, not to 
mention a means for social interaction. It would seem, then, that for the 
rural dwelling family the Church was of the utmost importance, making 
Tackett’s claim regarding the centrality of the Church and Christianity in 
French rural life a valid one.
 In urban areas, the Church also maintained its centrality to human 
life, but it did so in different ways. Paris, for example, afforded men and 
women with much more than days spent farming, marked by the ringing 
of church bells. Instead, the capital “had the greatest concentration of 
intellectuals, artists, and such cultural institutions as salons, theaters, 
academies, [and] booksellers.”8 It would seem that with so many different 
institutions present, the spiritual would take a backseat to the secular. 
However, Paris had the most convents and monasteries of any city in 
France.9  By some estimates, the clergy in France “amounted to…100,000,” 
6  Tackett, 152.
7  Norman Hampson, A Social History of the French Revolution (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1963), 29.
8  Kennedy, 30.
9  Ibid.
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but those employed in some capacity by the Church—as well as by 
convents and monasteries—must have exceeded even these numbers, 
making the number of people directly involved with urban churches 
perhaps even greater than those in rural areas.10 There were many specific 
jobs that required the attention of both clergy and the laity. In some parts 
of the nation there could be as many as thirty ecclesiastics at one time who 
were employed at a single church. Such urban centrality is reflected in 
the way in which at “Notre-Dame one [man] was a chevicier who had to 
sleep in the church as a night duty priest, another a sacristan of masses, 
and a third the sacristan of the chapelle de la Vierge.”11 There would also 
be those who were responsible for caring for relics, altar ornaments, the 
keeping of minutes, and even attendance registers. Each person who held 
such a position was an employee of the church. As for lay employees, 
churches were “in oversight of lawyers, registrars, bailiffs, collectors, and 
the like.”12 But church appointment did not end there, for every profession 
from that of mason and goldsmith, to that of cleaner and dog-catcher (yes, 
dog catcher), had their place in the parish system.
 Thus, it would seem as though an eighteenth-century France that 
was so dependent upon the Church would be the last place that one would 
expect to find cries for religious reform. But then came the Revolution 
and with it the deposition of the sovereign king and dechristianization. It 
is important to note, however, that the stage had been set for a religious 
reformation long before the Revolution. As early as 1685, the revocation 
of the Edict of Nantes had “guaranteed for all time the predominance 
of the Roman Catholic religion, in perpetual alliance with His Most 
10  Hampson, 28. 
11  John McManners, Church and Society in Eighteenth Century France, Volume 1: The Clerical 
Establishment and its Social Ramifications (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 423.
12  Ibid., 435.
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Christian Majesty.”13 In all actuality, it looked as though the revocation 
of this edict was anything but reformational since it created religious 
uniformity. But it was under this umbrella of guaranteed Catholicism at 
the beginning of the Revolution that the clergy would set about improving 
(i.e.—reforming) their religion. Such improvements would focus on the 
“cultivation of religious music; research into ecclesiastical history—and on 
the pursuit of power and office.”14 And the clergy certainly did gain power 
and office insomuch as the Church “intervened in the political, social, 
and economic life of the community at all levels while itself escaping 
from secular control.”15 The Church would receive its income based on 
tithes, while remaining exempt from taxes, thus allowing their wealth to 
accumulate. The Church would also have substantial influence over the 
crown, would maintain the rights to censor all published materials, and 
would dominate education within France. With such evidence in tow, 
we can see that French life had begun to stray further and further away 
from a real spiritual connection to the Church—eighteenth-century France 
came to be a nation that was “against a life of religious contemplation.”16 
And when Louis XVI was forcibly made to return to Paris from his 
shameful attempt to flee to Varennes, extreme religious reform in the 
form of dechristianization would begin. The king’s flight would prompt 
the removal of his power and authority. This deposition of the sovereign 
king would also serve as a deposition of God. After all, if the king was no 
longer worthy of his claim to the throne—and he had received this claim 
by appointment from God—then perhaps there was no longer any need 
for a Christian God in France. And if there was no need for God, there 
13  Hampson, 27.
14  Ibid., 28.
15  Ibid.
16  Ibid., 30.
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would, of course, be no need for Catholicism, the clergy, or the Church. To 
further symbolize the removal of sovereignty from God and king, a new 
constitution was put into effect to govern the new non-Christian Nation 
of Revolution. In essence, these events would serve as visual evidence as 
to the transfer of sovereignty to the nation—one that was not France, for 
France had always had a sovereign king linked with a sovereign God. 
However, this transfer created a problem. French culture, as it had been 
defined until this point, could no longer exist since the Catholic Church 
would no longer play a central role in French life. We now turn our 
attention to the way in which popular culture—specifically songs, art, and 
festivals—would cease to be French as the result of dechristianization and 
would seek to promote the idea of a sovereign Nation of Revolution.
 Prior to the Revolution, French music was almost exclusively 
religious. Certainly, one could hear non-religious songs in cafés, at the 
theater, or in bars; but these songs had little, if anything, to do with the 
national state of affairs. Songs of meaning, then, were religious. This, 
of course, was because most important parts of French life had links to 
Christianity. A look at the liturgical calendar yields a number of holy 
days and feast days which called for meaningful songs. On one particular 
Easter in Angers, for example, “two ecclesiastics in dalmatics wearing 
gloves and red hats represented the mourning women and approached 
the long white curtains symbolic of the ‘sepulchre’; the gospel words were 
read, and from the ‘tomb’ emerged the ‘angels,’ two chaplains in copes 
wearing silver-mounted ostrich eggs and singing ‘Alleluia, Ressurrexit 
Dominus.’”17 Such a spectacle had reached its pinnacle with a religious 
song as necessary means of expressing the joy of Christ’s resurrection; 
it could not be expressed in mere words. Obviously, the singing of 
17  McManners, 423.
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the “Alleluia, Ressurrexit Dominus” served as a means of emotional 
expression. But the singing at the celebration would not end there, for 
the choir would respond to this song with a singing of “Deo gratais, 
Alleluia,” before the service would end with what was arguably the most 
important song in France until the time of the Revolution, the Te Deum. 
This traditional song of praise was sung at any celebration of importance. 
If France emerged victorious in war, the Te Deum was sung. In response 
to births, marriages, and baptisms, the Te Deum was sung. And, of course, 
at the king’s coronation this hymn of praise was sung. Thus, it seems 
that this Christian song of praise “had been drawn out of its devotional 
and liturgical context to be made the propaganda manifestation of the 
monarchy.”18 Essentially, the song was praising God, Christ, and the 
divinely appointed king. We can also see the importance of this song in 
Toulouse, where it was apparently sung seventy-two times between 1730 
and 1780.19 Here, it was sung for everything from the canonization of 
saints, to the recovery of the king’s health. Christian singing would not be 
exclusive to celebratory events, though, for in “times of national danger 
the psalm Deus judicium would be sung,” while a more solemn Tenebrae 
would be performed during the season of Lent.20 The aforementioned 
songs for the celebrations of births would have their remorseful 
counterparts as well, for songs would also mark the end of life. While 
most of these pieces outlined above were performed and provided by the 
maître de musique, or the music teacher, there is evidence to suggest that 
when lay persons wrote songs, these also subscribed to religious themes. 
Again, such was the case at Toulouse where locally composed carols 
“depicting each guild and community in town bringing picturesquely 
18  Ibid., 16.
19  Ibid.
20  Ibid., 446.
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characteristic offerings to the manger,” were written by young men each 
year during Christmastide and in hopes of having their songs chosen by 
the church choir.21 And finally, the most important aspect of religious 
life—the high Mass—would contain a great number of musical pieces, 
such as “the Kyrie, Gloria, Credo, Sanctus, Agnus Dei, and Benedictus.”22 
The songs sung during Mass were not confined to those selections, 
however, for “motets might be added after the Epistle and during the 
Offertory and the Consecration.”23 Ultimately, religious songs were a part 
of everyday life in every area of France. And this was only natural since 
clerics of old France were well aware of “the ways in which art [could] 
serve religious ends” and would knowingly use songs to keep Christianity 
and the Church at the center of French culture.24 
 The dechristianization movement that would accompany the 
Revolution necessitated a shift in the nature of the songs which would 
be sung in the Nation of Revolution, however. No longer could the Te 
Deum be sung in praise of the king, for there was no king to praise after 
his execution in 1793. And as we have already acknowledged, this was 
symbolic of the death of God in France, as well. Free of God and the king, 
the people would transfer sovereignty to the nation and themselves. 
Therefore, songs that had played such a central role in French cultural 
life, would have God stripped from their stanzas and would promote the 
nation and the people as deities creating a genre of music that could no 
longer be considered French.
 This shift in the character of French songs would be gradual, for 
initially songs would seek to combine a Revolutionary mentality with 
21  Ibid.
22  Ibid., 445.
23  Ibid.
24  Ibid., 436.
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Christian themes and scriptures. For example, this excerpt from Marc-
Antoine Desaugiers’ hiérodrame, suggests this combination of Christianity 
and Revolution:
 CITIZEN
 Regain your courage and fight: You are called to liberty!
Our enemies have drawn the sword to destroy the weak and 
indignant;
 Let their sword enter into their own hearts. 
 (Kings 4.9; Fal. 5.13; Ps. 36. 14, 15)
 CITIZEN AND CHOIR
May our enemies blush and be dispersed; that they flee and that 
they may perish.
(Ps. 6.14; Ps. 67.1)
CHORUS OF WOMEN DURING THE PRECEDING
O God help us!
(Ps. 78.9)
THE CITIZEN AND THE CHORUS
Yes God will come to our help.
THE CITIZEN
The Lord rejects the councils (or counsels) of the princes.
Let us run and destroy their odious fortress.
God will combat for us. Let it be.
(Ps. 32.10; Isa. 51.22)25
This collection of songs was written to commemorate the storming of 
the Bastille, but it “used a church genre (the sung psalm) to celebrate 
particularly the Fourteenth of July.”26 As the reformation-amidst-
revolution continued to mount, however—culminating with the removal 
of the Church and king—God would no longer be the help of the nation. 
Instead, songs would come to represent the nation as bringing about its 
own liberty. Thus, the nation no longer needed to glorify God through 
song. This sentiment is evident in “satirical songs directed against the 
court [that of the divinely-appointed king] and the formerly privileged 
25  Kennedy, 240.
26  Ibid.
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orders were cross parodies of sacred hymns.”27 One example is the “O 
Filii,” (translated as “O Daughter”), which was a sacred Easter hymn. 
The words to this hymn would be altered to claim that the archbishop of 
Paris was a thief of the most sordid kind, while further claiming that the 
pope was a turkey.28 But songwriters would soon make the transition from 
simply parodying existing hymns, to that of creating their very own which 
would deify the nation or national characteristics which were represented 
by the people. Such new hymns included: “Hymn to Equality,” Hymn 
to Humanity,” “Hymn on Peace,” and even one entitled “Hymn to the 
Eternal,” all of which offered “constant sanctification of the patrie.”29 
Even the most professional of songwriters from the Institut national de 
Musique would create hymns that dethroned God and Louis XVI and 
which would be distributed to the military. Rosseau’s L’âme du peuple et du 
soldat, a government subsidy that saw “100,000 copies…distributed to the 
army,” would include this kind of professionally written military hymn.30 
Included in this particular subsidy were the song lyrics which were placed 
at the beginning of this article. Translated, they read:
Tremblez, ennemis de la France,
Rois ivres de sang et d’orgueil;
Quake, enemies of France,
Kings drunken with blood and  
       arrogance;
Le peuple souverain s’avance; The sovereign people advance; 
Tyrans descendez au cercueil.  Tyrants descend to the tomb. 31 
Here, Rousseau begins by defining the enemies of France, the king and 
his God, before he asserts that the “sovereign people” will justifiably keep 
these enemies at bay. Notice that there is no build up to the transfer of 
27  Ibid., 257.
28  Ibid.
29  Ibid., 241.
30  Laura Mason, Singing the French Revolution: Popular Culture and Politics, 1787-1789 (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1996), 121.
31  Ibid., 122.
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sovereignty from God and king to the people. Rousseau seems to suggest 
that national sovereignty is an understood trait and that the nation had 
always held it; their rights as deities had been kept from them by those 
who desired these rights for their own purposes (i.e.—God, the pope, 
clerics, and the king), but this would be the case no longer. Whatever 
Rousseau’s intent, however, it is clear that the transfer of sovereignty 
is official. After all, the king has been deposed and with him, God, the 
Church, and Christianity. One final hymn that promotes a deified Nation 
of Revolution is François de Neufchâteau’s “Hymn to Liberty.”
O Liberty, holy Liberty!
Goddess of an enlightenedpeople!
Reign today in this sanctuary,
By you this temple is purified!
Liberty! Before you reason chases away imposture:
Error flees, fanaticism is vanquished.
Our gospel is nature.
And our cult is virtue.
Love one’s country and one’s brothers,
Serve the sovereign people,
These are the sacred characteristics,
And the faith of a Republican.
Of a shattered hell
He does not fear the empty flame;
Of an illusory heaven
He does not wait for false treasures; 
Heaven is in peace of soul,
And hell in remorse.32
Every line of this hymn is carefully constructed in such a way as to 
desanctify Christianity and then transfer this sanctity to the Nation of 
Revolution. In the very first line, the national concept of “Liberty” is 
referred to as being holy, a characteristic which had previously been 
reserved for the Christ as well as the French king. By the time we make 
it to the fourth line, Christianity has been discredited further, as the 
32  Kennedy, 281.
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song proclaims that “the temple is purified.”33 Thus, Christ has been 
removed from the sanctuary, for the church is an acceptable place only 
for holy Liberty to reside. As the song moves into the second stanza, it 
reaffirms this new idea that people of the nation are the true sovereigns. 
Perhaps the most important line of this stanza—of the entire song—is the 
seventeenth. Here, the song declares that heaven is simply an illusion. In 
doing so, it further implies that a sovereign God must also be an illusion. 
After all, how can God exist within a realm that itself does not exist? 
Thus, the “Hymn of Liberty,” “sung at the height of the dechristianization 
movement,” undoubtedly promoted the assertion that the nation was its 
own new deity.34 It was, then, a new music for a new nation, a non-French 
song culture for the Nation of Revolution.
 While many famous songs and hymns were a large part of daily 
French life, the same cannot be said of the great works of art which were 
religious in nature before the Revolution began. Paintings and sculptures 
were not part of everyday life for the average French citizen. However, 
there was in fact one particular form of art which was widespread and 
readily available—the architecture of the church. Recall that the Church 
employed an incredibly large number of people due to its many specific 
needs. Obviously, such employees would be continually reminded of the 
sovereignty of God and king while working within any given church. But 
even those who were not official employees would receive the same divine 
reinforcement each time they were present for the holy Mass. An example 
of architecture as a re-enforcer of the divinity of God and king can be seen 
in the vision Soufflot had in September of 1764 for a new church in Sainte-
Geneviève. His vision was that of “a cross-shaped building with four 
33  Ibid.
34  Ibid., 281.
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equal arms, lighted by forty-two large windows, a central dome under 
which the reliquary of the saint would repose, and an altar with a colossal 
glorie of angels set in one of the arms, and, outside, a vast colonnade.”35 
Certainly, the entirety of the proposed design was meant to reinforce the 
mighty power of God. It must indeed seem doubtful that anyone could 
be present at such a church, looking at the glorie of angels, without being 
reminded of their Creator as well as their link to Him—the divinely 
appointed king. Likewise, between 1699 and 1725 at the Notre-Dame 
in Paris, there were “fifty-two high stalls and twenty-six low ones, their 
back decorated with bas-relief and the pillars between the seats carved in 
foliated scrolls and the instruments of the Passion,” commissioned as a 
reminder of God’s majesty.36 There were even “statues of the Virgin and 
of Louis XII and Louis XVI commissioned,” which further supported the 
nature of any king’s divine appointment. It can be assumed, then, that 
each time a man or woman entered a church that he or she would be 
presented with an artistic representation of the sovereignty of God and 
king through architecture.37 
 As was the case with songs, the dechhristianization of the 
Church as a building was gradual. After 1793, it would seem that 
“changes were episodic and destructive, getting rid of excesses of an 
unfashionable past.”38 As church architectural art was secularized, stained 
glass windows and statues of the saints, and even of Christ, would be 
removed entirely after Louis’ execution, as churches closed altogether and 
dechristianization moved the Nation of Revolution more determinedly 
forward.
35  McManners, 437. 
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 With the secularization of both rural and urban churches, 
however, these buildings would no longer be a part of national life, 
in which another kind of decidedly non-French popular art would 
take center stage in asserting that the people were truly sovereign in 
the Nation of Revolution—newspaper and journal prints. Such prints 
satirized the Church and the kingship, stripping them of their divinity 
and transferring it to the nation and its people. Before the Revolution, 
“printing and publishing had been tightly controlled by the government 
and by the printers’ guild,” in which “the number of printing shops was 
limited to thirty-six in the capital and 266 in the French provinces.”39 
However, under the umbrella of the Revolution, the number of 
printers would grow, and by “1798 there were 221 printing shops in 
the capital.”40 With the number of printers increased and the number 
of newspapers and journals that were being printed escalating, there 
were more people exposed to dechristianizing prints. According to Joan 
B. Landes, “From the Revolution’s outset, allegorical imagery served 
as a vocabulary for depicting…the new nation.”41 One such print that 
would promote the new sovereign nation would be Liberty Triumphant, 
Destroying Abusive Powers from the newspaper Révelutions de France et 
de Brabant. Much as Neufchâteu’s “Hymn to Liberty” did in an audible 
way, this print deified “Liberty” visually. Here, Liberty is positioned 
over symbols of the ancient régime, and “with her left hand she throws a 
lightning bolt at the symbols of despotism, monarchy, clerical rule, and 
aristocracy.”42 More specifically, Liberty, a characteristic of the sovereign 
39  Jeremy D. Popkin, Revolutionary News: The Press in France, 1789-1799 (Durham: Duke 
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nation, is rendering God and His divinely appointed king obsolete 
through the use of a lightning bolt. Furthermore, the transfer of divinity 
to the nation is evident in the way in which beams of light surround her 
head, much like that of the halo in Christian iconography.43 As for the 
clergy and the king, they are further discredited by a 1790 print entitled 
Le Pied de nez ou L’Aristocratie écrasée or A Nose Thumbed, or the Aristocracy 
Crushed. On a fundamental level, this print “calls for the crushing of 
the holders of all privileges.”44 Here, clergymen and nuns are ridiculed 
as they are depicted with overtly large noses. And for Joan Landes, the 
“nose is linked to the phallus” in which case the clergy and aristocracy 
are “lowered from the eternal sphere of their pretended nobility and 
spirituality to the base order of the body and its most elemental needs.”45 
To associate the clergy with something as profane as that of sexual desire, 
was to quite forcibly discredit the Church, as well. The message, then, 
became more than one of a God who was simply no longer needed, but 
of a God who is to be avoided for He is perverse. As for the divinely 
appointed king, a “crowned masculine figure is splayed out, gripping 
a serpent (another symbol of distrust and sexuality) that originates in 
his mouth as the hooked end of his nose and comes out of his anus.”46 
Again, the king is depicted at his lowest point, and his fallen state reveals 
a defeated monarch and a defeated God. The viewer’s eye is inevitably 
drawn upwards at this point to see “standing triumphantly above these 
ruined, helpless creatures…an allegory of the nation.”47 Thus, the nation is 
the true deity in this print, hovering over the unholy king and clergy.
 Finally, Pierre-Paul Prud’hon’s 1793 print, Liberty, provides 
43  Ibid.
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viewers with a representation of the shift in sovereignty to the nation, 
successfully completed. Once again, Liberty is presented as a divine 
goddess, but Prud’hon’s representation features something which had 
previously gone unseen in dechristianized art. Here, beneath the deified 
Liberty’s right foot “lie various human heads, one of which is crowned.”48 
While the other prints mentioned in this article did in fact depict a 
monarchy which had been overthrown and stripped of its sovereignty, 
the divinely appointed king is here dead. He has been killed by Liberty 
and the divine nation. With the monarch dead, the sovereignty of the 
king can seemingly never again exist, and by association, neither can the 
sovereignty of God since he had provided the king with the divine rights 
that the nation came to control. Furthermore, the goddess “carries [in her 
left hand] a broken yoke symbolizing the overthrow of oppression, and in 
her right [hand] and ax, [the] instrument of liberation.”49 As such, it seems 
that this print suggests the finality of the shift in sovereignty, what with 
the images of a dead king and the deified Liberty herself standing over 
him as the central focus of the print. Such prints replaced the religious 
architectural art of the Church that had previously been a central part of 
French culture, courtesy of a booming print industry. But, again, such 
art cannot be considered French and instead must join the revised songs 
of national deification as part of a new popular culture for the Nation of 
Revolution.
 Certainly, dechristianized songs and art had quite an impact on 
the everyday lives of the people of the Nation of Revolution, but perhaps 
no form of popular culture was more important than the festival. Prior 
to the Revolution, the religious festival and ceremonial ritual was the 
48  Kennedy, 281. 
49  Ibid.
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seminal form of French culture. This was especially true in rural areas 
where “local tradition: a sub-Christian, or perhaps pre-Christian culture…
was constantly influencing the forms of Catholic worship.”50 Here, 
folk-Christian festivals that went along with holy days and feast days, 
including Lent, Easter, Pentecost, Advent, Christmas, Epiphany, etc. were 
quite important, but there were other religious festivals to be celebrated, 
as well. For example, the Lenten cycle was “inseparably linked to the 
popular festivities of Carnival and Mardi-Gras,” and feast days for a 
parish’s patron saint were “accompanied by profane celebrations known 
in the diocese as vogues.”51 There were also folk-Christian ceremonial 
rituals that were practiced for more specific reasons. The people of 
L’Epine would make a pilgrimage to a spring in Notre-Dame where it 
was said that the ceremonial and “ritual washing of the basin by a nude 
virgin” would provide their community with relief from drought.52 
Similar processions were made to chapels in Ribiers or La Fare, in the 
event that an infant died, where the people would perform a ceremonial 
ritual to revive the child so he or she could be baptized.53 
 As for religious festivals and ceremonies in urban areas, the most 
obvious one to mention would be the Sacre, the king’s coronation. On June 
11, 1775, in Reims, this religious festival commenced at seven o’clock in 
the morning as “the procession set off down the newly constructed way to 
the archbishop’s palace.”54 It was here that Louis XVI would kneel at the 
sacred altar of Christ as holy water was sprinkled over his head, and the 
following prayer was uttered:
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God almighty and eternal, who hast elevated to the kingdom
thy servant Louis, grant that he may ensure the good of his
subjects in all the course of his reign, and never depart from
the paths of justice and truth.55
Such a prayer that publicly declared Louis’s “elevated” state would leave 
no doubt in the minds of those present that their sovereign God had 
appointed Louis to be their sovereign king. To further promote Louis 
XVI as a divinely-appointed king who was linked to God, he would also 
receive seven unctions, like those that bishops received. This meant that 
the “Church received him [Louis] into the circle of its chosen ministry by 
giving him communion in both kinds, a prerogative of the clergy.”56 All 
of these elements were clearly arranged so as to promote the idea that 
the king was God’s anointed. Yet, as was the case with songs and printed 
art, this part of cultural life would have to change in order to promote 
the transfer of sanctity to the nation after the deposition of God and king. 
There would, then, no longer be French cultural religious festivals, but 
instead festivals for the Nation of Revolution.
 To counter the number of religious festivals which had been a 
central part of French life prior to the Revolution, the National Assembly 
would promote many new festivals that would suggest that the nation and 
its people were divine, while God and his king were not. Such festivals 
were those for Continental Peace, the 18 of Fructidor, Enlightenment, 
Labor, Liberty, Reason, Regeneration, the Federation, the Republic, and 
the sovereignty of the people.57 We have, of course, already looked at the 
importance of the Festival of Federation as it was outlined at the beginning 
of this essay. It is here that we turn to the Festival of the Supreme Being. 
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While this festival was celebrated nationwide, we will limit our focus to 
the celebration as it took place in Paris on June 8th, 1794. We will further 
analyze that which its creator, Maximillian Robespierre, said about this 
important celebration. Mona Ozouf, the foremost scholar of festivals 
during the French Revolution, claims that “what the festival was trying 
to demonstrate is not clear. Neither religious fanaticism, nor atheism: 
the Festival of the Supreme Being…stretched between denunciation of 
monarch and rejection of anarchy.”58 It is within this stretched-between 
state that I see a festival which supports the deification of nation and 
humankind. 
Certainly, those human beings in the Nation of Revolution 
could see their sovereignty reflected in the way in which the festival was 
fastidiously organized. For example, every woman’s hair was to be styled 
in the same way; only certain pieces of music were to be performed; and 
the types of flowers that girls could carry was standardized to reflect 
unity. Such a display of organization had not been present in old France, 
with its monarch and its faith in God. Only a defied people could create 
such order effectively. But perhaps the belief in this piece of popular 
culture as one that deified the nation is nowhere more evident than in the 
words of Maximillian Robespierre. He claimed that it was a celebration 
“worshipping a deist ‘supreme being’ while resisting the more extreme 
tendency of some to eliminate spirituality outright through an atheistic 
‘cult of reason.’”59 If not God or king, then who else could this ‘supreme 
being’ be than that of the people of the Nation of Revolution themselves.
The sovereignty of the people and their nation was not restricted 
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to their unifying prowess, however. It is further evident in the way in 
which the festival seemed to glorify the nation above all else. The festival 
would begin at 5 o’clock in the morning as citizens would decorate their 
houses in the spirit of the Revolution, before a salvo from the artillery 
would signal each of them to make a procession to the National Garden. 
Here, again, we see the people as divine governors of a divine nation. 
After all, the ‘spirit’ of Revolution was the one that had maintained them 
through all of the tumultuous events in recent memory and not the Holy 
Spirit from God. Furthermore, their signal to process to the National 
Garden, to move forward as a nation, had not been a command from God 
but one from other people. No longer was God or king their governor, 
for they had maintained order themselves. Upon reaching the National 
Garden, Robespierre would provide the procession with an explanation 
for the festivities, claiming that “Never before has the world he [the 
‘supreme being’] created offered him a sight so worthy of his eyes.”60 
This statement suggests much more about the nation than it does of the 
supposed creator to whom Robespierre refers. In essence, the statement 
glorifies the nation and its people for having brought about some kind 
of ideal and glorious age. Robespierre says nothing celebratory in regard 
to the creator; he simply acknowledges that a creator of some kind does 
exist. Furthermore, there is no mention of the creator as being a divine or 
powerful councilor. But perhaps the most revealing statement Robespierre 
makes about the new nation’s purpose is that of a call-to-arms. To those 
present, he declared: “Frenchmen, Republicans, it is up to you to cleanse 
the earth they [the enemies of the sovereign nation] have sullied and to 
restore the justice they have banished from it.”61 Only a divine nation 
60  Ibid., 2.
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would have the authority and ability to regenerate the earth. Therefore, 
the dechristianized festival would be the ultimate form of national 
popular culture—combining music, visuals, and ceremony—to promote a 
shift in sovereignty and subsequently create a non-French culture for the 
Nation of Revolution.
 But such dechristianizing artifacts would all but disappear. The 
revised songs, printed art, and national festivals would fade away in 
eleven years. As Emmet Kennedy states, “Humanity was being taught to 
reach less to some being above and beyond than inward to the self and 
outward to all people to find human greatness.”62 But the glorification 
of human greatness had never been a truly French ideal. As such, if the 
nation wanted to return to being one which could be called France, with 
its history, legacy, and faith in God intact, the Nation of Revolution would 
have to be abolished, and with it the popular culture which so forcibly 
promoted its divine nature. Perhaps Napoleon recognized this, for it was 
under his reign that the Concordat of 1801 would return Christianity to 
its former prominence in France. Napoleon himself, however, only saw 
religion as a political tool, as was evident when he stated, “‘In religion…I 
do not see the mystery of the Incarnation but the mystery of the social 
order.’”63 But there was one thing that Napoleon believed in; he believed 
in the power that Christianity had in regard to the collective to life of 
the nation. And when the Concordat of 1801 came into effect mending 
the alliances with the Roman Catholic Church and allowing Christianity 
to flood the nation once again, perhaps it was then that French popular 
culture was able to become identifiably French again.
62  Kennedy, 338. 
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Hampton Court and the Perception 
of Cardinal Wolsey
Hannah Goode
The rise to power in Tudor times was hard if one was not of noble birth, 
but Thomas Wolsey somehow took that challenge and achieved greatness 
rising from a poor boy of Ipswich to the owner of four splendid residences, 
one of which was Hampton Court. Thomas Wolsey was a proclaimed self-
made man who rose to power through his relationship with Henry VII and 
Henry VIII – power he illustrated through Hampton Court. While Wolsey 
portrayed himself as a self-made man, he did not really see himself as 
such. After Wolsey rose to greatness in King Henry VIII’s court, he used 
Hampton Court as a symbol of his prominence and wealth. This rise to 
power shows up in every aspect of the Cardinal’s life, especially in the 
vastness of Hampton Court. Hampton Court has 1,300 rooms, though 
some were added after Wolsey’s time, and the palace and grounds spread 
over six acres. Architect John Summerson thought that Hampton Court 
showed “the essence of Wolsey – the plain English churchman who 
nevertheless made his sovereign the arbiter of Europe and who built and 
furnished Hampton Court to show foreign embassies that Henry VIII’s 
chief minister knew how to live as graciously as any cardinal in Rome.”1 
Wolsey wanted to show that he belonged, and Hampton Court was his way 
of demonstrating that. 
Thomas Wolsey came from the small village of Ipswich, Suffolk, 
England. His father may have been a butcher, but sources show that this 
could have been a lie created either to bring Wolsey down or created by 
1  Sir John Summerson, Architecture in Britain: 1530-1830 (New Haven: The Yale University 
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Wolsey himself to show how high he had ascended in the King’s Court. 
George Cavendish asserts that the young Wolsey was not the poor boy he 
lead Henry VII to believe he was “in fine, upon a new and strict inquiry, 
several gentlemen in Suffolk are of opinion that Wolsey’s father was in 
truth a reputable grazer in the town of Ipswich, and not a poor butcher 
and as many have asserted.”2  Therefore, the Cardinal either never 
corrected anyone about the wealth and status of his family, or he just 
made the story up to look better in the eyes of Henry VII. The kitchens 
at Hampton Court attest to Wolsey’s humble beginnings as Wolsey 
most likely spent a fair amount of time in this area of his home growing 
up—especially if he was from a poorer home. Therefore, he created large 
kitchens at the palace. He also needed vast kitchens because he had over 
five hundred people working at Hampton Court. The kitchens show his 
wealth and how far he had risen to achieve the splendor of Hampton 
Court Palace. 
Thomas Wolsey attended Ipswich School and Magdalen College 
School before studying theology at Magdalen College, Oxford. T. W. 
Cameron writes that “Wolsey told him he had taken that degree at fifteen, 
which was a rare thing and seldom seen, and won him the honorable 
nickname of the boy-bachelor.”3 Therefore, Wolsey was eleven when he 
started school there. He always asserted that he had done this on his own 
and that his success was his and his alone. Wolsey never had anything 
handed to him so he had to make it on his own. This drive for something 
greater motivated Wolsey to try his best and never give up in his struggle 
for the things he wanted even if it meant lying, cheating, and stealing 
his way to the top. The only way for Wolsey to move forward was to 
2  T. W. Cameron, “The Early Life of Thomas Wolsey,” The English Historical Review 3 (July 
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gain “admission to the university and entry into the Church [that] would 
open up unlimited possibilities.”4 The Church offered a career for Wolsey 
who as a scholar and could do little more than become a priest with 
his education. Wolsey had what was necessary to become a priest, and 
“within [the] priesthood, there was fierce competition for the higher prizes 
which were there to be won by the priest with the necessary qualities – 
ability, energy, ruthlessness, and the knack of making useful friends.”5 
These qualities drove Wolsey’s decision to become a priest as he had all of 
these and more to add to the list, and they allowed him to become one of 
the most powerful men in King Henry VIII’s court. 
In 1498 Wolsey was appointed Junior Bursar of Magdalen College; 
he was in charge of collecting funds to build a tower, but after some time 
he was released from this office for breaking the regulations. Wolsey’s 
tendency to cut through the red tape to get things done became one of his 
trademarks later in life. It was not long into Wolsey’s rise to power before 
he reached the king’s court. By 1502 he had became a chaplain to Henry 
Deane, Archbishop of Canterbury, who died the following year. He was 
then taken into the household of Sir Richard Nanfan who trusted Wolsey 
to be the executor of his estate. George Cavendish asserted how important 
it was for Wolsey to serve Nanfan: “this knight he served, and behaved 
him so discreetly and justly, that he received the special favor of his said 
master; insomuch that for his wit, gravity, and just behavior, he committed 
all the charge of his office to chaplain.”6 Wolsey had an ability to make 
people trust him, leading him to the king after Nanfan’s death in 1507. 
Wolsey gained the trust of King Henry VII because the king 
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had introduced measures to curb the power of the nobility and favored 
those from more humble backgrounds. This played right into Wolsey’s 
advantage at the king’s court. Wolsey won favor with Henry VII “through 
his instant labor and especial favor his chaplain was promoted to the 
king’s service, and made his chaplain.”7 Wolsey was not promoted just 
because of his cunning ways; he was promoted because he was a hard 
worker and could accomplish the hard tasks at hand. Henry VII appointed 
Wolsey royal chaplain, and in this position Wolsey was secretary to 
Richard Foxe who recognized Wolsey’s innate capability and commitment 
and appreciated his diligence and enthusiasm to do anything that was 
asked of him. Wolsey’s remarkable rise to power from humble origins can 
be attributed to his high intellect, his extremely diligent nature, his driving 
ambition for power, and the connection he was able to attain with the 
king. He was approachable and welcoming when it came to the king, and 
his relationship with Henry VII was crucial in his rise to the Archbishopric 
of York and the control that Henry VIII would later give him.
Wolsey’s rise coincided with the ascension of the new monarch, 
Henry VIII, whose personality, plans, and political mindset differed 
significantly from those of his father, Henry VII. The young Henry 
VIII was uninterested in the details of governing during his early years 
whereas under the tight, personal monarchy of Henry VII, Wolsey would 
have been unlikely to have obtained as much trust and responsibility. 
Wolsey was a man “whose head was full of subtle wit and policy. 
Perceiving a plain path to walk in towards promotion, he handled himself 
so politically, that he found the means to be one of the King’s council, 
and to grow in good estimation and favor with the King.”8 Wolsey made 
7  Ibid. 
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his move, growing closer to the young King Henry VIII, and proved to be 
indispensable.
Thomas Wolsey’s relationship with Henry VIII became one of 
the pivotal stepping stones in Wolsey’s reaching prominence. One of 
the reasons for Wolsey’s rise was because Henry saw him as a “suitable 
instrument for his own ambitions – and when he ceased to be such, he was 
dismissed.”9 Wolsey tried to take advantage of the young king who knew 
little about how to rule since he had been raised for the Church. Henry 
VIII was Henry VII’s second son following his deceased elder brother, 
Arthur. Henry VIII was not prepared to become king, and Wolsey was 
more than willing to take advantage of a “young and lusty King” who was 
more than happy to place all the difficult business in Wolsey’s capable 
hands. 10 Wolsey completely seduced Henry by distracting the young king 
with plans to turn Henry’s palace into a “temple of all pleasures.”11 At the 
same time, Wolsey turned his sights on his own palace, Hampton Court.
Wolsey’s Hampton Court possessed greatness that, in time, would 
surpass any dwelling the King had. Earnest Law asserts that “Wolsey had 
no sooner entered into possession of Hampton Court, than he began with 
characteristic energy to plan the erection of a vast and sumptuous edifice, 
commensurate with the dignity and wealth he had just attained to.”12 
Hampton Court was a stage. Wolsey wanted his palace to be majestic and 
even more impressive than the King’s court. Cardinal Wolsey “made no 
serious attempt to suppress these verses which were secretly circulating 
in manuscripts in the court and elsewhere; instead, he bribed Skelton, by 
9  Peter Gwyn, The Kings Cardinal: The Rise and Fall of Thomas Wolsey (London: Barrie & 
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gifts and patronage, to write several poems in which he praised Wolsey in 
the most fulsome style.”13 One of Skelton’s verses proclaimed, “Why come 
ye not to court? To which Court? To the King’s court, Or to Hampton 
Court? Nay, to the King’s court; The King’s court should have the 
excellence; But Hampton Court Hath the preeminence.”14 Hampton Court 
was also very menacing. Earnest Law asserts that “the palace was very 
Tudor, red brick, pinnacles, gargoyles, and heraldic beats, on gambles.”15 
Wolsey wanted people to fear and respect him, and he also wanted to 
prove to the world that he belonged with the aristocracy. Wolsey needed 
to validate that he was not just that poor boy who rose through the ranks, 
but that he had become a man of true power. 
Once firmly entrenched in the king’s favor, Wolsey wanted to 
keep the king out of the affairs of the state and leave it for him to run. 
By 1516 Wolsey had become “so proud that he considered himself the 
peer of the King’s.”16 Henry VIII chose Wolsey to be his leading man 
because he shared the king’s dreams, and Wolsey could turn them into 
reality through his forcefulness and desire to do the king’s will. Although 
Wolsey wanted to do the king’s will, he still yearned for the authority and 
affluence he could gain by keeping the king content. Earnest Law writes 
that “these were the earlier days of Henry’s reign, when he conceived 
nothing but implicit trust and respect for his faithful Wolsey, and 
regarded Katharine with nothing but tender love.”17 These days would 
end with the rise of Anne Boleyn.
Henry trusted Wolsey with his most important matter -- his 
divorce from Catherine of Aragon. In this matter, Wolsey failed the king 
13  Ridley, 16.
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for what was most likely the first and only time. Anne Boleyn never 
liked the Cardinal because he was Catholic and she was protestant, and 
she wanted to influence the King in removing England from the grip of 
Rome. Anne “utterly hated the Cardinal and got Henry to give orders 
that he was not to come henceforth within three miles of the Court unless 
expressly summons.”18 Anne also feared the Cardinal’s power over the 
King as “it was obviously potentially dangerous for him if someone else 
was exercising strong influence over Henry.”19 With Wolsey losing his 
touch with the people of England and with Anne Boleyn whispering in the 
king’s ear that he was slowing Henry’s divorce, the Cardinal was bound 
to fall from the king’s graces. James Gairdner states that “the king knew 
very well that Wolsey had only failed because success was impossible. The 
divorce was a business in to which he had been unwillingly dragged; but 
he had done the utmost that he could in it, well knowing that it would be 
his ruin at any time not to give the king satisfaction”20 
Another problem Wolsey faced was Henry’s decision to call his 
bluff. Henry VIII wanted to break from the Roman Catholic Church, and 
by doing so, he alienated Wolsey. The Cardinal did not even realize that 
his end was drawing near. In September he was visited by du Bellay who 
later stated, “I have less hope of his maintaining his influence, since my 
talk with him, than I had before, for I see he trusts in some of his own 
creatures, who, I am sure, have turned their coats. I am very shaken, for I 
should never have believed that they would have been so wicked; and the 
worst of it is that he does not realize it.”21 By 1529 the Cardinal’s failure to 
procure the divorce for Henry ultimately led to his arrest and seizure of 
18  James Gairdner, “The Fall of Cardinal Wolsey,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 
New Series 13 (1889): 82.
19  Ridley, 190.
20  Gairdner, 76.
21  Ridley, 217.
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his property, including Hampton Court. Hampton Court is now known 
as Henry VIII’s palace; the Cardinal is barely recognized as its builder. 
The great and powerful Wolsey was removed from the King’s court, his 
most prized possession in the hands of the king. The king took residence 
at Hampton Court because it was even grander than the dwellings he 
owned. On his way to the Tower of London, to face the charge of treason, 
the great Wolsey fell ill and died. When the Cardinal fell from the king’s 
graces so did “the greatness and splendor of Henry’s reign.”22 No one 
could ever be compared with the great Cardinal and the legacy he left 
behind at Hampton Court. 
Wolsey built Hampton Court to reflect the view he wanted people 
to have of him. He was ever the actor, and Hampton Court was his stage. 
Hampton Court embodies every aspect of what Wolsey wanted people 
to see in him when they looked at his palace. At times Hampton Court 
is very masculine and menacing, and other times there is beauty in the 
deep red Tudor brick and majestic grand halls. The Cardinal wanted to 
prove to the world that he belonged with the aristocracy and spared no 
expense building and upgrading the grand palace. It is proof of his power 
and greatness, and it is a reminder that power and glory came at a cost. 
Wolsey paid the ultimate price—he paid with his life. The image of the 
Cardinal is that of a brooding and powerful figure, a sinister string-puller 
who wanted nothing but to please his King and rise in power and riches. 
Hampton Court shows the longing Wolsey had for greatness employing 
“the best carvers, painters, and gilders in London... Sometimes he sent 
to Italy direct for decorative work. The terra-cotta medallion bust of the 
Roman Emperors surrounded with rich arabesque borders, which are 
affixed to the turrets in each side of the gateways of the courts, were 
22  Law, Cardinal Wolsey, 26.
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ordered by him.”23 The terra-cotta medallions still exist at Hampton Court, 
and they are one of the few things remaining from Wolsey’s reign in the 
palace. Not only did the outside of Hampton Court show his extravagance 
but the furniture and decoration inside did as well. Law writes that “rich 
as was the furniture of the Cardinal’s palace, and cast as was its extent, 
it only just adequate to meet the requirements of the enormous and 
splendid household which he maintained.”24 Wolsey spared no expense 
on the grand dwelling; for example, he installed tapestries in every room 
and would have them changed weekly. He had created a palace that 
was celebrated throughout Europe “for the quantity of splendid Arras 
hangings that it contained. For this form of artistic decoration Wolsey 
appears in fact to have had a perfect passion.”25 One room that remains 
of Wolsey’s is what is known as “Wolsey’s Closet.”  It is a room that 
has been greatly reduced in size, but the dark carved panel walls still 
show the extent of Wolsey’s extravagance where “the whole decoration 
of this room, faded though it is by time, gives us that idea of splendor 
and richness without gaudiness, which was a characteristic of the artistic 
taste of the great Cardinal.”26 His motto can still be seen in Latin, which 
translated to English means “the Lord be my helper.” 
Hampton Court was to Wolsey what the White House is to the 
President; it was a symbol of power. Whoever lived there held all the 
power necessary to rule the world. This is what Wolsey wanted Hampton 
Court to be, a status symbol which suggested that he was there to rule. 
Hampton Court is that and so much more. It tells the story of a man who 
rose from nothing to become the most important man in England next 
23  Ibid., 21.
24  Ibid, 31.
25  Earnest Law, New Guide to the Royal Palace of Hampton Court with a New Catalogue of the 
Pictures (London: George Bell and Sons, 1882), 7.
26  Ibid., 25.
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to the king, though Wolsey did not want people to see him as such. He 
would have rather had people forget that he was once a poor boy and 
instead think of him as the all-powerful Cardinal who did the king’s 
bidding. On a plaque at Hampton Court it says, “Henry and Wolsey 
wielded architecture and interior decoration like weapons. Spending 
extravagantly, they deployed artists, architects and craftsmen from all 
over Europe in a never-ending cultural battle with the rival courts of 
France and Holy Roman Empire.”27  Wolsey loved showing his power 
and grandeur though his architecture; it was his way to display his wealth 
and status. It was said that his palace “lit up the eyes of the beholders, by 
reason of their sumptuous work.”28 Thomas Wolsey used Hampton Court 
to show his prominence and wealth, but not even that could save him in 
the end.  
27  Historical Royal Palaces. Hampton Court Palace: July, 9 2011.
28  Ibid. 
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Citizenship and Soldiering: An 
Analysis of the Early Boy Scout 
Movement
Jason Hewer
A quick ferry ride across Poole Harbor took me to Brownsea Island on the 
southern coast of England. Brownsea Island is part of the British National 
Trust and is home to a variety of flora and fauna. It operates as a nature 
preserve now, but this was not always the case as back in 1907, it was 
private property. It was in this year that Robert Baden-Powell decided to 
make an experiment on the island by inviting twenty boys to come and 
camp for a week in what would become the first ever Boy Scout camp. 
It was easy for me to think back 100 years and picture myself at that first 
camp. Standing atop a cliff, looking down at the sandy beach as the waves 
broke upon it, I was imbued with the romanticism that must have inspired 
Baden-Powell to use “Scout-craft” as a means of character education. Yet 
for all the good Baden-Powell intended, Scouting has not been without 
its critics. In this paper I will explore the beginnings of the Scouting 
movement, the criticism it encountered in the period after the First World 
War, and the transformation the movement underwent in response to 
a changing society. I hope to prove that despite very clear retrospective 
military qualities, the Scouting movement was founded on views that 
were appropriate for the time; and as the years have progressed and 
society’s opinions have changed, Scouting has kept pace.
 From its conception, the Scouting movement has been charged 
with indoctrinating our youth with military ideals; however, the Scouting 
movement has routinely rejected this accusation. Robert Baden-Powell, the 
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founder of the movement wrote an explanation of his movement in 1910:
So many people ask me, ‘What is Scouting? What do 
Scouts do?’
 Well, Scouting is not, as some seem to think, in 
any way connected with Soldiering. It is really the work 
of Colonial frontiersmen, coupled, in our case, with a 
good deal of knight-errantry. That is to say, the boys 
learn backwoodsmanship, and have, as part of their duty, 
to do a good turn to a fellow-creature every day. It is a 
method of developing among boys the manliness and 
character which are so much needed among our future 
citizens. It consists, briefly, in giving them Scouting-craft 
in place of loafing or rowdiness, which are now becoming 
so prevalent. To drive out a bad habit it is necessary to 
inculcate a substitute, and Scout-craft is the substitute we 
suggest. By Scout-craft I mean an education in character 
outside the school walls, as distinct from mere book-
learning learnt within the school.1
So if Scouting is not about “Soldiering” but rather about the work of 
“Colonial frontiersmen”, where do these accusations come from? It is 
necessary to look closely at the methods and materials of the movement to 
find an answer.
 When reading through Scouting for Boys, Baden-Powell’s highly 
successful handbook for the Scout movement, it becomes clear that the 
main goal of Scouting is to turn boys into better men. However, “better” is 
a highly subjective term. What constituted “better” for Baden-Powell? The 
Oath requisite for membership in the Boy Scout Association offers insight:
On my honour I promise that-
1. I will do my duty to God and the King.
2. I will do my best to help others, whatever it costs me.
3. I know the scout law, and will obey it.2
The Scout Oath is three-fold and listed in order of importance: duty to 
God and country, the highest calling; duty to others; and duty to self (the 
1  Robert Baden-Powell, Scouting for Boys: An Explanation (1910), 1.
2  Robert Baden-Powell, Scouting for Boys: A handbook for instruction in good citizenship 
(London: Horace Cox, 1908), 40.
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Scout Law being a list of twelve attributes a Scout possesses). The Oath 
really is a promise to be a better citizen, and citizenship is really what 
the Scouting movement is about. But it has been over 100 years since the 
conception of the Scouting movement. What was citizenship in 1908? 
Baden-Powell describes a good citizen in Scouting for Boys: “’Country first, 
self second,’ should be your motto. Probably, if you ask yourself truly, 
you will find you have at present got them just the other way about.”3 To 
Baden-Powell, “better” citizenship meant placing the needs of the country 
before the needs of the individual.
This view is not surprising coming from a soldier such as Baden-
Powell who was hailed as a hero for his actions at the Siege of Mafeking 
in South Africa during the Boer Wars. He knew what devotion to country 
meant; and to him, I’m sure, citizenship involved being prepared to 
defend his country. In Scouting for Boys he writes, “Every boy ought to 
learn to shoot and to obey orders, else he is no more good when war 
breaks out than an old woman, and merely gets killed like a squealing 
rabbit, being unable to defend himself.”4 He goes on to say
A SCOUT OBEYS ORDERS of his patrol leader or scout 
master without question.
Even if he gets an order he does not like he must do as 
soldiers and sailors do, he must carry it out all the same 
because it is his duty; and after he has done it he can come 
and state any reasons against it: but he must must [sic] 
carry out the order at once. That is discipline.5
So if Scouting is not soldiering, why does Scouting for Boys have such a 
militaristic tone to it? Truthfully, it does not. It is a sizeable work, and 
with enough effort can probably be quoted to support anything. These 
short passages do not offer a true feel for what the work was about. When 
3  Robert Baden-Powell, Scouting for Boys: Revised Edition (London: C. Arthur Pearson, 1910), 
25.
4  Ibid., 16.
5  Baden-Powell, Scouting for Boys: A handbook for instruction in good citizenship, 50.
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Baden-Powell states that Scouting is not soldiering, we would do well to 
believe that in his mind it is not. It is a system of educating boys in good 
citizenship in a way that appeals to their naturally adventurous spirits. 
In his own words, “With a view to making the subject appeal to boys, 
and to meet their spirit of adventure, I held up for their ideal the doings 
of backwoodsmen, knights, adventurers and explorers, as the heroes for 
them to follow. These I grouped generally under the title, ‘Scouts.’”6 The 
movement is full of secret signs and codes of honor. It places emphasis 
on tracking ability and outdoor skills. It puts boys in a group with which 
they can feel camaraderie. If in retrospect, the movement appears to have 
military qualities, it is more an anachronism than anything else because 
as society’s perceptions of what “Soldiering” is have changed, so have the 
methods of the Scouting movement.
This is not to say that at the time of its conception Scouting was 
not charged by suspicious critics as being a militaristic organization. It 
was easy to lump the movement in with cadet corps that were springing 
up in various countries. The fact that Scouting was the idea of a soldier 
with an impressive military record did not help dispel these perceptions. 
The fact is, that at this time, and shortly after the Scouting movement 
began, a whole slew of youth movements began to spring up. Each of 
these movements professed its own ideology and put forth its own goals. 
There were communist movements such as the Russian Red Pioneers and 
the Young Communist League of Great Britain. There were authoritarian 
movements such as the Italian Balilla and the German Hitler Jugend. 
There were older, established movements such as the Young Men’s 
Christian Association. And then there was Scouting. Where on the 
6  Boy Scout Association, Boy Scouts and Citizenship: The handbook of the Great International 
Jamboree (London: 1920), 11.
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spectrum of youth organizations did Scouting fit? If we can determine 
what organizations Scouting sought to associate itself with, or even what 
organizations sought to ally themselves with Scouting, then we gain better 
insight into the identity of the movement’s critics and why they offered 
criticism.
Arguably, the biggest criticism of Baden-Powell and his early 
Scouting movement is his determination to keep up relations with the 
Hitler Jugend and the Balilla. In both Germany and Italy, the Scouting 
movement had been absorbed by these respective institutions. However, 
Baden-Powell hoped that by fostering good relations with the fascist 
organizations, common goals could be achieved. Baden-Powell certainly 
did not approve of the methods used by either group. He cringed at the 
thought of compulsory participation and eventually viewed the groups as 
state-run cadet corps. These characteristics stood in stark opposition to the 
volunteer basis of the Scouts which sought to foster initiative from within 
the boy rather than clear-cut obedience from without. Historian Tim Jeal 
makes the interesting point that after the Hitler Jugend participated in 
the Kristallnacht attacks “neither Baden-Powell nor any of the Scout and 
Guide leaders... ever again wrote or spoke a word in favour of maintaining 
contact with the Hitler Jugend.”7 This had not, however, stopped him from 
trying to associate with them in their early years.
If Baden-Powell invited cooperation with the fascist organizations, 
it follows that the liberal youth movements would seek to disassociate 
themselves from Scouting and would become some of its most ardent 
critics. In 1927, the Young Communist League of Great Britain went so 
far as to send Baden-Powell a coffin, a message which clearly meant 
7  Tim Jeal, The Boy-Man: The Life of Lord Baden-Powell (New York: William Morrow and 
Company, Inc. 1990), 547.
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“We hope you die!”8 It is safe to conclude that they did not approve of 
Scouting’s goals. The communist youth movements viewed the Scouts 
as a tool to indoctrinate boys with national pride in a system they saw as 
evil. Scouting was very much a movement that sought to build men into 
good British subjects, and Baden-Powell’s insistence on cooperation with 
authoritarian regimes served to alienate the leftist youth movements and 
cement them in opposition to him.
 The First World War saw both the rise of communism and marked 
a turning point in the Scouting movement. More than that, it marked a 
turning point in society in general. The carnage resulting from the conflict 
inspired a massive push away from anything thought to lead to another 
such disaster. Old standards such as nationalism and military prowess 
were placed under the microscope of public opinion and scrutinized for 
their role in starting the Great War. Where did the Boy Scouts fit into 
society’s new model? Scouting set itself up as a flexible organization, but 
how would it handle its new outspoken critics? For critics it did have. 
Even before the war, it was accused of being a military organization. In 
1910, The Advocate of Peace, a pacifist publication, accused the Scouts of 
meaning “to catch the boys and fill their minds with the love of military 
performances before they are old enough to discriminate, and thus to 
foster the war spirit in the nation and promote the further growth of the 
navy and the army.”9 After the war, these accusations became far more 
common; but as society demobilized, Scouting would follow suit.
 Earlier in this paper, I identified several passages from the 1908 
edition of Scouting for Boys which had a decidedly militaristic tone to 
them. Let us re-examine these passages. The first passage stated, “Every 
8  Ibid., 544.
9  “The Boy Scout Movement,” The Advocate of Peace 72, no. 10 (1910): 231.
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boy ought to learn to shoot and to obey orders, else he is no more good 
when war breaks out than an old woman, and merely gets killed like 
a squealing rabbit, being unable to defend himself.”10 It is significant 
that this passage was not included in later editions of the book.11 In like 
manner, the excerpt that described obedience was re-written thus: 
A SCOUT OBEYS ORDERS OF HIS PARENTS, PATROL 
LEADER, OR SCOUTMASTER WITHOUT QUESTION.
Even if he gets an order he does not like he must 
do as soldiers and sailors do, and as he would do for his 
Captain in a football team, he must carry it out all the same 
because it is his duty; and after he has done it he can come 
and state any reason against it: but he must carry out the 
order at once. That is discipline.12 (Italics added to denote 
change.)
Although the allusions to military discipline were not omitted in this 
case, “Parents” were added to the list of people the scout is required to 
obey; and following orders of a football captain was added to the list of 
examples of situations where discipline is necessary. This clearly dilutes 
the original effect. Giving examples of respecting a football captain or a 
boy’s parents by obeying their orders lends credibility to the assertion that 
obedience is a desirable quality without associating it with the military.
The shifting language of Scouting for Boys demonstrates how 
the aims of the program were changing with the times. However, the 
old adage “Actions speak louder than words” bears significant truth. 
If Scouting was, as Baden-Powell asserted, a peaceful movement, how 
would it show it? The answer came in the form of the first International 
Jamboree. Even before the war had ended, Scouting’s leaders hoped 
to have a celebration to mark the ten-year anniversary of the Scouting 
10  Robert Baden-Powell, Scouting for Boys (London: C. Arthur Pearson, 1908), 9-10.
11  Robert Baden-Powell, Scouting for Boys: Memorial Edition, 24th ed. (London: C. Arthur 
Pearson, 1946), 31.
12  Ibid., 46.
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movement. Plans were made to hold the celebration in 1918 provided that 
the war had come to a close. Of course, the war had not concluded by the 
beginning of 1918. Moreover, it became apparent that something more 
than a celebration of Scouting was required. After careful consideration, 
it was determined to hold an assembly in 1920 that would foster unity 
among the various scouting organizations of the world. Reflecting on the 
event shortly after its conclusion, Baden-Powell wrote:
To bring impressions into their proper perspective after 
the shock of such revelation requires time and reflection, 
but there cannot have been one among us under that great 
dome who did not feel that here in these times of anxiety 
and doubt was unfolded a prospect full of promise and 
hope, where men and future men of all nations were 
gathered as brothers in mutual happy comradeship under 
a common ideal for the weal of the world.13
In addition to Scouts from across the British Empire, Scouts from 21 other 
nations arrived to represent their respective countries.14 The number of 
nations represented in subsequent jamborees would continue to grow. 
In 2011, 146 countries came to the 22nd world jamboree in Sweden.15 This 
in itself is a testament to the ultimate popularity of the movement in the 
post-war era.
 That the jamboree movement was designed to promote peace in 
the world, there can be little doubt. The common theme in the speeches 
made to the scouts during this event was peace. The Archbishop of York, 
Cosmo Gordon Lang, charged the assembled body thus:
I am almost awed by the huge power of the boys 
assembled here. How is such a solemn trust as is implied 
in this Movement to be used? There is only one answer- to 
13  Boy Scouts International Bureau, The Jamboree story: the full story of the eight World 
Jamborees of the Boy Scout movement, 1920-1955 (Jenkins, 1957), 15.
14  Ibid., 13.
15  World Organization of the Scout Movement, Scouts: Creating a Better World, http://
scout.org/en/information_events/events/world_scout_events/jamboree/22nd_world_scout_
jamboree.
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make a new and better world. You are out not to claim 
rights, but to do your duty; not to care for yourselves, 
but for others; not to work for the class, but for the 
commonwealth; not to suspect and fight other nations, but 
to make comrades and brothers.16
Baden-Powell, as the newly nominated Chief Scout of the World, gave the 
closing address. The address, being the last words spoken, in many ways 
set the tone of the entire event: 
The war has taught us that if one nation tries to impose 
its particular will upon others, cruel reaction is bound to 
follow... If it be your will, let us go forth from here fully 
determined that we will develop among ourselves and 
our boys that comradeship, through the world-wide spirit 
of the Scout Brotherhood, so that we may help to develop 
peace and happiness in the world and good will among 
men. Brother Scouts, answer me. Will you join in this 
endeavour?17
Of course, the response was a hearty “Yes!” accompanied by boisterous 
applause. It can be seen as a sharp bit of strategy on Baden-Powell’s part 
to end with the asking of this poignant question.
Word choice was one of Baden-Powell’s exceptional strengths. 
Even the term “Jamboree” was not determined lightly. Baden-Powell 
wanted a term that would not be associated with anything else but 
Scouting. For this reason he passed up terms such as “rally” or “parade”.18 
A rally, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, is a “rapid 
reassembling of forces for renewed effort or fighting” or a “meeting of the 
supporters of a cause, esp. in order to demonstrate the strength of public 
feeling, or to inspire or foster enthusiasm; spec. a political mass meeting” 
whereas to parade is defined as to “assemble (troops, etc.) for inspection 
or review”.19 These words had connotations that the leaders of the 
16  Boy Scouts International Bureau, 12.
17  Ibid., 15.
18  Ibid., 9.
19  OED Online, “rally, n.1”, June 2012, Oxford University Press, http://www.oed.
66 Articles 
Scouting movement wished to distance themselves from. Jamboree was a 
relatively new term and was appropriately malleable. The Oxford English 
Dictionary defines jamboree as a “noisy revel; a carousal or spree.”20 
Baden-Powell wrote of his word choice:
Different people assign different derivations to the word, 
but whatever its derivation, it will have quite a distinct 
meaning for most people after this year (1920). It will 
be associated with the greatest gathering of boys that 
has ever been held. ‘Jamboree’ to them implies a joyful, 
cheery gathering of boys with broad-brimmed hats and 
broad grins- complete in their workmanlike kit of shirt, 
shorts, staff, and scarf. They are the important part of the 
Jamboree.21
Even with the careful consideration placed into planning the Jamborees, 
they would also fall under scrutinizing eyes.
One controversial point related to the Jamboree movement 
was the eventual semi-inclusion of the German Hitler Jugend and the 
Italian Balilla as observers at the 4th jamboree in Gödöllö, Hungary.22 
These organizations were not part of the Boy Scout movement. In fact, 
in both cases they had superseded and suppressed the Boy Scouts in 
their respective countries. However, Baden-Powell saw an opportunity 
to foster goodwill between the organizations and hoped for cooperation 
not competition. It is for this reason, not for any shared doctrinal views, 
that the Scouts associated with these two fascist organizations. The vast 
majority of evidence shows the Scouts pushing away from any perception 
of military organization during this time. The jamborees even went so far 
as to discontinue the March Past of the Nations after the outbreak of WWII 
com/view/Entry/157707?rskey=MNWQYG&result=1&isAdvanced=false; OED 
Online, “parade, v.”, June 2012, Oxford University Press, http://www.oed.com/view/
Entry/137321?rskey=epxci9&result=3&isAdvanced=false. 
20  OED Online, “jamboˈree, n.”, June 2012, Oxford University Press, http://www.oed.com/
view/Entry/100700?redirectedFrom=jamboree. 
21  Boy Scouts International Bureau, 9.
22  Ibid., 40.
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for fear that having boys march in rank under their various nations’ flags 
would foster a military spirit.23 These actions represent clear proof that the 
Scouting movement had no hidden military agenda.
 After examining the evidence, it becomes clear that by today’s 
standards the original Scout movement had military qualities. Moreover, 
after the First World War, it continued to have military qualities. It is 
even possible to trace militarism in Scouting up to the present day if one 
were so inclined. But if one were so inclined, that search would show the 
evidence of militarism ever decreasing. Scouting is a living organization. 
As the values of society change, so do the methods of the Scouting 
movement. Scouting will always have its critics. The period following 
the First World War was a time of particularly harsh criticism. However, 
Scouting has also proved itself as an organization dedicated to promoting 
world peace and cooperation. Baden-Powell’s idea of a program that 
would foster good citizenship assist in character development has not 
come to the present day unchanged, but the essence of the idea lives on.
23  Ibid., 13.
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Eighteenth-Century British  
Industrial Development and  
Nineteenth-Century British  
Industrial Dominance: A Case of 
Mutual Causation and Ongoing  
Innovation
Catherine James 
Today, the concept of industrialization seems obsolete, germane only 
to underdeveloped nations and disengaged from economic vigor, not 
to mention environmentally hazardous and potentially life-threatening. 
However, in the nineteenth century, Britain marveled at its status as the 
world’s preeminent industrial power, with contemporary Oxford historian 
Arnold Toynbee asserting in his renowned 1881 Lectures on the Industrial 
Revolution in England that industrialization was as crucial and definite an 
era in British history as the Wars of the Roses.1 Although industrialization 
has received acknowledgment as an historical era since Toynbee’s lectures, 
explaining Britain’s emergence as a major industrial power has been more 
intangible and controversial, requiring the pinpointing of factors which 
made industrialization possible and necessitating the identification of the 
context in which industrialization actually began.   
Nineteenth-century Britain possessed numerous advantages 
which could have allowed it to become the world’s industrial leader. 
For example, Britain had a stable currency and reliable financial lender 
in the Bank of England.2 As seen in its past success with wool and fish 
1  Christopher Harvie, “Revolution and the Rule of Law (1789-1851),” in The Oxford 
Illustrated History of Britain, ed. Kenneth O. Morgan (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1995), 419. 
2  Robin W. Winks and Joan Neuberger, Europe and the Making of Modernity, 1815-1914 (New 
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products, Britain was a commercial nation, and the possibility of greater 
profits could have stimulated industrialization.3 Britain experienced 
a demographic surge in the nineteenth century, with its population 
doubling by midcentury and clustering in urban areas. A bigger 
population demanded more food and clothing, while a growing middle 
class desired luxury items such as china.4 Also, Britain contained vast 
reserves of coal and iron ore, in addition to internal waterways that 
created a natural transportation system. British political stability supplied 
a nourishing environment for innovation and enterprise.5 Finally, Britain 
witnessed the advent of the railroad, connecting raw materials to factories 
and factories to markets and consumers.6 These economic, demographic, 
geographic, political, and technological factors certainly enhanced British 
industrialization in the nineteenth century, but they were not responsible 
for Britain’s emergence as a major industrial power; indeed, railroad 
expansion did not transpire until after the mid-1800s. Instead, events 
of the preceding half-century are fundamental to explaining British 
industrialization. During the late eighteenth century, agricultural change, 
cotton’s ascendancy, and diversion of a key economic rival combined 
to allow Britain to emerge as a major industrial power in the nineteenth 
century. 
Eighteenth-century agricultural change was the prerequisite for 
extensive industrialization in the nineteenth century. In fact, “agriculture 
was the indispensable foundation for industry, for there was no other 
York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 81. 
3  Trevor Griffiths, Philip A. Hunt, and Patrick K. O’Brien, “Inventive Activity in the British 
Textile Industry, 1700-1800,” Journal of Economic History 52, no. 4 (1992): 881.
4  Christopher Harvie and H. C. G. Matthew, Nineteenth-Century Britain: A Very Short 
Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 12-13. 
5  Winks and Neuberger, 80-81. 
6  Ibid., 74-75. 
70 Articles 
regular source of the nation’s food.”7 British agriculture’s improved yield 
and efficiency in the late eighteenth century had two significant effects: 
fewer agricultural laborers were needed, which gave industry a ready 
workforce, and greater internal productivity supplied industrial workers 
with food, which otherwise would have been imported.8 Agricultural 
progress was sufficient to sustain the population during the transition 
to industrialization and, therefore, Britain emerged as an industrial 
power without a significant portion of its population perishing from 
malnutrition.9 Overall, agricultural change after 1750 was so important 
because it allowed industrialization to both happen and flourish in the 
nineteenth century.10 If industrialization was reliant upon agricultural 
progress, then there would have been no agricultural revolution without 
adoption of the enclosure system.  
Enclosure signaled agricultural change by consolidating common 
lands. Prior to the late eighteenth century, the majority of British farm 
acreage was common land in villages, divided between grazing and 
arable land. Common lands afforded equal opportunity to every family, 
acting as a sort of safety net. Since land was communally held, farmers 
were compelled to abide by a mandatory crop choice and schedule.11 Such 
rigidity meant agriculture was disinclined to change, neither planting 
different crops nor attempting new farming methods. However, starting 
in the 1750s, enclosure abolished common land and its associated rules, 
7  E. J. Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire: The Making of Modern English Society (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1968), 77. 
8  David S. Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor 
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), 213. 
9  Maxine Berg and Pat Hudson, “Rehabilitating the Industrial Revolution,” Economic History 
Review 45, no. 1 (February 1992): 27. 
10  John Komlos, “Nutrition, Population Growth, and the Industrial Revolution in England,” 
Social Science History 14, no. 1 (1990): 82-85. 
11  Robert Allen, “Agriculture during the Industrial Revolution,” in The Economic History 
of Britain Since 1700, eds. Roderick Floud and Donald McCloskey, 2nd ed. (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 1:97-98.
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replacing the communal system with individual farm ownership or tenant 
farming. Between 1750 and 1760, Parliament passed approximately 150 
enclosure acts, most at the behest of powerful landowners who wanted to 
increase their land’s agricultural productivity.12 Profit may have motivated 
enclosure, but the end result was an agricultural revolution that would 
feed an industrializing nation. 
Whether small farmers or large landlords, the independence that 
enclosure imparted let them pursue new crops and techniques which 
greatly increased yield. For example, nutrient-rich silage crops, such as 
clover and turnips, were introduced and prevented weeds from growing 
in fields, as well as sustaining bigger herds of livestock and thereby 
producing more manure for fertilizer.13 The silage crops also added 
nitrogen to the soil, which further boosted production. With enclosure, 
farmers could rotate crops, rather than limit themselves to permanent 
acreage for a specific crop like wheat. Yield per acre of wheat increased 
due to crop rotation, rising from 12 bushels per acre in 1750 to 20 plus 
bushels by 1800. Enclosure not only benefitted crops, but also relieved 
farmers, placing the burden of labor upon animals, whose numbers 
swelled because of more nutritious feed. In the latter half of the eighteenth 
century, horse power experienced a 27% growth rate and, in turn, 
served to enhance soil fertility by transporting loads of lime and sand 
to the fields. By 1800, British agriculture claimed an output per worker 
percentage growth of at least 60%.14 That eighteenth century efficiency 
would support industrialization’s growth, as it drew more workers away 
from agriculture into factories throughout the nineteenth century.
12  Winks and Neuberger, 68. 
13  C. Peter Timmer, “The Turnip, The New Husbandry, and The English Agricultural 
Revolution,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 83, no. 3 (1969): 382-83. 
14  Pat Hudson, The Industrial Revolution (New York: Edward Arnold, 1992), 66-70.
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 Agricultural efficiency and enclosure directly contributed 
to Britain’s emergence as a major industrial power in the nineteenth 
century. Obviously, greater efficiency reduced the number of farmers 
required to feed the population and those displaced laborers needed 
other work, which would provide industry with a ready workforce as it 
simultaneously developed in the latter half of the eighteenth century.15 
While the link between lost agricultural work and an available, cheap 
industrial labor supply has been well established, some historians have 
asserted British agricultural efficiency created a surplus to be sold on 
the international market. The notion of a surplus has been questioned, 
however, since between 1700 and 1800 British farmers were required 
to grow roughly 20 million bushels of grains to keep the population 
adequately fed.16 Regardless, agriculture did produce enough food to 
sustain the population during the transition to industry, a pattern that 
much of the rest of the world would not follow. Enclosure also stimulated 
the shift to industrialization by displacing agricultural laborers, 
particularly as tenant farmers’ rent doubled and even tripled from the 
enforcement of enclosure in the 1750s to the turn of the century.17 In 
sum, enclosure affected 7.35 million acres and worked in tandem with 
agricultural efficiency to eliminate farming employment. Many small 
independent farmers sold their land immediately before enclosure was 
implemented or afterwards were forced to get rid of their land because 
they could not support families on such small acreage without access to 
pasture.18 Eighteenth century agricultural change generated two factors – 
adequate food and displaced workers – essential to Britain’s position as an 
15  Harvie and Matthew, 10. 
16  Timmer, 382. 
17  Landes, 213. 
18  Hudson, 74-75.
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industrial power in the nineteenth century, yet those factors were useless 
without a product to spur industrialization. 
Cotton was the product which stimulated British industrialization 
and, more specifically, the mechanization necessary to industrialize on a 
large scale. Indeed, “cotton textiles were the power which towed the glider 
of industrialization into the air.”19 Records of raw cotton imports from the 
late eighteenth century to the early nineteenth century verify that cotton 
acted as a root cause of Britain’s emergence as a major industrial power. For 
example, in 1765, Britain imported 4,636 pounds of cotton, while in 1785 cot-
ton imports rose to some 18,887 pounds. Still, imports jumped dramatically 
by 1805, with approximately 68,208 pounds imported that year – proving 
industrialization was an outgrowth of the late eighteenth century’s innova-
tion.20 Cotton made innovation possible because of its malleability, which 
wool and linen lacked; moreover, Britain had access to a cost-efficient sup-
ply of cotton from the American South by the last decade of the eighteenth 
century.21 This product became the basis of British industrial power in the 
nineteenth century, not only due to its natural properties and availability, 
but also as a result of parliamentary law and pervasive fraud.   
Parliament unwittingly thrust cotton into industrialization with a 
series of prohibitive acts in 1720 and 1721, which banned the importation of 
Indian cotton – both unfinished and finished goods. Ironically, this ban was 
meant to protect British wool and linen cottage industry, as well as infant 
attempts to mechanize the spinning of wool. However, the British public 
wanted cotton because of its affordability, and wool did not adapt to mech-
anization, its fibers being too coarse and wiry at the outset; therefore, cotton 
19  Harvie and Matthew, 14. 
20  Abbott Payson Usher, “The Industrialization of Modern Britain,” Technology and Culture 1, 
no. 2 (Spring 1960): 112-13. 
21  Harvie and Matthew, 14.
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became the fiber of choice for mechanization.22 Rampant fraud in the cot-
tage industry further encouraged cotton’s industrialization. Cottage work-
ers often took raw goods “from one merchant and then [sold] the finished 
article to a competitor, stalling now one, now another, and they learned to 
set some of the raw material aside for their own use. Trying to conceal their 
embezzlement, weavers made thinner, poorer fabrics.”23 Such deception 
among cottage industry workers made employers aware of the benefits of 
regulation and, when cotton was mechanized, spinners and weavers would 
work in factories, under strict supervision throughout the entire day.24 The 
environment in the latter half of the eighteenth century was set for mecha-
nization of the cotton industry and three inventions allowed industrializa-
tion, absorbed displaced agricultural workers into factories, and assured 
Britain’s industrial preeminence in the nineteenth century. 
In 1829, Scottish social commentator Thomas Carlyle wrote about 
Britain’s “Mechanical Age,” describing it as “the age which, with its whole 
undivided might, forwards, teaches and practices the great art of adapting 
means to ends.”25 The “Mechanical Age” Carlyle described in the nineteenth 
century was initiated in the late eighteenth century with the mechanization 
of the cotton industry, whose three greatest inventions – the spinning jenny, 
the water frame, and the mule – were paramount examples of “adapting 
means to ends.” A surplus of farm laborers and frustrated cottage indus-
try employers already existed, but the machines were lacking. However, in 
1764, James Hargreaves invented the spinning jenny, followed by Richard 
Arkwright’s water frame in 1769, and finally Samuel Crompton’s mule in 
22  Landes, 207. 
23  Ibid., 208. 
24  Ibid., 209. 
25  Thomas Carlyle, “Signs of the Times: The ‘Mechanical Age,’” Modern History 
Sourcebook – Industrial Revolution, Fordham University History Department, http://www.
fordham.edu/halsall/mod/carlyle-times.html (accessed May 31, 2011). 
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1779. The mechanization of cotton textile production was transformed in 
an intense span of invention and the impact of these eighteenth century 
inventions and their link to Britain’s nineteenth century industrial power 
was not lost on contemporaries, as revealed in Andrew Ure’s 1835 Philoso-
phy of Manufactures. A renowned Scottish scholar, Ure was amazed that the 
machines “enable[d] an operative to turn out a greater quantity of work 
than he could before – time, labor, and quality of work remaining con-
stant, [and effected] a substitution of labor comparatively unskilled, for that 
which is more skilled.”26 Prior to 1764, each step in production was manual. 
Hargreaves’ spinning jenny exchanged hands twisting fibers into yarn for 
rotating spindles, directed by metal bars, while Arkwright’s water frame 
improved handwork by using a series of rollers to stretch out fibers into 
more durable yarn. Ultimately, Crompton’s mule combined the spinning 
jenny and the water frame, which permitted the spinning of the finest, top-
grade yarn possible. These inventions lessened the time needed to spin 100 
pounds of cotton to 300 hours by the 1790s, as compared to roughly 50,000 
hours required manually for the same amount.27 Without doubt, cotton 
spurred industrialization, but changing the manner of work would change 
everything else.
By the 1790s, machinery had been invented to mechanize cotton 
textile production and therefore changed the manner in which people 
worked. Instead of home production, employees gathered into factory 
settings; rather than individual manufacture, factories introduced unified 
methods of production. Factories were necessary because of the massive 
26  Andrew Ure, “The Philosophy of the Manufacturers, 1835,” Modern History Sourcebook 
– Industrial Revolution, Fordham University History Department, http://www.fordham.edu/
halsall/mod/1835ure.html (accessed May 31, 2011). 
27  Joel Mokyr, “Technological Change, 1700-1830,” in The Economic History of Britain Since 
1700, eds. Roderick Floud and Donald McCloskey, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994), 1:19-20.
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machinery that cotton production required, yet they also ensured Britain’s 
cotton textiles were the best and cheapest in the world – certainly, this is an 
example of the mutual causation in the eighteenth century that drove Brit-
ain to industrial power in the nineteenth century. Hargreaves’s spinning 
jenny and Arkwright’s water frame were responsible for raising production 
of cotton yarn tenfold by 1790, but the factory system made that increase 
possible. For example, the spinning jenny allowed mass production due 
to its simultaneous motions of anywhere from six to twenty-four spindles. 
While the jenny was usually powered by operators in a factory, Arkwright’s 
water frame made the leap from manpower to using another source of en-
ergy – water. His machine used power from a watermill to operate a spin-
ning frame, containing about one hundred spindles, and produce yarn. Al-
though Hargreaves’s invention did stimulate factory formation outside of 
the household, Arkwright’s water frame necessitated a factory be built next 
to a power source and hundreds of employees work at a location removed 
from the household, but, in many cases, still within their villages. In 1779, 
Crompton’s mule advanced power spinning further, being 30 times more 
productive than Arkwright’s water frame. Only eight years later, Edmund 
Cartwright invented a water-powered loom to weave cotton cloth. These 
two devices – Crompton’s mule and Cartwright’s loom – began a continual 
process of concentration of factories and mills. In fact, the expansion of the 
factory system generated more than 50,000 power looms within Britain by 
1830.28 Cotton and related technology were the leading sector of British in-
dustrialization in the late eighteenth century and maintained that position 
into the early nineteenth century. However, cotton and its eighteenth-cen-
tury-invented machines also served as catalysts to create more diverse in-
28  Winks and Neuberger, 71-73; Landes, 191-93. 
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dustrial development in Britain that would extend into the early nineteenth 
century and ensure British industrial supremacy. 
Some modern historians refer to eighteenth-century cotton textile 
production as the “self-sustaining process of innovation,” a process which 
propelled Britain to industrial supremacy in the early nineteenth century. 
The “productivity growth at the rate experienced in cotton textiles was 
achieved elsewhere, but the success of cotton … was intimately related 
to and dependent upon innovations and radical transformations in other 
branches of the primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors.”29 Thus, the tech-
nology used in cotton production, such as water power, spread to other 
infant industries in the late eighteenth century, including additional tex-
tile production like that of worsteds. Conversely, cotton demanded new 
technology to improve its quality and hence motivated engineering – such 
as fireproofing factories with metal columns and joists.30 In 1795, English 
writer John Aikin gave witness to cotton’s “self-sustaining innovation,” de-
claring: 
The prodigious extension of the several branches of the 
Manchester manufactures has likewise greatly increased the 
business of several trades and manufactures connected with or 
dependent upon them. The making of paper at mills in the vicinity 
has been brought to great perfection, and now includes all kinds, 
from the strongest parcelling paper to the finest writing sorts, 
and that on which banker’s bills are printed. A considerable iron 
foundry is established in Salford, in which are cast most of the 
articles wanted in Manchester and its neighborhood, consisting 
chiefly of large cast wheels for the cotton machines …. The tin-
plate workers have found additional employment in furnishing 
many articles for spinning machines; as have also the braziers in 
casting wheels for the motion-work of the rollers used in them; 
and the clock-makers in cutting them.31
29  Berg and Hudson, 32. 
30  Harvie and Matthew, 15. 
31  John Aikin, “A Description of the Country from Thirty to Forty Miles Round 
Manchester,” in The Past Speaks, ed. Walter Arnstein, 2nd ed. (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 
1993), 148-49. 
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Aikin perfectly described the momentum that stemmed from cotton’s 
industrialization and mechanization. Indeed, momentum characterized 
the late eighteenth century, from agricultural changes that produced a 
ready-made industrial labor supply to the innovations that generated 
continually improved machinery in cotton and then were transferred to 
subsequent areas of British industry.32 Yet, momentum also combined with 
those root causes of industrialization – agriculture and cotton – in the late 
eighteenth century to create the final step in Britain’s climb to the summit 
of industrial power in the nineteenth century.  
A commercial advantage, specifically on the international market, 
comprised the final step in Britain’s emergence as a major industrial pow-
er in the nineteenth century. Agricultural change and cotton production’s 
mechanization had set off a chain reaction – first a surplus of laborers, then 
a surplus of goods, and finally a needed market beyond domestic consump-
tion for those goods. Even though Britain demanded cotton textiles, the 
mechanization of the industry saturated the domestic market by the end of 
the eighteenth century. For example, in 1795, Britain produced 40 million 
yards of cotton, far exceeding British home need. Furthermore, cotton prices 
decreased as output rose with mechanization, from 38 shillings per pound 
of cotton yarn in 1786 to 2 shillings per pound by the early 1800s. At the 
same time, industrial workers’ numbers grew, as seen in Manchester’s fac-
tory and related population – which increased from approximately 40,000 
in the 1780s to about 70,000 by 1801.33 Cotton manufacturers attempted an 
early form of salesmanship on the home market, promoting cotton printed 
with national figures and attractive designs and encouraging customers to 
32  Winks and Neuberger, 64. 
33  “The City in European History – Industrial Manchester in the Nineteenth Century,” 
Primary Sources, The Industrial Revolution, The University of North Carolina at Pembroke, 
Department of History, http://www.uncp.edu/home/rwb/manchester_19c.html (accessed 
May 31, 2011). 
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fulfill their desire for more cloth.34 Unfortunately for those manufacturers, 
the domestic market had reached its threshold, and Britain had to find an 
external market for surplus goods to maintain the eighteenth century sta-
tus quo and to progress into the nineteenth century. However, Britain was 
well-situated to capture the international market, as it could sell for less. 
Cotton mechanization dramatically lowered the cost of labor and improved 
the final product. British industrial cotton produced on Cartwright’s loom 
was of the same quality as the high-grade, non-mechanized Indian cotton 
textiles which dominated the international market, but it was much lower 
in price because of time-saving technical improvements.35 In addition, Brit-
ain acquired a dependable supply of raw cotton in the last decade of the 
eighteenth century from the American South, primarily due to the cotton 
gin and guaranteed slave labor, and could thus expand its market without 
fear of disrupting its raw material supply.36 Ultimately, Britain was able 
to gain a commercial advantage on the world market and deter industrial 
decline due to the diversion of a key economic rival in the late eighteenth 
century. 
Between 1789 and 1815, Britain had a decided commercial advan-
tage on the world market because France was embroiled in and diverted by 
the French Revolution and a series of subsequent wars. While agriculture 
provided the labor supply and cotton the product and the mechanization, 
the concurrent economic disengagement of France was perhaps the key 
factor in British emergence as a major industrial power in the nineteenth 
century. France, as well as the majority of the European continent, was con-
sumed by war in the late eighteenth century and was greatly hindered in 
34  Griffiths, Hunt, and O’Brien, 891, 900-01.
35  George N. Von Tunzelmann, “Time-Saving Technical Change: The Cotton Industry in the 
English Industrial Revolution,” Explorations in Economic History 32, no. 1 (1995): 17.
36  Mokyr, 1:19.
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either competing with Britain or replicating British technology, a situation 
which “helped determine the relative technological performance” of Britain 
in that period.37 By the mid-eighteenth century, Britain was about to expe-
rience agricultural change and see the rise of cotton and mechanization, 
but was still on equal footing with other major European powers – Spain, 
Portugal, France, and the Dutch. By 1850, Britain was acknowledged as 
the unrivalled industrial power and the “workshop of the world.” 38 This 
distinction was due to Britain’s ability to seize the competitive advantage 
while the rest of Europe was occupied by war in the preceding century. 
Nineteenth-century British thinkers were aware of the importance 
of the ongoing wars in Europe for British commercial advantage. In 1814, 
lawyer Patrick Colquhoun asserted that he believed “it [was] impossible to 
contemplate the progress of manufactures in Great Britain within the last 
thirty years without wonder and astonishment. Its rapidity, particularly 
since the commencement of the French revolutionary war, exceeds all 
credibility.”39 Oddly, many modern historians seem to disregard this 
eighteenth-century factor in the emergence of nineteenth- century British 
industrial superiority, preferring instead to focus on late nineteenth-
century developments in railroad transportation – particularly in India 
and Africa – and the consequent boost to British industrial expansion.40 
Nevertheless, the international vacuum from 1789 to 1815 was crucial in 
establishing British industrial dominance, and the British navy played a 
key role in maintaining Britain’s newfound competitive advantage.41
Throughout that twenty-six year period, the British navy prevent-
37  Ibid., 1:33. 
38  J. R. Ward, “The Industrial Revolution and British Imperialism, 1750-1850,” Economic 
History Review 47, no. 1 (1994): 44.
39  Quoted in Berg and Hudson, 26. 
40  Usher, 125. 
41  Hobsbawm, 111. 
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ed efforts from mainland Europe, especially France, to enter the interna-
tional market via the seas. Accordingly, Britain was able to seize approxi-
mately 50% of the existing world trade in cotton textiles that it did not al-
ready control.42 While somewhat dubiously regarded today, British cotton 
producers at the time claimed that they supplied French troops with the 
cotton elements of their uniforms owing to British industrial supremacy.43 
Regardless of boastful tales, Britain certainly expanded its market and re-
lieved the pressure of surplus cotton textiles at home. For example, Britain 
consolidated control of India, captured markets in South Africa and the 
Dutch East Indies, and obtained a lucrative trade agreement with former 
Spanish colonies in Latin America.44 With the help of its navy, Britain was 
further enabled to claim the cotton trade with China by the 1790s. Overall, 
the vacuum created by mainland European wars allowed the worth of 
cotton exports to soar, from £13.6 million in 1786 to £24 million in 1796.45 
Britain’s mechanization and the international market vacuum were a lucky 
coincidence, but they were fully utilized to continue the process of indus-
trialization.
Based upon eighteenth-century agricultural change and mecha-
nization of the cotton industry, British industrial dominance was indis-
putable by 1815. “As the only industrial power, [Britain] could undersell 
anyone else, and the less discrimination there was, the more she could 
undersell.”46 As ruthless as British industrial supremacy seems, it was sim-
ply a fact of the time. Continental European wars severely damaged the 
economy of rival European nations, and Britain prospered. If the conflicts 
from 1789 to 1815 did not create Britain’s competitive advantage, then 
42  Harvie, 423-24. 
43  Ibid., 435. 
44  Ibid., 436. 
45  Ward, 56-60.
46  Hobsbawm, 196. 
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they certainly widened the competitive gap in Britain’s favor.47 Moreover, 
Britain made the most of the chaotic political and economic situation to 
strengthen its industrial standing around the world. Britain sought to 
sell its cheaper and better cotton textiles everywhere, without regard for 
protective tariffs or indigenous industries. Britain also protected its ad-
vanced machines, such as Crompton’s mule and Cartwright’s loom, with 
patents, which was an easier task in wartime due to a heightened sense of 
security and the naval blockade. Essentially, Britain preserved its lead on 
the international market by combining its cotton products with forcible 
sales.48 Britain could maintain that level of commerce into the nineteenth 
century because its textile factories could easily meet increased demand, 
its machines capable of doubling replication.49 In the late eighteenth cen-
tury, Britain succeeded in cornering the international cotton market, a feat 
that was predictive of its standing as a major industrial power in the nine-
teenth century. 
Before 1750, Britain was unquestionably agricultural and no 
modern industry existed; yet, in only a century, Britain would become 
the world’s industrial leader.50 Such astonishing and swift progress was 
made possible by three intertwined root causes which occurred in the late 
eighteenth century. Today, most historians agree that “Britain had the 
right combination at the right time” – and the right combination consisted 
of agricultural change, cotton’s ascendancy, and diversion of a key 
economic rival.51 The mutual causation of Britain’s industrial revolution 
neither exceeded previous nor surpassed later achievements in historical 
progress, but both the intensity and duration of Britain’s industrialization, 
47  Mokyr, 1: 33. 
48  Winks and Neuberger, 83. 
49  Ward, 60-61.
50  “The City in European History – Industrial Manchester in the Nineteenth Century.”
51  Winks and Neuberger, 83. 
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as well as its ability to advance without causing malnutrition, made it 
atypical of all subsequent world industrialization.52 Indeed, agricultural 
change, cotton and mechanization, and commercial advantage coincided 
and “surged up with a suddenness for which it is difficult to find a 
parallel at any other time or place.”53 The city of Manchester, England, 
serves to illustrate the intensity and power of British industrialization. 
In 1773, Manchester had no cotton mills and roughly 25,000 citizens; in 
1802, it boasted 52 mills and a population of 95,000.54 Undeniably, Britain 
witnessed a transition to industrialization from the late eighteenth to early 
nineteenth century. 
Explaining Britain’s emergence as a major industrial power 
requires pinpointing the root causes which made industrialization possible 
and necessitates the identification of the context in which industrialization 
actually began. As this paper has shown, eighteenth-century events were 
the combined root causes and context in which Britain emerged as an 
industrial power in the nineteenth century. While supported by modern 
historians, this view of British industrialization was first proposed by 
astute nineteenth-century British observers. In 1835, Andrew Ure observed 
that “when the first water-frames for spinning cotton were erected at 
Cromford, in the romantic valley of the Derwent, about sixty years ago, 
mankind were little aware of the mighty revolution which the new system 
of labor was destined by Providence to achieve.”55 A similar opinion is 
found in Richard Guest’s Compendious History of the Cotton Manufacture, 
published in 1823. Guest noted that it was a “curious circumstance, that, 
when the Cotton Manufacture was in its infancy, all the operations … 
52  Komlos, 85. 
53  Peter Temin, “Two Views of the British Industrial Revolution,” Journal of Economic History 
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were completed under the roof of the weaver’s cottage. The course of 
improved manufacture which followed was to spin the yarn in factories.” 
Guest was amazed that “those vast brick edifices in the vicinity of all the 
great manufacturing towns in the south of Lancashire, towering to the 
height of seventy or eighty feet, which strike the attention and excite the 
curiosity of the traveler, now perform labors which formerly employed 
whole villages.”56 In 1881, Arnold Toynbee, who first defined British 
industrialization as a distinct era, affirmed “an agrarian revolution plays 
as large part in the great industrial change of the end of the eighteenth 
century as does the revolution in manufacturing industries.”57 As those 
contemporaries noted, agricultural change, cotton, and competitive 
advantage on the world market made Britain the premier industrial power 
by the advent of the nineteenth century. Yet, Britain would continue 
its industrial dominance because innovation in those three original 
root industrial causes created an environment for greater industrial 
advancement, in effect a chain reaction of infinite possibility. 
56  Richard Guest, “The Steam Loom, 1823,” Modern History Sourcebook – Industrial 
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Politics, Persistence, and Power: 
The Strategy That Won the French 
Wars
Jackson Prather
In the year 1815, as the dust settled on the battlefield of Waterloo and 
the ink dried on the various agreements signed at the Congress of 
Vienna, Great Britain emerged as the undisputed hegemon of Europe. 
She commanded the seas and vanquished Napoleon. The Industrial 
Revolution powered the dynamic, robust British economy, and the Empire 
extended from the Caribbean to Southeast Asia and from the British Isles 
to the southern tip of Africa. Great Britain seemed invincible and the 
greatest power the world had yet known. However, the previous twenty-
two years were among the most difficult and perilous in British history. 
For those two decades Great Britain was at near constant war with her 
age-old rival: France. Ultimately, Great Britain won the French Wars 
because of strategy.
The French Wars, as they were known in Britain, lasted from 
1793-1815, with a brief ceasefire in 1802-1803 called the Peace of Amiens. 
The hostilities in Europe actually began in 1792 with the Coalition of 
Kings – an alliance between Prussia and Austria – that was created to end 
the French Revolution and reinstate the Bourbon monarchy. The combat 
expanded and soon embroiled Europe in the most destructive war it had 
yet seen. The first period of the war, lasting from 1792-1802, is known 
as the French Revolutionary War. By the time the war resumed in 1803, 
French General Napoleon Bonaparte had become the leader of France, 
and as such started the second phase of the war, the Napoleonic War 
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(1803-1815). The wars were fought as a series of seven Coalitions against 
France, and these alliances were made up primarily of Great Britain, 
Austria, Prussia, and Russia. The Coalitions were named in order of their 
formation, from the First Coalition (1793-1797) to the Seventh Coalition 
(1815). 
Great Britain was the most persistent and steadfast opponent of 
France, refusing to accept French dominance in Europe and remaining 
totally dedicated to the destruction of the French Empire. Although Britain 
would emerge with a complete victory over France, such a victory seemed 
unlikely if not impossible for the majority of the French Wars. France was 
a military juggernaut, and on numerous occasions Britain’s allies were 
forced to surrender and left the British as the only power left opposing 
France’s quest to conquer all of Europe. 
Great Britain’s strategy was to proceed with caution and 
pragmatism throughout the wars. Victory was a byproduct of Britain’s 
ability to overcome and persevere when the odds were against her. The 
British political system encouraged dissent yet managed to consistently 
find solutions. Great Britain had far fewer soldiers than France but was 
much better at forging alliances. Britain’s willingness to adapt when 
plans failed allowed her to develop a comprehensive strategy that would 
eventually lead to victory. 
I. Overcoming Difficulties
Britain’s victory in the French Wars is all the more impressive when the 
difficulties she overcame are considered: internal political dissent and 
upheaval, a constant shortage of manpower, and recurring chaos in the 
Coalitions. Much of the domestic dissent was caused by the epic events 
unfolding across the English Channel. The British watched everything the 
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French did very closely, and this was no exception.
When the French Revolution broke out in 1789, the reaction in 
Britain was altogether confused. The previous century had seen the most 
intense stage of the Anglo-French rivalry, often referred to as the Second 
Hundred Years’ War.1 Hatred for the French was as fervent as ever in 
Britain, and the sour taste left by the French intervention in the War of 
American Independence still lingered. The British, always conscious of 
economic competition, saw the French Revolution as an opportunity 
to reassert their naval power globally and once and for all become the 
world’s commercial titan.2 The French Revolution was more than a mere 
regime change and, much like the American Revolution, produced strong 
ideology that challenged the status quo that existed in Europe. Many 
in Britain sympathized with this new political philosophy, including 
powerful men in Parliament, like Charles James Fox and William Pitt 
the Younger.3 The British considered themselves to be a free people and 
the French to be subjects of a despotic government. Fox was a proponent 
of Britain welcoming the Revolution with open arms and embracing 
the revolutionary spirit that was sweeping the world. Fox’s ideological 
rival, Edmund Burke, almost instantly recognized the threat that the 
French Revolution posed to both France and the whole of Europe. Burke 
went so far as to call the events in France an “irreparable calamity to 
mankind,” and predicted that the Revolution would soon be taken over 
by some charismatic general that would lead France into perpetual war.4 
The rivalry between Fox and Burke would be played out not only in 
1  Clive Emsley, Britain and the French Revolution (Harlow: Longman, 2000), 3.
2  Michael Duffy, “British Diplomacy and the French Wars 1789-1815,” In Britain and the 
French Revolution (Basingstroke: Macmillan, 1989), 127.
3  Trevor Lloyd, Empire: The History of the British Empire (London: Hambledon and London, 
2001), 63; William Pitt, Orations on the French War (London: London, 1906), 18. 
4  Emsley, 10; Lloyd, 64.
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Parliament, but also throughout the British public. Many were appalled 
at the behavior of the French, while others thought the Revolution 
wonderful and a sign of possible political reform in Britain as well. 
 Opinion began to sway in favor of the conservative opponents 
of the French Revolution in 1792. Tension between France and her two 
primary continental rivals, Prussia and Austria, reached a breaking 
point on 20 April 1792 when France declared war. Prussia and Austria 
were longtime rivals, having just fought a war in the late 1770s.5 The 
events in France terrified the two nations enough to force an alliance of 
convenience, and they prepared for an invasion of France.6 This alliance, 
known as the Coalition of Kings, was expected to crush the disorganized 
French armies and restore the Bourbon monarchy. Regardless of how 
confident many were of victory, the people of Britain had no interest in 
waging yet another war against France. British finances were still in poor 
order following the loss of the American colonies, and war against France 
did not provide any advantages for Britain. Therefore, Britain remained 
neutral. It was not until the surprising French victory over invading 
Austro-Prussian forces and the subsequent French invasion of the Low 
Countries7 that Britain became concerned with France’s behavior. Britain 
had always feared French expansionism, and in November 1792 France 
conquered and occupied present-day Belgium at the Battle of Jemappes.8 
The situation escalated in January 1793 with the execution of France’s 
King Louis XVI. This action horrified the British people because they 
remembered what chaos and bloodshed resulted from the execution 
of a monarch in their own civil war during the 17th century. Then, on 1 
5  War of Austrian Succession
6  Stephen Pope, The Cassell Dictionary of the Napoleonic Wars. (London: Cassell, 1999), 10-16.
7  Present-day Belgium and the Netherlands
8  Pope, 17, 529.
Articles 89 
February, France declared war on Great Britain. Although the British 
government had positioned itself to oppose France long before this 
declaration, the fact that France appeared the aggressor united many in 
Parliament and the public.9
 Political and public dissent would continue for the course of the 
war. George III was involved in strategic planning, and his opinion was 
widely respected in Parliament. He supported prosecuting the war against 
France and finding European allies to fight alongside Britain.10 William Pitt 
the Younger, George’s hand-chosen Prime Minister, honored the King’s 
wishes and sought peace only when it appeared favorable for Britain - as 
it did in 1802.11 George III’s involvement prevented any type of broadly 
supported coalition from forming within Parliament and alienated many 
factions, such as the Foxites. Fox strongly supported peace in 1796 as the 
First Coalition appeared to be on the brink of collapse, but George III 
insisted that no peace negotiations be held until after the completion of 
British expeditions to the East and West Indies.12 
 Popular dissent was also a problem for Britain throughout the 
war. Riots raged constantly and grew increasingly violent as the war 
affected more and more Britons. The Burdett riots in April 1810 and the 
food price riots that resulted from the poor harvest of 1811 epitomized 
this trend. Compounded by the ever-present fear of Irish insurrection, 
Britain was forced to tie down over forty thousand infantrymen and five 
regiments of cavalry for the purpose of maintaining domestic security.13 
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King George III had no tolerance for such insubordination, and in June 
1798 he wrote to Pitt about these riots: “I trust … that as the sword is 
drawn it not be returned into the sheath until the whole country has 
submitted without condition.”14 These events siphoned valuable resources 
that could have otherwise been used against France. 
 Great Britain faced a massive shortage of manpower during the 
French Wars. At the outbreak of war, Britain’s population was a little more 
than half that of France.15 The British Army was always outnumbered in 
battle, and therefore was forced to rely on Coalitions to deploy enough 
men to fight the French. Even the combined forces of Austria, Prussia, 
Russia, and Britain struggled to match the enormous French armies, 
which were the result of levee en masse, or mass conscription. After 1796, 
France held the numerical advantage over the combined forces of the 
Coalition.16 France neglected their navy and was able to put all of her 
manpower resources into the army, creating the most formidable fighting 
force the world had yet seen. Britain’s constitutional system forbade 
such measures to force men into service. The British thought themselves 
a free people in direct contrast to the French. Conscription is the most 
coercive act a government can perform on its citizens, therefore the British 
government would not dare to mimic the French.  Britain struggled 
mightily to convince men to sign up to be sent overseas. It was seen as a 
death sentence by the public to enlist in the British Army, especially after 
the horrifying casualties in the West Indies campaign of 1793 that resulted 
in the death of over sixty thousand British regulars from disease.17 
 This lack of manpower severely constrained Britain’s strategic 
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options and made large-scale offensive operations rare. The overwhelming 
majority of British soldiers were used in either the defense of the British 
Isles or in the protection of colonial possessions. This left small armies 
for invasions into Europe, which is the primary reason for Britain’s lack 
of continental success prior to the Peninsular War in 1808. The lack of 
available men encouraged caution on the part of British commanders and 
fostered a reluctance to use British soldiers unless all other options had 
been exhausted. This strategy caused distrust among the Coalition allies 
and made it difficult for Britain to convince her allies of her dedication to 
the cause. 
 Great Britain was well aware that she could not defeat France on 
her own; France was equally aware that she could not defeat Britain on her 
own. The stalemate was compounded by the tactical situation: Britain was 
dominant on the seas, and France’s land armies were unstoppable. These 
two great advantages cancelled one another out as Britain’s navy blocked 
France from invading the British Isles, and France’s army prevented 
Britain from being able to gain a foothold on the continent. In order to tip 
the balance of power in their favor the two rivals had to build powerful 
alliances. France and Napoleon conquered nations and conscripted their 
people into service or subdued foreign governments and forced them 
into alliances. The latter was the case in Spain and the Confederation of 
the Rhine. Great Britain, however, was the only power involved in the 
French Wars not interested in territorial gains in Europe, and therefore 
went about alliance building in a very different way: financial and tactical 
support. Despite Britain’s success in building these Coalitions, they were 
very turbulent and unhappy alliances that resulted in infighting, betrayal, 
and rampant distrust. 
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 In wars past, such as the Seven Years’ War, Britain relied on 
significant numbers of European mercenaries (i.e. Prussians) and would 
support them with small detachments of British regulars. This, combined 
with a dominant British naval presence, was enough to defeat the enemy 
and emerge victorious. The Anglo-Prussian alliance was made all the 
more convenient by the lack of Prussian colonial ambitions and Britain’s 
disinterest in territorial expansion in Europe.18 However, with Prussia’s 
rise in the late 18th century and increased appetite for land in Northern 
Europe, notably in Hanover, the native land of the British monarchs, 
Britain could no longer rely on Prussia for ground forces. Furthermore, 
when Prussia and Austria formed the “Coalition of Kings” in 1792 to 
invade France, Prussia would need every soldier she could muster, 
leaving none to hire out to the British. For the British, a stronger, broader 
Coalition had to be built from all European countries threatened by 
French expansionism. 
Britain built these Coalitions in two primary ways - financial 
support, through subsidies and loans, and tactical support, via weaponry 
donations and naval support.19 In this way, Britain was able to cobble 
together Coalitions time and time again to resist French expansion. 
Britain did not initiate the First Coalition (1792-1797), but soon joined in 
early 1793 after the French invasion of the Low Countries and France’s 
subsequent declaration of war on Britain. French victories in 1794 and 
1795 threatened to collapse the Coalition, but Britain held it together until 
1797 when Austria made a separate peace with France at Campo Formio. 
Almost two years later Britain, Austria, Russia, and several smaller nations 
formed the Second Coalition to oppose French actions on the Rhine 
18  Pope, 12.
19  Lloyd, 65.
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and in Italy. Initial allied success soon gave way to humiliating defeat, 
primarily at the hands of France’s rising star: Napoleon Bonaparte. The 
Second Coalition collapsed in 1801 despite Britain’s valiant efforts to hold 
it together. By early 1802, Britain was the only nation still at war with 
France; soon the Peace of Amiens was signed between the two countries 
bringing about the only period between 1793 and 1815 that Britain and 
France were not at war.20 
Great Britain was able to assess her strategy during this brief 
cessation of hostilities, because even the most optimistic Britons knew that 
Amiens was a mere ceasefire and more war was on the horizon. Prime 
Minister William Pitt the Younger and his top advisors believed that as 
long as Napoleon was in command in France, Britain would not be safe. 
Despite the peace treaty, Bonaparte remained aggressive with Britain, 
saying to the British ambassador Lord Malmesbury, “Our real enemy is 
England. The French Republic must either destroy the English monarchy 
or be destroyed by it.”21 Napoleon was not the only one making such 
declarations, however, as Lord Grenville, the British Foreign Secretary, 
had said that Britain would never allow France to be the ruler of the Low 
Countries.22 The Peace of Amiens was merely an attempt by both nations to 
address domestic issues and retool for impending war. 
The way in which the first two Coalitions ended seriously 
hindered Britain’s trust in her allies. Despite agreements to the contrary, 
Coalition members made separate peace with France, alienating Britain 
and exposing the weakness of the Coalition to France. The lack of trust 
and respect was ubiquitous in the Coalitions. Prussia and Austria were 
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age-old rivals; the flimsy Coalition of Kings in 1792 was marked by a 
total lack of coordination and rampant showmanship by the respective 
armies.23 Prussia, Austria, and Russia all had territorial ambitions in 
Poland, which constantly caused rifts in the Coalition and distracted 
valuable resources away from the war against France. The obsession 
with Poland heavily frustrated Britain due to its total irrelevance to the 
French issue. Conversely, Britain’s lack of interest in Eastern Europe 
caused Prussia, Austria, and Russia to view Britain as selfish. The three 
continental Coalition members also distrusted Britain because of her 
strategy during the first two Coalitions. While Britain maintained control 
of the seas and gained riches in the form of colonial possessions in the 
West and East Indies, Africa, and India, the continental allies endured 
heavy casualties and territorial losses (in the case of Austria and Prussia) 
at the hands of the French.24 The allies consistently overestimated Britain’s 
military strength, and at nearly every negotiation demanded that Britain 
open a western front against France. 
Prussia, Austria, and Russia also repeatedly overestimated 
Britain’s financial reserves and the liquidity of her wealth.25 Following 
the War of American Independence, Britain was in a state of economic 
calamity. In 1783 William Pitt the Younger became Prime Minister, and 
because of his skill Britain’s finances began to slowly improve. But just 
as things started to look better in the early 1790s, the war with France 
broke out, placing enormous strain on the British economy. Though 
Britain weathered the war better than any other European nation, she 
was not immune to debt and deficits. The lack of available funds for loans 
posed a problem for Britain every time she attempted to form a Coalition 
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or keep one together; an ally would ask for a significant sum of money 
but Britain could only provide a portion. Prussia, Russia, and Austria 
thought that Britain was being greedy and hoarding her money. Since, as 
the continental allies believed, Britain was not negotiating in good faith, 
they did not have to either. Russia had at the end of the Second Coalition 
formed the Armed Neutrality of the North and convinced Denmark, 
Sweden, and Prussia to join the league to oppose British commercial 
policy. Britain had used her navy to enforce a rule called the right of 
search, which essentially authorized British vessels to stop any ship, allied 
or neutral, to search for potential contraband headed for France. The 
sudden hostility from longtime allies posed several significant problems 
for Britain. Primarily, it threatened to undermine Britain’s last effective 
weapon against France - the blockade. It also cut Britain off from valuable 
resources that she acquired from the Baltic: grain to feed the people of 
Britain (compounding food riots at home) and timber to build and repair 
ships. In 1801, Britain used force to coerce the Danes out of the league, and 
soon thereafter it fell apart.26 Nonetheless, the Armed Neutrality of the 
North exemplified the hostilities among Coalition members and furthered 
the lack of trust among them. 
Britain so heavily disliked her allies when war with France 
resumed in 1803 that many prominent British MPs such as Lord Grenville 
and Charles James Fox opposed the formation of a Third Coalition. Fox 
believed bringing Prussia and Austria into the war would “end in making 
Bonaparte as much in effect the monarch of Germany as he is France.”27 
Had it not been for King George III’s insistence, it is unlikely that Britain 
would have sought another Coalition because the first two Coalitions 
26  Chandler, 16-17.
27  Hall, 59.
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ended in dismal failure. Britain loaned Prussia and Austria huge sums of 
money that were unlikely to ever be paid back, and the two continental 
allies had shown a complete inability to defeat or even slow down the 
French armies.28 
The distrust manifested itself tactically on the battlefield 
throughout the wars, mostly in the form of a lack of coordination. In 1793, 
the First Coalition had France in a compromised situation, with armies 
in disarray and the French frontiers open to invasion. An inability to 
manage a systematic attack on France allowed the Revolutionary armies 
to regroup. By 1794 the window had passed and the French armies were 
on the offensive again.29 The Sixth Coalition was also afflicted by the lack 
of coordination. Great Britain and Russia formed the alliance in 1812 
following Napoleon’s ill-fated invasion of Russia; Portugal and Spain 
joined nominally to pledge support for their liberators, the British.30 When 
Napoleon’s armies limped back into central Europe, Prussia betrayed 
the French.31 Despite the state of Napoleon’s armies, he was able to 
regroup and destroy both Prussian and Austrian forces that launched dis-
coordinated attacks against him. Even the victorious Seventh Coalition 
faced a lack of comprehensive battlefield strategy. Upon Napoleon’s 
return in 1815, disagreement about whether to strike at the heart of France 
or confront the French army that was invading the Low Countries almost 
caused disaster. Fortunately for the Coalition, the Duke of Wellington 
marched to meet the French and crushed Napoleon, winning the most 
famous battle of the age at Waterloo.32 Even with victory on the cusp, 
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the allies struggled to come together and fight Napoleon as one unified 
Coalition. The Coalitions were victorious in spite of themselves, for the 
distrust and lack of coordination gave France far more opportunities to 
continue fighting than she had earned. 
II. Colonial or Continental Strategy
When Great Britain joined the war in 1793 she faced a tough decision 
regarding her primary strategy. Henry Dundas, the Secretary of State 
for War from 1794-1801, was a strong proponent of a colonial strategy, 
which entailed conquering French and French-allied colonial possessions 
in order to deny France the income that would help continue the war.33 
Lord Grenville, who served as the Home Secretary, the War Secretary, 
and Prime Minister at various times throughout the war, argued for a 
continental strategy and never supported any peace negotiations with 
France.34 Grenville believed that the only way to secure a true peace with 
France was total victory, and that included the defeat and abdication of 
Napoleon. Total victory could not be achieved by battles in the West Indies 
and India, so Grenville strongly advocated the use of British resources 
on the European continent to directly confront and defeat France. His 
opponents, including Dundas, disagreed primarily because of the 
potential cost of such a strategy; Britain had virtually no battlefield success 
against France in the first decade of the war and continued defeat could 
open up the British Isles to French invasion. The two strategies, colonial or 
continental, would be the primary argument among British policymakers 
throughout the French Wars. 
At first, the debate was so heated and eloquently argued for both 
33  Henry Dundas, Memoirs of the Right Honorable Henry Dundas, Lord Viscount Melville 
(London: James Imray, 1805), 14-5; Chandler, 130.
34  Chandler, 184-185.
98 Articles 
sides that Britain attempted to do both.35 This dual strategy was doomed 
to fail, for Britain did not have the resources to pursue colonial conquests 
and continental confrontation. Inevitable failure of such a strategy was 
obvious to most all policymakers; even King George III recognized it. He 
wrote to Pitt in September 1793: “The misfortune of our situation is that 
we have too many objects to attend to, and our force must be consequently 
too small at each place.”36
 Through trial and error – mostly the latter – Britain learned that 
Grenville was right. Britain could not have lasting peace and security 
without a total defeat of France. During the First Coalition, Britain 
aggressively sought French colonial possessions in the West Indies. In 
1794, Britain captured Martinique, France’s major military outpost in 
the Caribbean.37 By 1795 the Dutch had joined the war on the side of the 
French, and the British seized the opportunity by capturing the Cape 
of Good Hope and Ceylon.38 This strategy was highly successful for 
British commercial and colonial interests. India was now protected from 
French and Dutch intervention, which allowed for great expansion on 
the subcontinent by the British East India Company. Britain rationalized 
the conquest of India with the potential threat of Napoleon marching his 
army from Egypt to India in the footsteps of Alexander the Great. Britain 
wanted total control over India before the French Revolution had even 
started, but the war with France provided an opportunity and excuse to 
pacify India.39
 The colonial strategy started to backfire by 1803. The West Indies 
campaign, although met with initial success, ended in disaster. Well over 
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60,000 British soldiers died from disease, with another 40,000 more being 
deemed unfit to fight. The effect of this mass loss of troops was twofold. 
First, many of the soldiers that died were Britain’s finest regulars, well 
trained with some experience in India. Second, the West Indies disaster 
ruined British troop morale. Defections increased and recruitment of fresh 
troops became nearly impossible.40 Strategically, the colonial strategy was 
ineffective relative to Britain’s war goal to establish peace and security. It 
became clear that Britain had overestimated France’s reliance on colonial 
income for her war effort, because with the French monarchy went 
the old systems of financing wars. France was not only able to harness 
all available domestic manpower for the war effort, but also all her 
financial resources. Napoleon paid little mind to the loss of the colonies, 
and only on one occasion - Peace of Amiens 1802 - did France want the 
captured colonies back. Following the Haitian revolution (1791-1804) and 
Napoleon’s sale of Louisiana to the United States in 1803, Britain realized 
that France was willing to abandon colonial possessions for the sake of 
continuing her European conquests.41 The British colonial strategy tied 
up huge numbers of warships and military personnel in the protection of 
Britain’s increasingly massive Empire. British forces were spread thin, and 
French blockade running was becoming more of a problem.42 Eventually, 
the fear of a French invasion forced Britain to refocus her efforts on 
Europe, but not before her strategy would cause problems with her 
Coalition allies. 
 While Great Britain was at the negotiating table with Prussia, 
Russia, and Austria trying to convince her allies of commitment to the 
European theatre, she was also conquering and plundering French and 
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Dutch colonies. Prussia, Russia, and Austria had deployed large land 
armies in Europe to engage the French and had suffered heavily for it, so 
it was no surprise that the continental Coalition members saw Britain as 
getting rich and expanding her Empire while they endured embarrassing 
defeats and humiliating peace arrangements at the hands of the French.43 
If Britain was going to defeat France, she needed the trust and cooperation 
of the continental allies. In order to gain and keep that trust, Britain 
needed a permanent western front against France. The memory of 
Britain’s repeated failures to gain a foothold in Western Europe made it 
very difficult for her to commit troops to a continental invasion. 
 When the French Wars first broke out in 1792 between France and 
Austro-Prussian forces, most European observers thought that the war 
would be short lived and end in French defeat. Rapid French victories 
at Valmy and Jemappes terrified the British, because it was at that point 
that it became obvious that France posed a threat to Britain directly.44 If 
a Revolutionary army full of untrained volunteers could so thoroughly 
defeat the professional armies of Prussia and Austria, all of Europe had 
something to fear in French expansionism. Jemappes was strategically 
very threatening to Britain as well, for it opened the way for French 
control of the Low Countries, which were Britain’s entry point for trade 
into Northern Europe. The great port of Antwerp provided a terrific 
location for France to assemble and launch an invasion force of Britain. 
Therefore, in February 1793, George III authorized Britain’s first military 
action of the war by deploying one brigade of Foot Guards to push the 
French out of the Low Countries. George III’s second son, the Duke of 
York, commanded this force. The Duke of York was not a competent 
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military commander, but even if he were, the expedition was doomed 
to fail. No general - not even Napoleon - could have emerged victorious 
with one brigade of light infantry against the hordes of the French 
Revolutionary army and the expert French artillery. To compound the 
difficulties, George III prohibited his son’s forces from being amalgamated 
into a larger allied force, arguing that no British Royal would be made 
subordinate to a German commander.45
 By 1795, the British were expelled from the Low Countries and 
France had become their de facto ruler. In June 1795, the British exhibited 
their trademark persistence and tried again, this time at Quiberon in 
southern Brittany, France. The Royal Navy deployed over three thousand 
French royalist émigré troops in an effort to create a counter-revolution. 
France quickly crushed the rebellion, which was marred by infighting 
among the royalist troops. Quiberon was the first and last major attempt 
by the British to use French émigré soldiers to foment a French rebellion, 
because as the British envoy reported to Parliament after the failure, 
“However [much] they hate one another, they all in the bottom detest 
us (the British).”46 These routine defeats at the hands of an increasingly 
confident and experienced French army forced Britain to nearly abort the 
continental strategy time and time again, for it was cheaper and easier to 
conquer French colonies. 
 Events in the Iberian Peninsula provided Great Britain with the 
opportunity to open up the long awaited western front against France. 
Portugal, long considered a British ally despite an official alliance with 
France, repeatedly refused to comply with Napoleon’s Continental 
System and continued to trade with the British and harbor Royal Navy 
45  Rose, 223-224.
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vessels.47 The Portuguese disobedience infuriated Napoleon and led 
to the deployment of French soldiers throughout Spain in preparation 
for an invasion of Portugal. The Spanish were not content with French 
rule either, and by 1807 the Iberian Peninsula was in open revolt against 
Napoleon. Spain requested British assistance in 1808, and Britain seized 
the opportunity and sent Lt. General Arthur Wellesley and General Sir 
John Moore to lead a British army in the liberation of Spain and Portugal. 
Success was not immediate, however. Napoleon himself marched a 
massive army across the Pyrenees and re-conquered Spain. Before he 
could finish off the British army at Corunna, he had to return to Paris 
because of increasing instability in his empire. The British army was 
able to escape, but General Moore was killed in the evacuation. Arthur 
Wellesley was now in command of the British forces.48
 Wellesley waged a calculated war of successive defensive and 
offensive operations that frustrated and eventually defeated the French 
in Portugal and Spain. For his actions he was made the first Duke of 
Wellington and received the baton of Field Marshall from George IV. 
The Peninsular War lasted from 1807-1814,49 and at varying times held 
down between 150,000 and 350,000 French soldiers while the British 
never deployed more than 50,000 men. Wellington’s campaign was the 
most brilliant exhibition of British martial genius in history, causing 
France to bleed money and soldiers during a period when they could 
least afford it. Napoleon massively underestimated Wellington and the 
British, for in 1812 – the height of the Peninsular War – he embarked on 
the infamous invasion of Russia. The Peninsular War epitomized British 
strategy throughout the French Wars. Although at first unsuccessful, 
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Britain remained persistent and refused to capitulate to the French. 
Outnumbered, Britain used her resources expertly, letting the French 
be the aggressors until the opportunity to strike presented itself. That 
opportunity came at Salamanca and Vitoria, where Wellington proved 
he was as capable an offensive general as he was defensive. By late 1813, 
Portugal and Spain were free from French oppression, and on 7 October 
1813 Wellington led his army through the Pyrenees and onto French soil, 
becoming the first allied army to do so since 1793. This British victory 
combined with the shattering of Napoleon’s army in Russia reinvigorated 
French opposition in Europe.50 Nearly every European country was at war 
with France in 1814 in what was to become known as the Sixth Coalition, 
and the first victorious Coalition of the French Wars. 
 Once the successes of the Peninsular War became clear to those 
in Parliament and London, British strategy was firmly continental. If 
France were to be thoroughly defeated, they would not pose a colonial 
threat regardless, which would enable Britain to be master of the seas 
and the dominant colonial power in Europe. The Peninsular War led to 
the liberation of Portugal and Spain, but the French Wars were disastrous 
for both countries, resulting in the eventual loss of their South American 
empires. Britain realized that the war was naturally eliminating imperial 
rivals, which allowed them to focus their resources on the issue at hand - 
defeating Napoleon and destroying the French Empire. 
III. Commercial and Strategic Interests
Great Britain’s strategy during the French Wars can simply be defined 
as pragmatic. With limited resources to expend, primarily those of 
manpower, and massive colonial commitments that required most of the 
Royal Navy to defend, Britain could not afford to waste her armies. It was 
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for this reason that Britain preferred not to capture and occupy France’s 
colonial possessions but rather to attack and open their markets by force.51 
This strategy was beneficial, especially during a time of war where Britain 
could not waste men guarding remote islands that tactically did nothing 
to defeat Napoleon. Britain’s caution grew after the resumption of war 
in 1803, for the Coalitions that formed between 1803 and 1812 were less 
comprehensive; and often, Britain was alone in their war against France. 
During this period, Britain had few major allies: Austria in 1809, Prussia 
from 1806-1807, and Russia from 1805-1807.52 If Britain were to launch an 
attack against France, it would be without support from allies. For most 
Britons, the risk of a failed assault far outweighed the benefits. France’s 
empire at its height reached from Portugal to Poland and from Antwerp 
to the Aegean. In order to cover such a daring amphibious assault, Britain 
would have to momentarily abandon her colonial possessions and open 
the British Isles up to a potential invasion. If such an assault on Europe 
were to fail, Britain would be left with no choice to make peace with 
France, and it is unlikely that Napoleon would make peace with Britain if 
they were ripe for invasion. 
 The inability to fight every battle all the time severely restricted 
Britain’s strategic options. Therefore, Great Britain only exerted her 
resources if there was a direct threat to strategic or commercial interests, 
or a great strategic or commercial benefit could be gained by doing so. 
When continental allies accused Britain of being selfish in their strategy, 
they were partly correct. However, had Britain not pursued this pragmatic 
and cautious strategy, it is unlikely they would have been able to wage 
war almost continuously from 1793-1815. Prussia, Russia, and Austria did 
51  Duffy, 139.
52  Pope, 24.
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not utilize such a strategy, and on numerous occasions were forced out of 
the war by French victory. 
 Great Britain’s strategy of only engaging when her interests were 
threatened is exemplified in the French invasion of the Low Countries 
in 1792. The unexpected French incursion violated both strategic and 
commercial interests for Great Britain. Strategically, the Scheldt River delta 
and the city of Antwerp provided arguably the best location in northwest 
Europe to assemble an invasion force to attack Britain. French control of 
this area also cut off Britain from easily meeting up with Prussian and 
Austrian forces, making any coordinated moves in northwest or northern 
Europe difficult. Commercially, the Low Countries were a major trading 
partner for Britain and were part of the primary trade route from Britain 
into northern Europe. French possession or subjugation of the Low 
Countries also meant that France controlled the Dutch fleet, which could 
pose a threat to British commerce in the Baltic Sea, North Sea, and even as 
far away as the Indian Ocean. For all of these reasons, Britain was obliged 
to get involved. Britain attempted to wrest control of the area from France 
in the 1790s, but the expedition ended in failure.53
 The Iberian revolt in 1807 provided Great Britain with an 
excellent opportunity to make substantial strategic and commercial gains. 
Commercially, Portugal and Spain owned vast empires in Central and 
South America that would make great markets for British goods. Portugal 
was a reluctant ally of France and had continually given safe harbor 
to British vessels en route to Africa, Asia, and the Mediterranean. The 
primary advantage offered by British intervention in Spain and Portugal 
was strategic. First, both Spain and Portugal possessed considerable 
fleets. The Spanish navy had suffered heavily at the Battle of Trafalgar 
53  Rose, 231.
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in 1805 at the hands of Britain’s most famous Admiral, Lord Horatio 
Nelson, but still had a capable fleet.54 As was the case with the Dutch, the 
fewer ships the French had under their command, the easier the British 
Royal Navy’s task of total blockade became.55 Better still, if these fleets 
were allied with the British, more Royal Navy vessels were available 
for colonial aggrandizement that would fulfill Britain’s desire to defeat 
France and conquer her colonies. The ferocity of the Iberian insurrection 
also guaranteed Britain of strong allied ground forces in Portugal and 
Spain. The Spanish guerillas proved especially effective, giving the British 
the critical advantage of knowing the terrain. Wellington maximized 
this advantage, expertly using topography to his defensive advantage. 
The large number of local soldiers fighting alongside the British army 
also made it easier to acquire provisions, lowered the cost of the entire 
operation, and increased troop morale. The largest strategic advantage 
provided by the Peninsular War was how it aided Britain’s efforts to build 
the Coalitions. Britain had finally opened a permanent western front 
and convinced her allies that she was totally dedicated to a land war in 
Europe. The persistence and eventual success against French armies was 
an inspiration to all the oppressed peoples and defeated armies of Europe. 
The new western front tied down hundreds of thousands of French 
regulars, and combined with the destruction of France’s Grand Army 
in the invasion of Russia, the French Empire’s eastern frontiers were left 
exposed. It was not until this period in 1812 that the Coalition saw a total 
victory over France as realistic since the early 1790s. 
Conclusion
British strategy during the French Wars was the result of years 
54  Lloyd, 65.
55  Mackesy, 159.
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of trial and error that eventually produced the winning combination 
of pragmatism, perseverance, and daring. The fact that Great Britain 
managed to overcome seemingly insurmountable odds in the 1790s speaks 
to the courage and persistence of her people and political system. Britain 
was reluctant to go to war with France, but once it began Britain would 
never surrender until victory had been achieved. The British may not have 
been totally united during these trying times, but it is through dissent 
and difference of opinion that many of the victorious strategies were 
devised. The British were willing to try anything: invasions into the Low 
Countries, support for French Royalists in Brittany, colonial conquests 
across the globe, and finally, liberation of the Iberian Peninsula. Many of 
these strategies failed, but British resilience kept the war effort going and 
pushed through until Napoleon had been defeated and peace once again 
fell over Europe. 
Great Britain was undoubtedly the most crucial opponent of the 
French during the wars. Every other European nation had at some point 
been defeated, allied themselves with the French, or were content with 
French dominance. The British vowed from the beginning to never allow 
France to be the master of Europe, even under the guise of liberty and 
revolution. That veil soon fell with the rise of Napoleon and tyranny and 
oppression remained in its place. There is no doubt that Britain gained 
much from the French Wars – near unchallenged hegemony over Europe 
and the beginnings of what was to become the largest colonial empire in 
world history - but Britain had no interest in conquering the many nations 
of Europe. Great Britain, along with her allies, liberated Europe, just as she 
would twice more in the next one hundred and fifty years. 
Sir Arthur Wellesley, the Duke of Wellington and Vice Admiral 
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Horatio Nelson, Viscount Nelson were the undisputed military heroes 
of the French Wars, but they were not the only reason Britain emerged 
victorious. Politics and diplomacy played a vital role in the war effort 
by crafting Coalitions and keeping the peace at home while Britain 
exerted all of her resources on war abroad. The French Wars provide a 
fascinating juxtaposition of a democracy waging war against an autocracy. 
The British parliamentary system was much messier and less efficient 
than the well-oiled war machine of France, but that did not prevent the 
British from achieving victory. The British were forced by their political 
system to accept failure and devise superior solutions; Napoleon never 
accepted failure. The British forged alliances by offering financial and 
tactical support, while the French created allies with coercion and military 
supremacy. In 1815, Britain was allied with most of Europe, while France 
was left friendless. The British strategy in the French Wars took nearly 
twenty years of evolution and revision to succeed, but when it did the 
victory was comprehensive and lasting. After nearly a millennium of 
warfare, the two nations would finally end their martial rivalry; 18 June 
1815 was the last day that Great Britain and France would ever be at war 
with one another. 
Articles 109 
UNITED STATES HISTORY
110 Articles 
From Benevolent Institution to  
Negotiated Space: 
A Historiographical Examination of 
Slave Christianity 
Brandon Blaylock
Every single fact does indeed evolve, but only as an element, and 
the whole sum of historical existence is still not the completely 
adequate medium of the idea, since it is the idea’s temporality and 
fragmentariness… that long for the backward-looking impulse 
emanating, face against face, from consciousness.1
Historically, the perspective of academics regarding slave religion has, like 
so much else, mirrored their perspective on race. The focus of this essay 
will be on how the understanding of slave Christianity in the antebellum 
period has evolved over time. As historians began to take the experiences 
of slaves more seriously, they have also taken the actions of the slaves 
more seriously. Consequently, the understanding of the slaves’ use of 
religion has evolved from an early view of religion as an outlet for primal 
frustrations, to a more recent view of religion as a tool used by slaves in 
establishing their own space and, consequently, their own humanity. Thus, 
while early polemical writers, such as Philip Alexander Bruce, would 
contend that slave religion was primarily a manifestation of frustration 
and boredom, modern historians, including Laurent Dubois, would take a 
more nuanced view. Dubois writes, “Religion was, in some sense, a space 
of freedom in the midst of a world of bondage.”2 
1  Søren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony with Constant Reference to Socrates (New York: 
Harper & Row Publishers, 1966), 49.
2  Laurent Dubois, Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution (Cambridge, 
MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), 43.
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Some of the earliest historical examinations of slavery came out 
of the South. Largely in response to the fear of a northern domination of 
southern history, many southern writers felt the need to present a southern 
perspective on the history of the South. Following the Civil War, a group 
of pseudo-academics sprung up in Virginia.3 Thoroughly committed to 
the “Lost Cause,” these men sought to eulogize, memorialize, and idealize 
the South. Condescension and racism are dominant features of these 
early works. One of the most notable of these early historians is Philip 
Alexander Bruce. 
Bruce was raised in the South and attended the University of 
Virginia and Harvard. He was a prolific writer and became an editor for 
the Virginia Historical Association.4 In an article published in the New 
York Times, Bruce summarized his attitude and goals as a writer, “Those 
of us who are interested in the history of the South have often ground 
for disputing the claim of New England writers.”5 Among his numerous 
books on the South is The Plantation Negro as a Freeman: Observations on His 
Character, Condition, and Prospects in Virginia (1889). Although primarily 
concerned with the post-bellum situation of freed blacks, The Plantation 
Negro as a Free Man discusses the characteristics of slaves and establishes a 
comparative approach to the evaluation of southern blacks.
In his writing on slave religion, Bruce mirrors many of his 
contemporaries. His attitude and approach are dismissive and racist. Bruce 
writes that many slaves did not feel comfortable worshiping alongside 
3   For a discussion of the “Virginia Cult” see Tomas L. Connelly’s The Marble Man: Robert E. 
Lee and His Image in Society (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1977).
4  The University of Virginia, “A Guide to the Philip Alexander Bruce Papers 1871-1933,” 
Alderman Memorial Library, http://vip.lib.virginia.edu:8080/cocoon/vivaead/published/
uva-sc/viu03278.document (accessed November 12, 2011).
5  Philip Alexander Bruce, “A PROTEST FROM THE SOUTH: New England Has No 
Monopoly of This Country’s Early Historical Events Burgesses Convened First. Elective 
System in Virginia,” New York Times, January 27, 1929.
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their masters. The reasons he gives for this are that the segregation in 
the churches reminds blacks of their “social inferiority” and further, the 
“average white clergyman speaks above the level of their intelligence.”6 
Comments like these are indicative of the tone throughout the work, and 
more broadly, throughout the genre of “Lost Cause” history. 
Bruce concludes his writing of black religion by asserting that 
slave religious gatherings should not have been a tolerated norm. He 
writes, “Even the good that the latter accomplish is so largely mixed with 
evil that there can be little doubt that the negroes of most communities 
would be in a better condition if they had no separate churches of their 
own at all.”7 Thus, in his conclusion, he maintains his dismissive racist 
attitude toward slave religious expression. 
Given the tone of Bruce’s writing, it is not a surprise to find that 
he did not take slave religion very seriously. In his discussions of the way 
in which slaves used their religion, he was equally dismissive. He argues, 
“The religious emotions that sway the blacks… are merely a physical 
drunkenness.”8 The expression of slave religion, according to Bruce, 
has no connection with proper religious expression. Further, the goal of 
slave religious expression is simplistic and adolescent. “Their eager and 
susceptible natures,” Bruce writes, “[are] overcome by a desire for change 
and amusement.”9
This view was dominant for a time. However, its dominance 
would not be sustained in the academic world. In 1918, Ulrich Bonell 
Phillips would publish American Negro Slavery. Thoroughly researched, 
meticulously detailed, and well received, American Negro Slavery forever 
6  Philip Alexander Bruce, The Plantation Negro as a Freeman: Observations on His Character, 
Condition, and Prospects in Virginia (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1889), 106.
7  Ibid., 110.
8  Ibid., 97.
9  Ibid., 98.
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altered the course of Southern historiography. Where Bruce and the “Lost 
Cause” historians were often careless with facts, heavy on speculation, 
and placed analysis over facts, Phillips offered a different approach. 
David M. Potter stated that Phillips “never set pen to paper without 
expressing cogent ideas.”10 Eugene Genovese went so far as to state that 
American Negro Slavery was “not the last word on its subject; merely the 
indispensable first.”11 Phillips, more than anyone before him, legitimized 
the study of southern history. In spite of all of this progress over earlier 
polemical writings, Phillips still falls victim to his own racist attitudes. 
Thus, his perspective on race informs his perspective on the use of religion 
by slaves.  Phillips draws few conclusions regarding religion. For the most 
part, he sees as his task collection of information rather than interpretation 
of that information. When he writes of the propensity of slaves to worship 
in any given manner, he does not, for the most part, attempt an evaluation 
of the behavior. Where he does attempt such an investigation, he is largely 
dismissive.  Genovese stated, “Because he did not take the Negroes 
seriously as men and women he could not believe that in meaningful and 
even decisive ways they shaped the lives of their masters.”12
Phillips’s next major work on the subject was Life and Labor in 
the Old South. Published in 1929, Life and Labor showed some signs of a 
softening of Phillips’s overt racism. However, critics have contended 
that any softening in tone was not a shift in perspective, “merely one of 
emphasis.”13 There is reason to believe that this is a bit of an exaggeration. 
It seems clear on inspection of Life and Labor that Phillips was developing 
10  David M. Potter, “A Biography of Printed Writings of Ulrich Bonnell Phillips,” Georgia 
Historical Quarterly 28 (September 1934): 271. 
11  Eugene Genovese, Introduction to American Negro Slavery: A Survey of the Supply, 
Employment and Control of Negro Labor as Determined by the Plantation Regime (1918; repr., Baton 
Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1966), xxi.
12  Ibid., xix.
13  Ibid., viii.
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a more nuanced evaluation of the slaves. Nonetheless, the work still 
fails to take seriously the slave as a person. Thus, any discussion of slave 
religion occurs from a top-down perspective. For example, in Life and 
Labor, Phillips discusses the passages from the Bible that were considered 
appropriate for slave religious functions. He also notes that often, when a 
black pastor was permitted to preach to slaves, the master would monitor 
the meetings. If the pastor dared to harp too much on the liberation 
of the Israelis from the Egyptians, he “risk[ed]… being lynched.” The 
preference of the planters was that the ministers only speak on such topics 
as “’servants obey your masters’, ‘render unto Caesar the things that are 
Caesar’s’, and ‘well done, thou good and faithful servant.’”14 Although 
Phillips never made the connection between slave religion and resistance, 
he hinted at a dynamic that would lead to this view. Foreshadowing 
the writing of Ira Berlin, Phillips noted that, “neither planters, nor 
slaves… were cast in one mold… Plantation life and industry had in the 
last analysis as many facets as there were periods, places and persons 
involved.” In spite of these variations, Phillips did see a unity in southern 
slavery. That unity was to be found in the “responsive adjustments 
between masters and men of the two races.”15 Ultimately, Phillips failed 
to follow these points to their logical conclusion. He was blinded by 
his racism, and consequently, he was limited in his ability to analyze an 
institution that rests fundamentally on the concept of “race.” The result 
of Phillips’s work was an understanding of slavery as a “benevolent 
institution.”16 The result of Phillips’s perspective is a vision of slave 
Christianity that is merely one example of the civilizing gift passed on to 
14  Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, Life and Labor in the Old South (1929; repr., Columbia, SC: 
University of South Carolina Press, 2007), 202.
15  Ibid., 304.
16  John David Smith, Introduction to Life and Labor in the Old South, xix.
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the slaves from their more culturally civilized masters. It is a lesson in the 
“school” of slavery.17
Phillips experienced a great deal of criticism in the years 
following his death in 1934. Occasionally, as was the case with criticism he 
received from Richard Hofstadter, the criticism was directed against his 
research methodology and Phillips’s disproportionate focus on the large 
plantation.18 Hofstadter does discuss Phillips’s racism, but it is certainly 
not central to Hofstadter’s critique of Phillips. The most substantive attack 
on Phillips’s Benevolent School view of slave religion would have to wait 
for the beginning of the Civil Rights Era, and it would come from Kenneth 
Stampp. 
Following the death of Phillips, the academic mood relating 
to slave studies began to shift toward recognition of the horrors of the 
institution of slavery. However, a major work challenging the Phillips’s 
School would not be written until Kenneth Stampp published The Peculiar 
Institution in 1956. Stampp believed that there was a need for a history 
of slavery that was informed by modern anthropological methods and 
understanding.19 He set out to write such a history that was in every way 
as comprehensive as Phillips’, but reflected the changes in developments 
and attitudes that had come about in the broader academic and social 
milieu. 
With regard to slave religion, Stampp’s perspective was similar is 
some ways to that of Phillips. Stampp, like Phillips, asserted that religion 
was something bestowed upon the slave by the master. Also, like Phillips, 
Stampp acknowledged the version of Christianity that was preached to the 
17  Phillips, American Negro Slavery, 328.
18  See Richard Hofstadter, “U. B. Phillips and the Plantation Legend,” The Journal of Negro 
History 29, no. 2 (April 1944): 109-124.
19  Kenneth Stampp, “The Historian and Southern Negro Slavery,” The American Historical 
Review 57, no. 3 (April 1952): 619.
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slaves was “carefully censored.”20 However, unlike Phillips, religion was 
not a cultural gift intended for the growth and development of the slaves; 
it was a means of imposing control over the slaves. Physical domination 
was a fundamental part of slavery. Conversion of the slaves to Christianity 
gave the master, according to Stampp, a level of spiritual control that 
allowed the “master class” to shape the slave’s behavior in ways more 
conducive to the maintenance of peace and of the institution of slavery in 
general.21 Stampp asserted that the ideal religion, according to the master 
class, “should underwrite the status quo.”22
As far as the way that slaves practiced Christianity, Stampp 
asserts, “The religion of the slaves was, in essence, strikingly similar to 
that of the poor, illiterate white men of the ante-bellum South.”23 Stampp 
does not attempt to make much in the way of generalizations nor does he 
attempt to unearth slave motivation with regard to religion. The closest 
Stampp comes to either is when he states, “What the slave needs now was 
a spiritual life in which he could participate vigorously, which transported 
him from the dull routine of bondage and which promised him that a 
better time was within his reach.” He acknowledges further that the 
slaves “took their religion seriously.”24 As much as Stampp explores the 
slave’s perspective on religion, he merely asserts a psychological need for 
escapism and offers no deeper analysis. 
Stampp’s perspective on slave religion was also indicative of 
his larger perspective on the institution of slavery. The institution was 
dominated by the master class, and left virtually no room for the slaves 
20  Kenneth M. Stampp, The Peculiar Institution: Slavery in the Ante-Bellum South (1956; repr., 
New York: Random House, Inc., 1984), 159.
21 Ibid., 158-159.
22  Ibid., 160.
23  Ibid., 377.
24  Ibid., 371.
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to assert any level of control over their lives. The primary shift from the 
Phillips’s paradigm is that of benevolence to domination. The focus was 
still on what was done to the slaves rather than what they were able to 
accomplish within the oppressive system. 
The Peculiar Institution was generally well received by historians. 
To the credit of Stampp, any work completed after The Peculiar Institution 
had to deal with the claims and tone present in Stampp’s work. For a time, 
Stampp was able to, if not supplant Phillips, certainly supplement him, as 
the author of a very significant work on southern slavery.25 
In discussing the currents in the historiography of slavery, it is 
vital that one mention a persistent counter-current that was only merged 
with the dominant matrix of slave studies after Stampp. This group of 
scholars never accepted the Benevolent School of Phillips and they, in large 
measure, rejected certain subtleties within Stampp’s Domination Paradigm. 
This group was composed primarily of minority scholars, who understood 
race from a different perspective than white scholars examining the 
institution of slavery. In 1953, a sociologist, E. Franklin Frazier, gave a 
series of lectures discussing slave religion from the perspective of a black 
scholar. His work, unlike that of Phillips or even Stampp, takes seriously 
the perspective and experiences of slaves as it relates to religion. Frazier 
25  A cursory examination of reviews of The Peculiar Institution reveals an almost universal 
belief that while Stampp’s work was vital, his polemical presentation prevented him 
from living up to the standard that he had called for in his AHR article “The Historian 
and Southern Negro Slavery.” Consequently, Phillips was still important to a complete 
understanding of the slave system. For examples see Chase C. Mooney, review of The 
Peculiar Institution: Slavery in the Ante-Bellum South, by Kenneth M. Stampp, The Journal of 
Southern History 23, no. 1 (February 1957): 125-128; Ralph B. Flanders, review of The Peculiar 
Institution: Slavery in the Ante-Bellum South, by Kenneth M. Stampp, The Mississippi Valley 
Historical Review, 43, no. 4 (March 1957): 679-680; and Keith Hopkins, review of The Peculiar 
Institution: Slavery in the Ante-Bellum South, by Kenneth M. Stampp, Population Studies 18, no. 
2 (November 1964): 204-205. Although these represent the consensus, some reviews were far 
more positive. An example of an overwhelmingly positive review is W. M. Brewer’s review 
of The Peculiar Institution: Slavery in the Ante-Bellum South, by Kenneth M. Stampp, The Journal 
of Negro History 42, no. 2 (April 1957): 142-144.
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represents something of a synthesis of certain standards of understanding 
related to slave Christianity. First, he states plainly that a carefully 
censored version of Christianity was used a means of social control.26 He 
adds that Christianity appealed to the slaves as it offered them a “message 
of hope and prospect of escape.”27 However, he does not stop there; 
he posits that slaves used Christianity as a way to reconstitute a social 
cohesion that was destroyed by the institution of slavery.28 This view of the 
agency of slaves in creating a social cohesion using the tools of oppression 
is a theme that would become dominant in the historiography of slavery 
sometime later. In a way, the major players of slave historiography were 
playing “catch up” to the currents long present in minority scholarship on 
the subject.
Other deviations, or at least additions, to the Stampp paradigm 
began to emerge soon after the release of The Peculiar Institution. One 
example of such a variation is found in the work of Stanley Elkins, Slavery: 
A Problem in American Institutional and Intellectual Life (1959). Elkins wrote 
with the same cultural understanding as Stampp. Slavery operated in the 
same paradigm of oppressive white domination as The Peculiar Institution, 
but Elkins attempts to go a step beyond Stampp. Elkins hypothesizes 
regarding the psychological effects of unmitigated oppression and 
constant dominance. The lack of slave resistance can be attributed to the 
“infantilizing” effects of white domination on the slaves.29 Although Elkins 
attempts an understanding of the psychology of slaves, his interpretation 
is dismissive. He assumes that there was little resistance among the slaves, 
26  E. Franklin Frazier, The Negro Church in America (1963; repr., New York: Schocken Books, 
1974), 18.
27  Ibid., 16.
28  Ibid., 13-16.
29  Stanley Elkins, Slavery: A Problem in American Institutional and Intellectual Life (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1959), 225.
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and he subsequently attempts to explain why this was so. Thus, the focus 
is still on the domination of the master, and not on the activity of the slave. 
The Stampp paradigm began to lose its primacy among slavery 
research as a result of two books published in the early 1970s: John W. 
Blassingame’s The Slave Community: Plantation Life in the Antebellum South 
and Eugene Genovese’s Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made. Both 
books altered the method of evaluating the slave community and both 
attempted to place the slave in the foreground of slave studies. Although 
Blassingame’s book was published just prior to Genovese’s, it was 
Genovese that would have the greater historiographical impact based on a 
better circulation of Roll, Jordan, Roll.30 After the release of Roll, Jordan, Roll, 
The Slave Community would garner much attention as a work contributing 
to the emerging paradigm.31
Blassingame’s contribution to the understanding of the way in 
which slaves used religion is fundamental. He stated, “In this test of wills 
the slave asserted that his master could inflict pain on his body, but he 
could not harm his soul… Clearly, religion was more powerful than the 
master, engendering more love and fear in the slave than he could.”32 
Blassingame agreed with Frazier that Christianity helped to foster a 
“sense of group solidarity.”33 He emphatically rejected Elkins’s “Sambo” 
conception. He also rejected Stampp’s one-sided oppressive model.
Although Blassingame discussed slave religion, it was Eugene 
Genovese who took the lead in shaping the historical understanding 
of slave religion. In Roll, Jordan, Roll, first published in 1974, Genovese 
30  See Al-Tony Gilmore, ed., Revisiting Blassingame’s The Slave Community: The Scholars 
Respond (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978).
31  Ibid.
32  John W. Blassingame, The Slave Community: Plantation Life in the Antebellum South (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1972), 147.
33  Ibid.
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puts to work his admirable research skills and his unmatched writing 
talent. One historian stated, “Those prone to dialectical generalization 
on such matters may well see a literal thesis, antithesis, and synthesis in 
the Phillips-Stampp-Genovese sequence.”34 There is some truth to this 
assertion; however, the author fails to recognize the impact of Genovese’s 
magnum opus. Genovese, although indebted to Phillips, does not swing 
the pendulum back in the direction of American Negro Slavery. He swings 
it further in the direction of a meaningful understanding of the slave 
experience. To Genovese, slaves are not passive entities to be acted upon, 
and they are the actors of their own history. They interact and manipulate 
the system. They take an active role in shaping their lives. This is 
fundamentally different than either Phillips’s or Stampp’s conception of 
the slave. 
Roll, Jordan, Roll is, at its heart, about slave religion.  Genovese 
uses slave religion to show the way that slaves coped with their existence. 
No longer was Christianity merely a tool used by planters for control, 
it also, in turn, was used by slaves to create a space of freedom. The 
slaves’ world was “made” by the slaves themselves, not by their masters. 
The cornerstone of this new paradigm was Genovese’s innovative 
understanding of paternalism. “Paternalism’s insistence upon mutual 
obligations – duties, responsibilities, and ultimately even rights – 
implicitly recognized the slaves’ humanity.”35 This assertion, that slaves 
were able to maintain some control over their lives, was completely 
revisionist. Genovese fundamentally shifts the paradigm of slavery 
studies by admitting the slave had a role in shaping his or her experience. 
34  Peter H. Wood, “Phillips Upside Down: Dialectic or Equivocation?” The Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History 6, no. 2 (Autumn 1975): 289–297.
35  Eugene D. Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made (New York: Random 
House, 1974), 5.
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This role was manifest most obviously, according to Genovese, through 
slave religion. 
Genovese acknowledges that the master was instrumental in 
introducing Christianity to the slaves in an attempt to serve his own 
purposes. However, the introduction of Christianity by the master was not 
made to a passive people. Genovese writes, “For good reason the whites of 
the Old South tried to shape the religious life of their slaves, and the slaves 
overtly, covertly, and even intuitively fought to shape it themselves.”36
Following the publication of Roll, Jordan, Roll, literature that 
specifically focused on the religion of slaves proliferated. Given a new 
operational paradigm, scholars were able to explore further within, and 
test the limits of, the concept of “paternalism” as employed by Genovese. 
Scholars were also able to expand on Genovese’s conception of slave 
agency and varying types of resistance. 
The most notable and thorough examination of slave religion 
to appear following Genovese’s work was Albert J. Raboteau’s Slave 
Religion: The ”Invisible Institution” in the Antebellum South. This book 
continues down the path beaten by Genovese and Blassingame. Raboteau 
examines in depth the concept of religion among slaves and the role it 
played for both the master and the slave. He takes a step further than 
Genovese and Blassingame by identifying the outward expression of 
the contending goals of slave religion. On one hand, there is the “visible 
institution” that represents black worship under the supervision of whites. 
This is a manifestation of white attempts at social control. Raboteau’s 
argument implies that, although social control of the slaves was a primary 
motivation for the allowance and encouragement of slaves’ participation 
in Christianity, it was not the overriding motivation of many of the white 
36  Ibid., 162.
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ministers. An example of this visible institution is Cotton Mather’s Society 
of Negroes. 37 The other and more important portion of Raboteau’s word 
is about the “invisible institution” of slave religion; the portion of their 
religious experience that the slaves carved out for themselves without 
regard to their masters. For example, when discussing the role of black 
preachers, he writes, “They acted as crucial mediators between Christian 
belief and the experiential world of the slaves.”38 
The slaves’ Christian belief, Raboteau contends, had more 
significant implications than mere escapist sentiment. There was an 
element of futurist longings and desire for retribution amongst some 
slaves.39 Yet, there was an often overlooked, revolutionary aspect of slave 
Christianity. It did not serve solely to uphold the established order as 
Stampp had asserted. Slaves often turned the moral precepts of their 
masters on their heads. They “stole” from the master, supposing that they 
had been stolen, thus they had a right to take from their master what they 
required. They often considered lying to a master a “religious duty.”40 
Raboteau shows throughout his work how slaves used Christianity to suit 
their needs as an enslaved and oppressed people. 
Since the publication of Roll, Jordan, Roll, most of the historical 
literature regarding the antebellum slave’s religion has focused to some 
degree on the “agency” of the slave. Following the example of Genovese, 
historians frequently seek to tell the history of the slave, with the slave as 
the central character. Further, they seek to show the ways in which slaves 
employed various means to achieve their own ends of creating some 
37  Albert J. Raboteau, Slave Religion: The “Invisible Institution” in the Antebellum South (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 107-109.
38  Ibid., 137.
39  For an example of this see pages 290-292 where Raboteau writes of some slaves that 
believed that in the “life to come” there would be white slaves and black masters.
40  Raboteau, 297.
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space of operation or a place of freedom within their bondage. This has 
been the dominant paradigm of slave religion. It is present in the works 
of Raboteau; it is also present in more recent works such as John Boles’ 
edited work Masters & Slaves in the House of the Lord and in Mechel Sobel’s 
Trabelin’ On: The Slave Journey to an Afro-Baptist Faith. Boles operates in a 
manner similar to Raboteau; however, he points out that the dominant 
Christian expression in the Antebellum period was interracial fellowship.41 
Thus, his focus is less on the “invisible institution” than on the “visible 
institution.” Nonetheless, it is still informed by, and operating within, the 
Genovesean paradigm.42 
Sobel, like Genovese and Blassingame, writes of the world 
that was constructed by the slaves. Although much of her focus is on 
the way the slaves incorporated their African identities into their new 
social realities, her paradigm is fundamentally that of Blassingame and 
Genovese.43 Sobel disagrees with Raboteau regarding the “visibility” of the 
southern antebellum black church. She asserts that the religious world that 
the slaves made was visible not invisible. She believes that the slaves used 
religion and the community it created to give coherence to their lives.44
In spite of the general consensus that developed around the need 
to see the institution of slavery as it was lived by the slaves, there has been 
a notable push back in the other direction. This has come primarily from 
the advocates of a position of “social death.” One example of such a work 
can be found in Orlando Patterson’s Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative 
41  John B. Boles, Introduction to Masters and Slaves in the House of the Lord: Race and Religion 
in the American South, 1740-1870, 1-18, edited by John B. Boles (Lexington, KY: The University 
Press of Kentucky, 1988), 1 & 10.
42  Elizabeth Fox Genovese, review of Masters and Slaves in the House of the Lord: Race and 
Religion in the American South, 1740-1870, edited by John B. Boles, The Journal of American 
Ethnic History 10, No. 3 (Spring 1991): 95-96.
43  Mechal Sobel, Trabelin’ On: The Slave Journey to an Afro-Baptist Faith (Westport, Conn.: 
Greenwood Press, 1979).
44  Ibid., 100-101.
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Study. Patterson states that a slave, in any society, is essentially a “dead 
person.”45 The religion of the slaves, according to Patterson, was not 
of their own construction, but rather did not differ from their master’s 
religion in any essential way.46 Although some still cling to the idea of 
“social death” it never caught on as a primary means of understanding 
the slave system.47 These “social death” advocates, though not defining 
the path of scholarship, still make important contributions to slave 
studies. Most notably, as scholars such as Genovese, Blassingame, and 
Sobel have focused on the social and cultural aspects of the lives of the 
slaves, the larger picture of an exploitative, brutal system can fade into the 
background. The “social death” historians make sure that this does not 
happen.
The study of slave Christianity in the South is one that has 
continued, and will continue, to flourish. There is no shortage of modern 
scholarship on the experience and lives of the slaves. The larger shift 
in the historical field of incorporating the histories of marginal or 
oppressed groups will no doubt continue into the foreseeable future. 
Current scholarship on slavery is led by academics such as Ira Berlin. 
Berlin has been leading slave studies in a different direction. While 
still acknowledging the “agency” of slaves, he has divided the study of 
American slavery into different geographic and temporal periods. Berlin 
argues that the slaves’ Christianity was supremely important to the slaves 
in the antebellum period. Not only did it offer them hope of deliverance, 
but it also gave them a strong sense of “place” within their enslavement.48 
45  Orlando Patterson, Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1982), 5.
46  Ibid., 74.
47  For a notable example of a current scholar that employs the idea of “social death,” see 
Stephanie E. Smallwood, Saltwater Slavery: A Middle Passage from Africa to American Diaspora 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).
48  Ira Berlin, The Making of African America (New York: Penguin Group, 2010), 128.
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This concept of “place” is one that is taking hold within the study of 
slavery. The scholarship is increasing, and it is shining a light on new 
ways of understanding the way that slaves reacted to, and understood, 
their environment. One recent work on this topic is Anthony Kaye’s 
Joining Places: Slave Neighborhoods in the Old South. Published in 2007, 
Kaye is leading the way in this understanding of place by showing how 
slaves constructed “neighborhoods” as areas of operation. He is operating 
within the context of “agency.” However, this well-trodden ground is 
complicated by the lack of intentionality in constructing neighborhoods.49 
This is indicative of a drift toward a more nuanced view of “agency” that 
incorporates unintended consequences and social realities outside of the 
direct control of the slaves. This unintentional space does not deny the 
slaves’ role in negotiating their existence; it simply adds another facet to 
scholarly understanding of the slaves’ world. Slave religion then operates 
as an intentional activity that leads to often unintended results, such as 
space and place. In discussing the place of Christianity in the creation 
of neighborhoods, Kaye writes, “[Slaves] conceived their place in the 
world in terms of the particular relations within the neighborhood ambit, 
especially kinship and Christianity.”50
If historians are looking for a “completely objective study of the 
institution which is based upon no assumptions whose validity cannot 
be thoroughly proved,” as recommended by Stampp in 1952, the search 
will be indefinite and in vain. 51 The goal should be, as it has been of late, 
to seek to flesh out the world of the slaves. If scholars cannot understand 
everything perfectly, they can certainly understand specifics better. 
49  Anthony Kaye, Joining Places: Slave Neighborhoods in the Old South (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 50.
50  Ibid., 44.
51  Kenneth Stampp, “The Historian and Southern Negro Slavery,” 613.
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Moving forward, the study of slave religion should focus on two 
vital components. The first is the system of belief itself. The Christianity 
of the slaves should be studied and appreciated on its own merits. This 
system is vital as it illuminates an important chosen lens through which 
the slave viewed his or her existence. Although the dominant method 
of “doing” history is through the prism of the three lenses, these are, 
to the individual, immutable realities of existence. 52 Although they are 
important to the understanding of history, one cannot choose his race 
or gender, and the slave in particular had virtually no input regarding 
his class. The system is inherently deterministic and thus it makes the 
agency of the slave less relevant to his environment. Viewing religion as 
a vital lens affirms the slave’s agency and emphasizes the role the slave 
played in shaping his own existence. The second focus of slave religious 
studies should include how religion informed the social relationships and 
constructs of the slave. This has been manifest of late in the work of Kaye 
and others. Throughout the historiography of slave studies, it is important 
to remember that the development of historical understanding regarding 
slave religion parallels one’s idea of race.  
52  The three lenses referenced here are race, class, and gender.
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Anti-Communism Reshapes  
American Citizenry
Berkan A. Ciger
The anti-communist sentiment swept the nation and engulfed most of 
what Americans were hearing, reading, or watching; it had gotten a hold 
of the media.  Mickey Spillane’s Mike Hammer series was wildly popular 
selling nearly three million copies of the first six books.  Mike Hammer 
was an all American private eye with a niche for sniffing out danger, 
“They were Commies…They were real sons of bitches who should of died 
a long time ago…They never thought there were people like me in this 
country.”  Mike was exemplifying what all good Americans should be, 
a hard working commie killer.  An editor that Spillane went to with his 
work noted that Mike Hammer was not in the best taste but the climate 
of the time made it a good sell.1  There were countless films ‘educating’ 
people about Communism and how to destroy it.  These films were clearly 
anti-communist propaganda but would always end with a phrase similar 
to, “what you have seen is not entirely fiction,” fostering the idea that 
Communists were the evil spirits they were portrayed as in American 
media.  
 Anti-communism also leaked into actually the Hollywood movie 
industry with John “Joker” Jackson explaining a “great way to live.  Keep 
your mouth shut until the day you die.”2  People were being brought 
up in a time where silence was valued over expression because to most 
there were only two modes of expression: pointing out a Communist 
1  David Halberstam, The Fifties (New York: The Random House Publishing Group, 1993), 
59-60.
2  The Defiant Ones, DVD, directed by Stanley Kramer (1958; New York: Curtleigh 
Productions).
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or implementing Communism.  The national best seller Witness by 
Whittaker Chambers preached that Communism, along with liberalism, 
was the enemy.3  The popular reverend Billy Graham wrote “the only 
way for America to combat Communism was through faith, prayer, and 
religious revival.  America without the Bible could not survive.”4  America 
was being taught to live a certain way and to hate a certain way with 
journalists only furthering the problem.  A journalist from the Chicago 
Tribune labeled anti-communism as “…a dream story, I wasn’t off page 
one for four years.”  These journalists rarely asked for any evidence 
because they were enjoying the ride on the gravy train that was false 
accusations of Communism and by doing so were only leading Americans 
down a path of hate, suspicion, and ignorance.5
 The choice of either Americanism or Communism was critical and 
there would be no compromise between the two.6  Harding College tried 
to make the choice as easy as possible with its own line of propaganda.  In 
one of their films, the speaker points out that “all of us can feel gratitude 
and pride toward American capitalism.  Its record at improving human 
welfare is unmatched in all history.”7  Americans were taught that the 
economic abundance in America was made possible by our incentives 
for progress and that we were far better off than the rest of the world.8  
Russia, according to an Iowa farmer who visited the country, has much 
lower production capability and much lower wages, not to mention 
3  Halberstam, The Fifties, 16.
4  Billy Graham, “A Christian America,” American Mercury (1955): 69-72.
5  Halberstam, The Fifties, 55.
6  Thomas Aiello, “Constructing ‘Godless Communism’: Religion, Politics, And Popular 
Culture, 1954-1960,” Americana 4 (2005).
7  A Look At Capitalism, DVD, directed by the National Education Program (1955; Searcy: 
Fotovox Inc).
8  The Responsibilities of American Citizenship, DVD, directed by the National Education 
Program (1955; Searcy: Fotovox Inc).
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the lack of freedoms to work, dream, compete, advance, and invest.9  A 
Look At Capitalism taught Americans about the three pillars of American 
capitalism: ownership of private property, the profit motive, and the 
open market.  While another film, In Our Hands, taught that money is 
vital to the American freedoms of producing, buying, selling, saving, 
and investing.  Americans were being conditioned to love our capitalist 
system and everything that made up the system.  They learned that under 
a Communist regime they would lose those freedoms due to the freezing 
of bank accounts, suspension of markets, government run insurance, and 
a redistributed labor force.  They believed that a Communist government 
would forcefully take their savings for investment.  Americans were 
learning to love their consumer society through an increased standard 
of living and through propaganda.  To take away Capitalism was to 
take away a great American pastime, a love shared by all full-blooded 
Americans.  Average Americans new found love of Capitalism would aid 
in the battle against Communism as the Communist were in complete 
opposition to the “American Way” and set out to destroy it.
 Americans were learning (read: being fed) that to be a citizen 
of their great nation was one of the most precious gifts on Earth.  They 
were also learning that their freedom was a privilege and to maintain 
that privilege they were to take on the responsibilities that came along 
with it.  “One man stands between freedom and Communism, that man 
is you.”10  To be that brave American that stands in the way of “evil” one 
must first understand Capitalism, become active in government by being 
constantly vocal on the issue of preserving our great system, and make 
9  The Secret of American Production, DVD, directed by the national Education Program (1955; 
Searcy: Fotovox Inc).
10  Red Nightmare, DVD, directed by George Waggner (1962; Hollywood: Warner Bros 
Studios).
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sure to dedicate a part of everyday to the fight for freedom.  “If every 
citizen, young and old, will accept the challenge of his citizenship then 
the Socialists, the Communists, and their followers will not prevail and 
America will go on toward the fulfillment of her great world destiny.”11
 Americans were told that their nation’s power was limited 
because of the sinister forces pitted against them.12  To combat these 
forces Americans must understand the tactics of the Communists, their 
godless philosophy, their goal for world conquest, and to not be duped 
by Communist propaganda techniques.  Returning to the “American 
Way” is the only way to fight the domestic dangers of Communism 
and Socialism.13  “Unless we understand and work effectively for the 
principles upon which our American way of life is founded the structure 
will crumble and our heritage of freedom will parish.”14  One of the ways 
to get back to the American way of living was to strive for spiritual growth 
by applying the principles of God’s truth to the American political and 
economic systems.  During these Cold War times a belief in America 
equated to a belief in God, which pushed an atheistic minority out of full 
citizenship because true Americans were loyal believers.15
 Many American’s were beginning to put more emphasis on 
their Christian beliefs.  So much so that they were beginning to see 
their free market system as fundamentally Christian and most wanted 
the Communist regimes of the world to be replaced with upstanding 
Christian nations.16  The Cold War became an allegory for good versus 
11  The Responsibilities of American Citizenship.
12  Halberstam, The Fifties, 53.
13  Ibid., 9.
14  The Responsibilities of American Citizenship.
15  Aiello, “Constructing Godless Communism.”
16  John Harold Redekop, The American Far Right (Grand Rapids: William B. Erdmans 
Publishing Company, 1968).
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evil and reawakened the idea of American divine right.17  Americans were 
identifying themselves as God’s chosen people who were sent to rid the 
world of evil which took the form of Communism.  Christianity became 
a major tool to fight Communism because, as Americans were told, 
Communists were all godless, and therefore, evil people.  The reverend 
Billy Graham saw the Cold War as “igniting a virtual revival and an 
increasing resort to the Bible for battle with the Communist foe.18 
 Parents began to take their kids to Sunday School not only to 
fight Communism, but to ensure a proper American upbringing.  The 
Cold War boosted church attendance in America from forty-nine percent 
of the population to sixty-five percent.  As church membership rose anti-
communism and Christianity became more intertwined.  William Howard 
Melish, a Brooklyn clergyman in 1954, was branded a Communist after 
advocating for a world in which Christianity and Communism could 
coexist.  The atheism that was associated with Communism was seen as 
an animalistic feature by these newly fanatic Christian Americans.  They 
could not understand how some people could buy into collectivist ideas 
and still call themselves Christian. 
 Manifest Destiny had made its way back into America and the 
claim to superiority and godliness engaged the U.S. in a religious battle 
with the Soviet Union who had their claim to superiority and godlessness.  
American Christians saw themselves as Communism’s biggest victim as 
well as its most worthy adversary.  President Truman was a believer in 
this epic battle telling a reporter that “Communism is the deadly foe of 
belief in God and of all organized religion.”19  Reverend Billy Graham 
17  Cedric Belfrage, The American Inquisition, 1945-1960 (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill 
Company, Inc., 1973).
18  Billy Graham, “Satan’s Religion,” American Mercury (1954): 42.  
19  “Text of Truman Talk Decrying ‘Hysteria’ in Fighting Communists,” New York Times, 
Nov. 11, 1953, 20.
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wrote that the Cold War was the battle between Christ and the anti-Christ 
and that one of them, Christianity or Communism, must die.  The federal 
government was becoming heavily involved with fighting Communism 
by way of religion. Senator Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota 1959 said 
that the spiritual treasure established in the United States gave it an 
overwhelming advantage in the fight. Representative Louis Rabaut of 
Michigan 1959 spoke on the House floor about the Christian foundation 
that America was built upon and that our fundamental belief in God 
pitted us against the godless and despicable Communists.  Many in the 
nation were beginning to draw a connection between their country and its 
constitution to Christianity and its Bible.        
 The American political system was set up perfectly to deal 
with situations like these, the majority would be satisfied.  Truth took 
a backseat to outlandish public opinion and the government happily 
obliged.  The people wanted Communism out of their country and it 
started with the government.  Each branch of the federal government 
had its own investigative body to sniff out the godless among them: 
the House had the Un-American Activities Committee, the Senate had 
the Government Operations Committee, and the White House had the 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.  In 1954, the Communist 
Control Bill had passed through Congress with an overwhelming 
endorsement and was put into action immediately.  The Bill stripped all 
Communist party members of their rights and had written guidelines for 
identifying a Communist: 
8. Has written, spoken, or in any way communicated by signal, 
semaphore, sign, or in any other form of communication, orders, 
directions, or plans of the organization…
12. Has indicated by word, action, conduct, writing or in any other 
way a willingness to carry out in any manner and to any degree 
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the plans, designs, objectives, or purposes of the organization;
13. Has in any other way participated in the activities, planning, 
actions, objectives, or purposes of the organization.20 
It was made so that if anyone even uttered the word, they would be 
labeled a dirty commie and dealt with accordingly.  Of course this would 
mean disaster for some politicians’ careers. 
 With the Democrats having held the presidency for five terms 
the Republicans had finally found their ace in the hole and the high 
road in American politics would be barren for much of this time.  It was 
a rare free shot in politics but the Republicans would use it against the 
Democrats trying to prove that they were soft on Communism and the 
Democrats would spend the next thirty years trying to refute it.21  When 
MacArthur was fired by Truman, Bill Jenner of Ohio said “this country 
is in the hands of a secret inner coterie which is directed by Agents of the 
Soviet Union.”  Hugh Butler of Nebraska declared that “if the New Deal 
is still in control of Congress after the election it will owe that control 
to the Communist Party.”  Anti-communism was no longer sitting in 
the holster of Republicans’ belts as they were attempting to shoot down 
every Democrat in office.  George Smathers beat out incumbent Claude 
Pepper of Florida by claiming that “Joe (Stalin) likes him and he likes Joe.” 
Everett Dirksen beat out incumbent Scott Lucas of Illinois by declaring he 
would clean house of any Communist and their sympathizers.  Although 
the well-respected Republican Senator Robert Taft thought the Cold War 
would transform America from a democracy into an imperial power by 
throwing it into the position of world police for which it was ill-suited he 
encouraged McCarthy to keep making noise and keep picking up as many 
20  “Communist Control Act (1954),” last modified May 31, 2007, http://www.
writing,upenn,edu/~afilreis/50s/comm-control-act.html.
21  Halberstam, The Fifties, 53.
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cases as he could.  Taft went as far as to call McCarthy “a fighting marine 
who risked his life to preserve the liberties of the U.S.” When Senator 
Millard Tydings of Maryland spoke out against McCarthy and the anti-
communist wave that was making its way through Congress by calling it 
a “hoax and a fraud…an attempt to inflame the American people with a 
wave of hysteria and fear on an unbelievable scale,” he lost his seat in the 
next election.22 
 Americans were taught that Communism was an evil, godless, 
and vile philosophy so they would vote to keep out the scoundrels that 
were determined to destroy their American way of life.  Propaganda 
films were being produced faster than entertainment films and most 
were showing what America would be like under a Communist regime.  
The film In Our Hands was telling Americans that under Communist 
rule their rights would be whatever the government decides and that 
those rights are subject to change pending certain circumstances.  In 
the movie Red Nightmare, produced by the Department of Defense, the 
protagonist is sentenced to be shot because “he challenged the supreme 
authority of the State, he has questioned its practices and its decisions.  
By these actions he has proved himself to be a dangerous enemy to the 
proletariat.”  Americans are made to believe that all Communism is the 
same and that under Communism people are slaves to the State.  In the 
Defense Department’s movie the citizens are required to have a permit 
number to make phone calls with no personal calls are allowed, soldiers 
could barge into your home unannounced and without a warrant, at work 
there are quotas that must be met even if that means working through 
lunch or unpaid overtime.  The protagonist’s daughter leaves to work on 
a farm because she was convinced to free herself of family life and his two 
22  Ibid., 56-58.
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younger children are leaving for state school because “home life does not 
encourage the collective character of which the party wishes to develop 
in its young people.”23  When the father goes to court he is guilty until he 
proves his innocence and, to make matters worse, his wife testifies against 
him.  Private property was a thing of the past and people were moved to 
new locations to work at new jobs, neither of their choosing.  
 Through the various propaganda films that were in circulation 
Americans were “learning” that life as a Communist was not a life worth 
living.  This horrid life that is Communism is able to survive due to the 
evil that runs through its doctrine.  Fredrick Brown Harris, chaplain of 
the Senate 1954, referred to Communism as the “most monstrous mass of 
organized evil that history has ever known,” describing the philosophy as 
being “lower in its practice than primitive, cannibalistic tribes.”24  Former 
President Herbert Hoover identified Communism as human slavery 
and a prominent Tennessee minister, in 1957, asserted that he “would 
rather see (his) nation die cleanly under the H-bomb than rot away under 
Socialism.”25 
 Communism was an evil unmatched by any other in the gullible 
eyes of mainstream America.  All Americans ever heard were nasty, 
dirty things about Communism, its followers, and any philosophy that 
resembled it.  The propaganda film What Is Communism taught its viewers 
just exactly what it takes to be a Communist and the character traits 
that came along with it.  According to the film Communists are taking 
orders from another government to do everything possible to destroy the 
American government.  In the process of carrying out these venomous 
deeds Communists show their true colors of being a lying, dirty, shrewd, 
23  Red Nightmare.  
24  83rd Cong. Rec. 100 (1954). 
25  Richard M. Fried, Nightmare In Red (New York: Oxford UP, 1990).  
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godless, murderous, and determined group of dastardly people.  They lie 
because to a Communist the truth is anything that will abolish their ideals, 
so Americans were conditioned to believe that every word coming out 
of a Communist’s mouth is a bold face lie, and a subversive one at that.  
They are dirty because they do not recognize human dignity or individual 
rights unlike the tolerant Americans who never struck their fellow man 
down no matter their conviction, as long as they were not Communist (or 
anything other than a wealthy white person).  They are shrewd because 
they take over American organizations through infiltration and agitation.  
When that happens you only need one successful Communist to wreck 
hopes, slaughter soldiers, and weaken the nation.  They are godless and 
set out to destroy the Church.  They are murderous because they casually 
shoot anyone in their way.  They are determined and America is their 
number one goal.  “The Socialists and Communists would like to see the 
American spirit extinguished.”26  They are challenging every aspect of 
American life which constituted, many believed, the greatest crisis in the 
short history of their nation.  
 Anti-communism spread quickly and sunk deep into the idea of 
what it meant to be an American.  At this time fighting was all Americans 
knew.  The citizens of the time saw both World Wars, the Korean War, 
and the Vietnam War.  The Cold War was a way to fight without being 
enlisted.  The anti-communism that was flowing freely through America 
was forcing its people to conform to a certain way of life and to act in a 
certain way, be it for fighting back Communism, limiting suspicion, or 
seeking out Communists to destroy.  This new life style was very different 
from the life styles most Americans were leading but they would follow 
suit as to not seem unpatriotic.  These new Americans were to love 
26  Responsibilities of American Citizenship.
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Capitalism, hate Communism, and carry out new American duties that 
would demonstrate both of those feelings.  American pop culture become 
tailored to the anti-communist attitude and trained people how to feel and 
act.  The government caught hold of this mind-set too and never let it die.  
Christianity had its revival in the States to combat the godless philosophy.  
American citizenship drastically changed from exemplifying freedom, to 
a uniform set of rules expectations.  The ultimate freedom that was lost in 
this hysteria turned America into a state closely resembling the ones in the 
propaganda that filled the heads of its masses.  Anti-communism changed 
America by making it forfeit some freedoms and adhere to some strict 
guidelines.  American’s had lost their sense of what it meant to be citizen 
of their great nation and filled it with a fabricated mess of intolerance and 
ignorance.               
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Franklin’s Failures: How  
Benjamin Franklin Hindered  
British-Colonial Relations
Kerrie Holloway
While many Americans look to Benjamin Franklin and his years in London 
as monumental in the fight for American Independence, Franklin’s work 
reconciling Britain and the colonies did more harm than good. Prior to the 
American Revolution, Franklin spent fifteen years in London as a colonial 
agent advocating the position of the colonies. However, this paper will 
argue that his many propaganda articles in London newspapers after the 
implementation of the Stamp Act, particularly those in response to an 
anonymous Englishman writing under the pseudonym “Vindex Patriae” 
-- Latin for “avenger of his country” -- as well as his examination before 
the House of Commons in which he shared the colonists’ viewpoints 
did nothing to improve British opinion or policy. Furthermore, his 
erroneous views on the colonists’ interpretation of a British taxation plan 
that he initially accepted led to even more friction between the colonies 
and Britain. Instead of helping the British understand the colonies, his 
distinction between internal and external taxes culminated in a series of 
acts including the Declaratory Act, the Townshend duties, the Tea Act of 
1773, the Coercive Acts, and the Quebec Act that angered the colonists and 
eventually led to their rebellion.
 Benjamin Franklin traveled to Britain as an agent of 
Pennsylvania in 1757 to argue before the Privy Council the necessity 
of the colonial proprietors, the Penn family, paying taxes on their land 
holdings. Franklin’s first stint in London was unsuccessful in replacing 
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Pennsylvania’s proprietary government with a royal charter, but during 
these five years, he grew to love London and the British Empire. Decades 
before the start of the rebellion, Franklin was completely loyal to the 
crown and Parliament, and he saw America as an integral part of the 
empire.1 But an integral part did not mean not autonomous. Franklin 
argued that while it was up to the colonies to make their own laws, the 
king could either approve or veto and Parliament existed to protect 
colonial interests.2 At the end of Franklin’s first sojourn, he succeeded 
in forcing the Penns to pay some taxes, but Franklin lost the theoretical 
argument as the Privy Council ruled that the colonial assembly and 
the governor were not enough to make a law -- a ruling that effectively 
stripped the colonies of the autonomy for which Franklin argued.3 The 
Privy Council’s decision set the stage for the growing tensions between 
Britain and the colonies.
After two years in America, Franklin returned to London as a 
colonial agent just months before the passage of the Stamp Act in March 
1765; and he stayed until the eve of the Revolution, not arriving back in 
the colonies until the first shots had already been fired at Lexington and 
Concord. During this trip, Franklin attempted to maintain his grasp on 
the attitudes of a people living 5,000 miles away, and his struggle began 
immediately. At the Stamp Act’s implementation, Franklin rationalized 
Parliament’s decision because he was an imperialist first and foremost, 
knew that empires cost money, and thought other colonists would feel 
likewise.4 Franklin showed his acceptance of the Stamp Act in appointing 
1  Walter Isaacson, Benjamin Franklin: An American Life (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003), 
183.
2  H. W. Brands, The First American: The Life and Times of Benjamin Franklin (New York: 
Doubleday, 2000), 281.
3  Ibid., 315.
4  Gordon S. Wood, The Americanization of Benjamin Franklin (New York: Penguin Books, 
2004), 106.
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of his friend, John Hughes, as a stamp officer -- a move that the colonies 
would later view as collaboration and later biographers would call “one 
of Franklin’s worst political misjudgments.”5 Franklin’s oversight led to 
Hughes’ removal from office by an angry mob before he even sold the 
first stamp, although his house was spared from being torched like other 
officers’. 
After learning the colonies abhorred the Stamp Act, Franklin 
relinquished his position and turned to the press to advocate the opinions 
of his fellow colonists through a series of Stamp Act essays. During the 
mid-eighteenth century, newspapers could not print what happened in 
Parliament and did not publish editorials, but otherwise censorship was 
virtually nonexistent.6 Printers vied with one another for provocative, 
controversial, and wildly popular letters to the press, “the most widely 
read part of each issue -- the mainstay of circulation.”7 These letters were 
almost always anonymous or signed with a pseudonym or initials rather 
than the author’s real name, and Franklin was no exception. While in 
London writing for the London press, Franklin used forty-two different 
pseudonyms to write approximately ninety letters to the press.8 
The Stamp Act essays shed light on Franklin’s complicated, 
and rather tardy, adjustment of his own ideas about the empire and 
American rights as he tried to align himself with the prevailing views of 
the colonists.9 Six of the essays were written in reply to Vindex Patriae 
with the first appearing in The Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser on 28 
December 1765. Vindex Patriae’s initial article five days earlier focused on 
5  Don Cook, The Long Fuse: How England Lost the American Colonies, 1760-1785 (New York: 
Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995), 72; Isaacson, 223.
6  Verner W. Crane, ed., Benjamin Franklin’s Letters to the Press, 1758-1775 (Chapel Hill, NC: 
The University of North Carolina Press, 1950), xix.
7  Cook, 43.
8  Wood, 14.
9  Crane, xxv-xxvi.
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the idea of colonial representation in Parliament. Vindex Patriae argued 
the colonies were represented virtually in Parliament giving Parliament 
the authority to impose taxes such as the Stamp Act. The article went on 
to say that even if the colonies did boycott British goods, it would not 
make a difference because of the breadth and scope of the British Empire. 
Franklin, writing as “N.N.,”10 replied, 
Do they expect to convince the Americans, and reduce them to 
submission, by their flimsy arguments of virtual representation, 
and of Englishmen by fiction of law only, mixed with insolence, 
contempt, and abuse? Can it be supposed that such treatment 
will make them rest satisfied with the unlimited claim set up, 
of a power of tax them ad libitum, without their consent; while 
they are to work only for us, and our profit; restrained in their 
foreign trade by our laws, however profitable it might be to them; 
forbidden to manufacture their own produce, and obliged to 
purchase the work of our artificers at our own prices?11
In his response, Franklin was attacking the very heart of Britain’s 
mercantilist economic system that Thomas Whately laid out in his 1765 
pamphlet entitled The Regulations Lately Made concerning the Colonies, and 
the Taxes Imposed upon Them, considered. In all mercantilist economies, the 
mother country sets up colonies to provide raw materials while retaining 
most, if not all, manufacturing rights for the entire empire. Whately 
explained the role of the colonies saying, “From them we are to expect 
the Multiplication of Subjects; the Consumption of our Manufactures; the 
Supply of those Commodities which we want; and the encrease [sic] of 
our Navigation: To encourage their Population and their Culture; [and] 
to regulate their Commerce.”12 Whatley also stated all imperial commerce 
should be controlled by the Mother Country in the interests of the empire 
10  N.N. stood for non nominates, Latin for “anonymous”.
11  N. N. [Benjamin Franklin], “First Reply to Vindex Patriae,” The Gazetteer and New Daily 
Advertiser, 28 December 1765, in The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, vol. 12, ed. Leonard W. 
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as a whole, but really, the interests of Britain and British merchants and 
manufacturers drove British interests while the desires of the rest of 
the empire went ignored.13 Franklin’s reply addressed these issues by 
reminding his readers of the value of the colonies to the mother country.
Franklin’s first reply to Vindex Patriae continued as he warned 
Vindex Patriae and the rest of Britain not to push the colonists to their 
breaking point. Franklin wrote, 
These people, however, are not, never were, nor ever will be our 
slaves. The first settlers of New England particularly, were English 
gentlemen of fortune, who, being Puritans, left this country with 
their families and followers, in times of persecution, for the sake 
of enjoying, though in a wilderness, the blessings of civil and 
religious liberty; of which they retain to this day, as high a sense 
as any Briton whatsoever; and possess as much virtue, humanity, 
civility, and let me add, loyalty to their Prince, as is to be found 
among the like number of people in any part of the world.14
By reminding the readers of the colonists’ true backgrounds, Franklin 
targeted the emerging sense of English nationalism -- a growing sense of 
“Englishness” and, consequently, arrogance that would not be matched 
until the European nationalism of the mid-nineteenth century. 
In the mid-eighteenth century, English “men and women of 
all social classes began to express a sentiment that might be described 
variously as a dramatic surge of national consciousness, a rise of 
aggressive patriotism, or a greatly heightened articulation of national 
identity.”15 With the growth of the British Empire, Britons began to 
feel dominant in all areas of life. The expanding empire and growing 
mercantilist economy led to relegation in the status of the colonists as they 
came to be regarded less as fellow Britons living across the Atlantic and 
13  John Derry, “Government Policy and the American Crisis, 1760-1776,” in Britain and the 
American Revolution, ed. H. T. Dickinson (London: Longman, 1998), 47.
14  N.N., “First Reply to Vindex Patriae.”
15  T. H. Breen, “Ideology and Nationalism on the Eve of the American Revolution: 
Revisions Once More in Need of Revising,” The Journal of American History 84 (June 1997): 19.
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more as another people to rule -- even though the Americans descended 
from British immigrants whereas natives predominantly populated the 
rest of the Empire.16 Most Britons at the time viewed the Americans as 
separate, distinct, and most importantly, inferior rather than as fellow 
nationals.17 The colonies’ distance from London led to their portrayal as 
“unpolished and lacking refinement.”18 As early as 1759 Franklin noted, 
in a letter to Isaac Norris, that appealing directly to Parliament may be 
tricky as “tho’ there are many Members in both Houses who are Friends 
to Liberty and of noble Spirits, yet a good deal of Prejudice still prevails 
against the Colonies.”19 Franklin spent the next several years striving, and 
failing, to correct this prejudice while writing essays for papers in London.
Before Vindex Patriae had even replied to N.N.’s criticisms, 
Franklin replied again less than a week later under another pseudonym, 
“Homespun.” On 2 January 1766 he responded to Vindex Patriae’s 
assertion that Americans would not be able to continue the boycott of 
British tea in aftermath of the Stamp Act because Indian corn was not as 
easily digestible for breakfast. As Homespun, Franklin wrote, 
But if Indian corn were as disagreeable and indigestible as the Stamp 
Act, does he imagine we can get nothing else for breakfast?…
Let the gentleman do us the honour of a visit in America, and I 
will engage to breakfast him every day in the month with a fresh 
variety, without offering him either tea or Indian corn.20
Franklin’s second reply was much more of a light-hearted satire than 
his first reply as N.N., but he continued to attack British opinion of the 
16  Wood, 113.
17  Stephen Conway, “From Fellow-Nationals to Foreigners: British Perceptions of the 
Americans, circa 1739-1783,” The William and Mary Quarterly 59 (January 2002): 68.
18  Ibid., 69.
19  Benjamin Franklin to Isaac Norris, London, 19 Mar 1759, in The Papers of Benjamin 
Franklin, vol. 8, ed. Leonard W. Labaree (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1965), 295.
20  Homespun [Benjamin Franklin], “Second Reply to Vindex Patriae,” The Gazetteer and New 
Daily Advertiser, 2 January 1766, in The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, vol. 13, ed. Leonard W. 
Labaree (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1969), 7-8.
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colonies as unrefined and backward. For years British political cartoons 
portrayed the colonists as Native Americans as they had yet to take on 
any recognizable physical identity of their own; but the Indian carried a 
savage, uncultured connotation with its limited clothing and dark skin.21 
While the British resorted to the Native American as an easy identifier 
for the colonies, the image only perpetuated the myth of the colonists as 
foreigners; and it was this myth that Franklin challenged by referring to 
colonial breakfast habits.
The controversy with Vindex Patriae continued as Franklin 
returned to the pseudonym N.N. for his third response in an article 
entitled “On the Tenure of the Manor of East Greenwich” in The Gazetteer 
and New Daily Advertiser on 11 January 1766. Since Homespun’s second 
reply, Vindex Patriae had written again, devoting most of his letter to the 
idea of virtual representation of colonial charters and the absurd idea 
of New England being part of the county seat of Kent. On 6 January, 
Franklin wrote,  
I still doubt the argument of your correspondent, proving, or 
attempting to prove, “that they are represented in parliament, 
because the manor of East Greenwich in Kent is represented there, 
and they all live in that manor;” will hardly appear so intelligible, 
so clear, so satisfactory, and so convincing to the Americans, as it 
seems it does to himself…
 In considering these questions, perhaps, it may be of 
use to recollect; that the colonies were planted in times when the 
powers of parliament were not supposed so extensive…That, 
excepting the yet infant colonies of Georgia and Nova Scotia, 
none of them were settled at the expence of any money granted by 
parliament.22
Using Vindex Patriae’s erroneous interpretation of virtual representation, 
21  Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837, 2nd ed. (2005; repr., New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 2008), 134.
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Franklin again reminded the readers that the colonists were Britons 
who immigrated to America under the pretense of much different living 
conditions than the rest of the empire that was conquered and then ruled 
by the British. The first colonists migrated because of disagreements with 
Parliament, and therefore, they were unlikely to approve of Parliamentary 
intervention any more than they had when they lived in Britain. Since 
the majority of colonies were set up through royal charters rather than 
Parliamentary acts, these colonies depended on the crown alone. 
At the time, however, Britons did not understand the colonists’ 
separation between the king and Parliament. By the 1760s, kings had long 
since ceased to function without Parliamentary approval.23 George III was 
not the king but the king-in-parliament. The behavior of British politicians 
during the years leading up to the American Revolution relied on the 
belief in Parliamentary sovereignty over the colonies.24 Furthermore, 
“it was beyond British upper-class comprehension how colonials could 
claim the same rights as Englishmen or could declare that the English 
Parliament had no right to impose taxes on them from London.”25 Perhaps 
it was this incomprehension that led Vindex Patriae to fabricate the idea of 
virtual representation.
Homespun’s second reply, and Franklin’s fourth overall, appeared 
in The Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser on 15 January 1766 under the 
title “Further Defense of Indian Corn.” In this letter, Franklin refuted the 
prevailing portrayal of Americans as Native Americans by again lashing 
out at those who used the idea of “Indian Corn” versus traditional English 
food as a distinction between the English and the colonists. Franklin 
wrote, 
23  Colley, 136.
24  Derry, 45.
25  Cook, 6.
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If I should not dare to say, that we do prefer it to a place at our 
tables, then you demonstrate, that we must come to England for 
tea, or go without our breakfasts: and if I do dare to say it, you fix 
upon me and my countrymen for ever, the indelible disgrace of 
being Indian corn-eaters.
 I am afraid, Mr. Printer, that you will think this too trifling 
a dispute to deserve a place in your paper: but pray, good Sir, 
consider, as you are yourself an Englishman, that we Americans, 
who are allowed even by Mr. Vindex to have some English blood 
in our veins, may think it a very serious thing to have the honour 
of our eating impeached in any particular whatsoever.26
Franklin’s articles, including this reply by Homespun, showed the 
increasing acceptance of the colonists to use the term American. Britons 
began using the word “American” to describe the colonists several years 
earlier, a term often invoking “images of unrefined, if not barbarous, 
persons, degenerate and racially debased, who lived in close proximity to 
African slaves and Indian savages thousands of miles from civilization.”27 
By the mid-1770s, the term “American” conjured up positive notions 
of independent men proud to fight for their freedoms and defend their 
rights. In the mid-1760s, however, colonists were more interested in 
asserting their Britishness than their independence or crafting a separate 
identity.28 The British, not the colonists, began using the term in a 
humiliating and debasing context consistently after 1763, a full decade 
before the colonists began use the label themselves.29 Only in response to 
this attitude in the late 1760s did the colonists reluctantly embrace their 
new identity as Americans, after they were refused all of the rights of 
Britons.30 
In his response to Franklin on 17 January, Vindex Patriae blamed 
26  Homespun [Benjamin Franklin], “Further Defense of Indian Corn,” The Gazetteer and New 
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all the colonists for the Stamp Act riots because they either participated 
or did not prevent; and he denied that manufacturing in America was 
restrained by British laws. Franklin’s final reply to Vindex Patriae, again 
writing as N.N., appeared in The Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser on 29 
January 1766. Franklin disputed the claims by saying,
I would only remark another instance of his unacquaintedness 
with facts. He denies, that the people of New England are 
restrained (as I heard they were) in “working their own beaver 
into hats, their wool into cloth, or their iron into steel:” Let him 
but consult the statutes under the several heads, and he will see 
how much those operations are fettered in America, and perhaps 
be sensible of his mistake.31
Vindex Patriae, and most likely many other Britons, would not have been 
aware of the technicalities of the laws affecting colonial manufacturing; 
and Franklin, as N.N., wrote to explain the difficulties already faced by 
the colonists. In a mercantilist economic system, colonies were seen as 
the source of raw materials while the mother country manufactured the 
raw materials into consumer goods. Mercantilism was typically much 
more beneficial for the mother country than the colonies, and under these 
constraints, the colonists could not make enough money to pay for both 
consumer goods and the high rate of taxes imposed by Britain.
Although Britain had been taxing the colonies for decades through 
duties regulating trade, Parliament implemented the Stamp Act, unlike the 
previous year’s Sugar Act, for the sole purpose of raising revenue.32 Based 
on European standards, the Stamp Act was a mild piece of legislation 
because it came on the heels of the large and expensive Seven Years’ War, 
and Britons saw the tax as the least the colonies could do since the war 
31  N. N. [Benjamin Franklin], “Reply to Vindex Patriae on American Representation in 
Parliament,” The Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser, 29 January 1766, in The Papers of Benjamin 
Franklin, vol. 13, ed. Leonard W. Labaree (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1969), 64.
32  Cook, 53.
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was for their protection.33 The colonists, however, could only see the heavy 
burden placed on them by Parliament.
After the papers printed Franklin’s Stamp Act essays replying to 
Vindex Patriae, Parliament called Franklin before the House of Commons 
on 13 February 1766 to give an account of the Stamp Act and its reception 
in the colonies. Adhering to the colonists’ sentiment rather than his 
original feelings, Franklin’s main argument rested on the difference 
between external taxes that regulated trade and would be tolerated by 
the colonists and internal taxes that raised revenue and would not be 
tolerated unless implemented by the colonies’ own legislative assemblies. 
Richard Jackson, a Member of Parliament for Weymouth and secretary 
to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, first made the distinction between 
internal and external taxes as early as 26 January 1764. In his letter to 
Franklin, Jackson wrote, “I am most averse to an Internal Tax, God knows 
how far such a precedent may be extended, and I have frequently asked, 
what internal Tax they will not lay.”34 Franklin used this distinction in his 
examination before the House of Commons, explaining, 
An external tax is a duty laid on commodities imported; that duty 
is added to the first cost, and other charges on the commodity, and 
when it is offered to sale, makes a part of the price. If the people 
do not like it at that price, they refuse it; they are not obliged to 
pay it. But an internal tax is forced from people without their 
consent, if not laid by their own representatives. The stamp-act 
says, we shall have no commerce, make no exchange of property 
with each other, neither purchase nor grant, nor recover debts; we 
shall neither marry nor make our wills, unless we pay such and 
such sums, and thus it is intended to exhort money from us, or 
ruin us by the consequences of refusing to pay it.35 
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Franklin believed the colonists would pay their share of the empire’s 
expenses if asked rather than forced.36 However, later in the testimony 
Franklin admitted, “It is hard to answer questions of what people at such a 
distance will think,” although that was exactly what he was attempting to 
do.37
While Vindex Patriae never refuted Franklin’s last reply in 
January 1766, that is not to say that Franklin had successfully swayed 
opinion. In fact, British opinion remained the same right up to the start 
of the American Revolution. Furthermore, British economic policy and 
the system of mercantilism continued along the same lines of increasing 
rather than lessening taxes to reduce the burden on the colonists. When 
Parliament repealed taxes, as it did the Stamp Act in March 1766, it was 
strictly due to the detrimental effects on Britain’s mercantilist system and 
the outcry of British merchants rather than American colonists. In fact, 
at this point, the British view of colonists as foreigners was so cemented 
that even a Member of Parliament in 1766 complained about the repeal 
of the Stamp Act in order “please these foreigners.”38 Franklin himself 
commented on this attitude the next year when he wrote in a letter to Lord 
Kames, “Every Man in England seems to consider himself as a Piece of a 
Sovereign over America; seems to jostle himself into the Throne with the 
King, and talks of OUR Subjects in the Colonies.”39 Subsequent legislation 
passed by Parliament would only further increase tensions between 
Britain and the colonies.
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On the same day Parliament repealed the Stamp Act, they passed 
the Declaratory Act. The colonies seemingly overlooked this act in their 
delight in the Stamp Act’s repeal and the Declaratory Act’s passive nature. 
This act, however, exerted Parliamentary authority over all colonies in 
all instances to safeguard to British colonial interests worldwide and 
Parliament’s answer to the colonies’ constitutional argument against the 
Stamp Act.40 It made Franklin and Vindex Patriae’s argument over virtual 
representation null and void as it championed the mercantilist economic 
system and firmly placed colonial interests under those of Britain. 
Franklin’s further articles satirizing the Declaratory Act went apparently 
unnoticed as this act was never repealed.
The next year, the Declaratory Act, as well as Franklin’s 
interpretation of internal versus external taxes as expression before the 
House of Commons, was put to test by the Townshend Duties, years 
after the colonies had dropped the internal versus external tax distinction 
from their official statements.41 After Charles Townshend was appointed 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, he proposed a new revenue-raising program 
in early 1767. Townshend based his program on Franklin’s definition 
of external taxes -- duties on goods considered luxuries that could be 
avoided by those who did not want to pay the tax such as glass, paper, 
paint, and tea. Rather than out of spite, the view commonly held in 
the colonies, “perhaps Townshend, like many in London believed that 
Franklin represented American opinion.”42 Regardless, while Townshend 
said these external taxes would be imposed to regulate trade, he also 
made it clear that his taxation program would raise revenue within 
40  Ian R. Christie, “British Politics and the American Revolution,” Albion: A Quarterly Journal 
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the colonies.43 Like internal versus external tax, the difference between 
regulating trade and raising revenue became the new, important 
distinction in the colonies well before Franklin noticed. 
As with the Stamp Act, Franklin originally accepted Parliamentary 
authority to levy the Townshend duties because he still viewed them as 
external taxes.44 Unfortunately for Franklin, “the Townshend duties -- 
which were just the kind of external taxes he said the Americans preferred 
-- were immediately rejected in America as illegitimate.”45 Once rejected, 
Franklin aimed first to quiet the colonists and appease the English rather 
than argue the constitutionality of the taxes.46 His strategy did not go 
over well with the colonists, and Franklin finally turned on Parliament 
while still remaining loyal to the crown and the idea of the empire. As 
an officer employed by the crown, “Franklin seemed to think the king 
could do no wrong…Franklin could not help being an enthusiast for the 
monarch against the tyrannical Parliament that had passed the Stamp 
Act, and he assumed his fellow Americans were with him.”47 By the next 
year, 1768, Franklin began to question the right of Parliament to pass any 
legislation regardless of the purpose, but “he still considered the colonies 
firmly attached to Britain through the Crown.”48 Several more years and 
several more bad decisions elapsed before Franklin turned on the king and 
supported American independence completely.
After the Townshend duties passed, “the British government 
was once more taken aback by the vehemence of American opposition” 
that manifested itself through boycotts and nonimportation agreements.49 
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Three years later Parliament repealed the Townshend duties with 
the exception of the tax on tea, again because of the economic impact 
the duties were having on English merchants rather than due to the 
grumblings of the colonists. Parliament kept the tax on tea because it 
raised the most revenue but also so as not to surrender completely to the 
demands of the colonies.50 While Franklin had hoped for a complete repeal 
of all the Townshend duties, the colonists relinquished nonimportation 
after the partial repeal; and he did not press the issue.51 Even if Franklin 
had returned to the press or the House of Commons, the tea tax was likely 
to remain as George III supported keeping one duty imposed on the 
colonies in order to keep them in their place.52
From 1770 to 1773, a deceptive feeling of calm prevailed 
throughout the British Empire as Parliament lay low and the colonists 
waited suspiciously for the next colonial policy.53 They did not have to 
wait long. Parliament, “with the clumsiness that had become characteristic 
of its American policy,” passed another Tea Act in 1773 that left the 
Townshend duty on tea unchanged but created a monopoly for the 
East India Company through a system of duty rebates and by removing 
the middlemen.54 The clumsiness was evident in Lord North’s refusal 
to repeal the Townshend tea duty even though he was advised that it 
would be “the best means of assisting the company and conciliating 
the Americans.”55 By refusing to repeal the last duty and creating the 
tea monopoly, Parliament again showed their apathy for Franklin’s 
previous arguments against mercantilism. Colonial merchants acting as 
50  Dickinson, 83.
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the middlemen would be hurt the most by this new legislation while the 
company set to profit was the well-connected East India Company. 
Characteristically, the colonists reacted badly to the new colonial 
economic policy. The Tea Act of 1773 led to the colonists’ dumping of 
£10,000 of British tea into Boston harbor and led to the British Coercive 
Acts, known as the Intolerable Acts in the colonies. Parliament passed 
the Coercive Acts to isolate the radical element in Massachusetts before 
it spread throughout the colonies. North felt a severe punishment 
would force other colonies to remain loyal to the crown rather than 
Massachusetts.56 Unfortunately for North, instead of “dividing the 
colonists from each other the Intolerable Acts drove them more closely 
together, united by a common sense of outrage at what the British had 
done.”57 After the Boston Tea party, Franklin “lobbied desperately against 
the passage in 1774 of the Coercive Acts, which closed the port of Boston 
and altered the Massachusetts charter, and he sought by a variety of 
avenues to convey the American position to the British government.”58 
Unfortunately for Franklin, just as with the Declaratory Act, his efforts 
went either unnoticed or ineffective as the Coercive Acts were never 
repealed.
Along with the Coercive Acts, in 1774 Britain passed the Quebec 
Act that made concessions to French Canadians in terms of their Catholic 
faith and politics. Religiously, the Act reworded the oath of allegiance to 
omit the Protestant faith and guaranteed the free practice of Catholicism. 
Politically, the Canadians were given the right of French civil law though 
English common law remained. In light of the circumstances, the colonists 
saw the act “as part of a plan for giving the British government arbitrary 
56  Ibid., 59.
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power in North America.”59 They viewed the concessions as British 
liberality toward Canadian Catholics while personally experiencing British 
restraint as New England Protestants.60 The Quebec Act, like the Stamp 
Act, reminded them of their inferior position in the empire, and possibly 
even more so this time since they now felt even more insignificant than the 
French Canadians.
By the next year, 1775, the colonists’ status as foreigners had 
been cemented. The ninety or so articles Franklin had written in the 
London papers failed to change British opinion or sway British policy. 
On 26 October of that year, King George III gave a speech in which he 
involved the high “Spirit of the British Nation” -- a British nation that 
almost certainly did not include the Americans.61 The Prohibitory Act that 
accompanied the King’s speech declared “American ships and trade were 
‘the Ships and Effects of open Enemies’ [and] put the colonies out of the 
nation beyond any conceivable doubt.” 62 Soon afterward, the colonists, 
now Britain’s “enemies,” wrote the Declaration and fired the first shots.
While Franklin did not succeed in changing British opinion, 
it is important to remember that neither British opinion nor colonial 
opinion was unanimous during any point in the run up to the American 
Revolution. The Revolution was above all a civil war – a war fought 
within one country with split attitudes on both sides of the Atlantic.63 
Civil wars are inherently fraught with shades of grey, and any effort to 
color the Revolution in black and white leads to “assumptions that the 
British were either very ignorant, or very corrupt, or very sinful, or all 
three, to fail to grasp the rectitude of the colonists’ position” rather than 
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seeing the complexities on both sides of the story.64 Another disconnect 
existed between what the British meant through their policies and how 
the colonies perceived those policies. The British were not guilty of a 
“premeditated conspiracy against American liberties,” but they failed to 
understand that the colonies would view their taxation policies and later 
restrictive acts on the city of Boston as tyranny and a repression of their 
rights.65 Similarly, while Franklin bumbled his way through his stint as 
colonial agent and did not succeed in changing opinions on either side 
of the Atlantic, in such a explosive situation even the most eloquent and 
perceptive mediator would have most likely failed to resolve matters 
completely.
Franklin’s sojourn in London, particularly his second sojourn 
that began in 1764, failed because reconciliation between the British and 
the colonies failed. The Pennsylvania Assembly sent Franklin to London 
twice, in 1757 and 1764, without knowing that “its decision to send the 
creator of ‘Poor Richard’ to London would play a part in launching the 
American Revolution.”66 Franklin’s biggest mistakes lay in poor timing. 
His miscalculations during the Stamp Act “very nearly ruined him 
politically throughout America.”67 At that point, he lagged behind colonial 
opinion in terms of revolutionary thought. Years later, he jumped ahead 
of the colonists and his “concept was too farsighted for King George III 
and his government.”68 These untimely disparities between Franklin’s 
advocacy and colonial opinion ultimately resulted in a failed mission of 
reconciling colonial-British relations.
64  Christie, 206.
65  Derry, 62.
66  Morgan, 1.
67  Ibid., 101.
68  Cook, 159.
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Deconstructing Mythic Triumph: 
The Battle of New Orleans
Catherine James 
During the War of 1812, the Battle of New Orleans was a conclusive 
American victory in what was an otherwise militarily inconclusive war. In 
the nineteenth century, Americans celebrated January 8, 1815 as a patriotic 
holiday equivalent to the Fourth of July. Most American historians of 
the nineteenth and early twentieth century asserted that the battle was 
extremely important because had the British captured New Orleans, 
they would have probably repudiated the Treaty of Ghent and tried to 
hem in the United States east of the Mississippi River. These historians 
also focused on American military tactics, particularly the long odds that 
the outnumbered Americans overcame to beat the British. All American 
historians chronicling the Battle of New Orleans in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth century placed Andrew Jackson at the center of their 
works. They believed the battle was important because America had been 
humiliated by the British in the war up until that point, then Jackson 
took charge and annihilated the British to become the “Hero of America” 
and the “Symbol of the Age,” going on to capture the presidency on the 
basis of that popularity. With the advent of social and cultural history in 
the mid-twentieth century, American historians’ views of the Battle of 
New Orleans changed significantly, from a defining moment to a minor 
incident that America won due to a lack of British coordination.1 The role 
of African-Americans, Indian tribes such as the Choctaws, Creoles, and 
pirates under Jean Lafitte have all been explored by historians in recent 
1  Robert V. Remini, The Battle of New Orleans (New York: Viking, 1999), 217-220. 
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years. Moreover, the heroism of Andrew Jackson in the battle has been 
questioned, with several historians branding him a military despot instead 
of national savior. Finally, the historiography of the Battle of New Orleans 
is even broadening to include women and music.
Within the domain of Battle of New Orleans historiography, the 
most basic category is that of military strategy. Struggle for the Gulf Border-
lands by Frank Owsley, Jr. ranks as the standard work on American tactics, 
drawing on Jackson’s papers, Department of War records, and Creole Major 
André Latour’s memoir. Owsley cites figures of 5,000 American troops ver-
sus 10,000 British soldiers and stresses Jackson’s strong defensive line with-
in a swamp and wooded area.2 Yet, Owsley argues that Jackson’s best tactic 
was his “ability to drive himself and his army through almost any kind 
of hardship, to maintain good discipline…, and never to lose confidence 
that he would win in the end.”3 While agreeing with Owsley’s flattering 
assessment of Jackson’s leadership, historian Charles Brooks’ The Siege of 
New Orleans emphasizes the tactical value of a mud breastwork Jackson’s 
troops and conscripted slaves constructed along his defensive line, which 
forced the British to attack head-on across unprotected, flat terrain and thus 
doomed them to suffer massive casualties against an inexperienced Amer-
ican army.4 In 1969, Wilburt Brown offered a new view of the battle’s strat-
egy, evaluating British Admiralty Office records and concluding that the 
American navy under direction of Commandant Patterson played a crucial 
role in supporting Jackson and demoralized British troops by steady bom-
bardment.5 Finally, a provocatively revisionist thesis proposed by military 
2  Frank Owsley, Jr., Struggle for the Gulf Borderlands: The Creek War and the Battle of New 
Orleans 1812-1815 (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1981), 157-162. 
3  Ibid., 5. 
4  Charles B. Brooks, The Siege of New Orleans (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1961), 
227-252. 
5  Wilburt S. Brown, The Amphibious Campaign for West Florida and Louisiana, 1814-1815: A 
Critical Review of Strategy and Tactics at New Orleans (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 
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historian John Mahon harshly criticizes Jackson for his negligence in de-
fending his right flank, a mistake that Mahon claims could have altered the 
eventual outcome of the battle and, at the least, posed a serious threat.6 
 After works on American battle tactics and strategy, the next major 
category of Battle of New Orleans historiography analyzes the consequenc-
es of the American victory. The traditional reading of the battle as a defin-
ing moment, indeed as justification of American national identity, remains 
the view of most American historians today. For example, Donald Hickey’s 
benchmark recent history of the War of 1812 confirms that the Battle of New 
Orleans “promoted national self-confidence and encouraged the heady ex-
pansionism that lay at the heart of American foreign policy for the rest of 
the century.”7 Likewise, Robert Remini’s monograph The Battle of New Orle-
ans describes the American victory as a pivot because in “one glorious mo-
ment the nation had demonstrated that it had the strength, will, and ability 
to defend its freedom and proved to the world that it was here to stay, that 
its sovereignty and rights were to be respected by all.”8 In recent decades, 
however, some historians have questioned the nationalistic implications of 
the battle. Because New Orleans was the overall war’s only victory and won 
by a Southerner, Frank Owsley, Jr.’s Struggle for the Gulf Borderlands argues 
that the battle disproportionately aided the South and led to the ascendance 
of that section’s political power.9 Daniel Walker Howe, author of the defini-
tive history of the early American Republic, also suggests a reinterpretation 
of the battle’s consequences. He asserts that the Battle of New Orleans de-
finitively ended fear of foreign domination, but concurrently manifested a 
1969), 169, 175-179. 
6  John K. Mahon, The War of 1812 (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1972), 368.
7  Donald R. Hickey, The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 1990), 3. 
8  Remini, Battle of New Orleans, 195.  
9  Owsley, Jr., 194-195.  
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tension within American society over national destiny – a future of urban, 
industrial progress, as evidenced by mass-produced artillery at the battle, 
or a future of westward expansion and individual frontiersmen, epitomized 
by Jackson.10
 Any history of the Battle of New Orleans necessarily involves 
Andrew Jackson, who took charge and annihilated the British to become 
an American hero. This historiographical category is traditional, but it has 
many present-day adherents, who believe that the Battle of New Orleans 
launched Jackson’s political career on the basis of his personal popularity 
as a victorious general and eventually secured him the presidency. John 
W. Ward’s aptly named 1955 work, Andrew Jackson: Symbol for an Age, 
stands as the best example of the hagiography surrounding Jackson and 
his New Orleans victory. Ward declares that “[i]n the victory at New 
Orleans, Jackson was explicitly and directly connected with God.”11 
Currently, Robert Remini, Jackson’s chief modern scholarly biographer, 
continues the “Great Man” history of Jackson and New Orleans. Remini’s 
monograph, The Battle of New Orleans, affirms that, due to “his victory 
at New Orleans, General Jackson became a hero such as the people of 
America had never enjoyed before.”12 He concludes that the American 
public elected Jackson to the presidency, despite his lack of education 
and few political credentials, as a reward for his fundamental role in 
upholding American independence at New Orleans.13
Controversy over American involvement in the Vietnam War 
convinced some historians to reassess the glory enveloping previous 
10  Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815-1848 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 17-18. 
11  John W. Ward, Andrew Jackson: Symbol for an Age (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1955), 108. 
12  Remini, Battle of New Orleans, 197. 
13  Ibid., 198.  
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American military engagements, including the Battle of New Orleans. 
From a defining moment that catapulted Andrew Jackson to the White 
House, the battle plunged to a minor incident that America won due to 
sheer luck, not superior strategy. Writing in 1969, historian Carson Ritchie 
was an early skeptic of the defining moment category of historiography. 
In fact, Ritchie acerbically describes the battle as “won and lost in a 
matter of minutes.”14 He also contends that British military blunders, 
such as lack of guns and equipment as well as general panic among 
troops, handed victory to the Americans, thus rejecting prevailing 
historiographic accounts of strong American defenses.15 Similarly, J. C. 
A. Stagg, author of Mr. Madison’s War: Politics, Diplomacy, and Warfare 
in the Early American Republic, 1783-1830, argues that America emerged 
victorious at the Battle of New Orleans because of adequacy rather than 
tactical supremacy.16 Stagg asserts the battle was no defining moment, but 
an episode when “the United States had done little more than survive.”17 
More recently, Daniel Walker Howe has reinterpreted the American 
victory as unnecessary, “a particularly tragic result of the slowness of 
communication at the start of the nineteenth century.”18 In other words, 
the battle was avoidable since a peace treaty between the United States 
and Britain had already been signed in December 1814, hence invalidating 
the reason for the battle in January 1815; ironically, news of the Treaty of 
Ghent did not arrive in the United States until February 1815, subsequent 
to the battle.  
Historians have also reconsidered the generic white male 
14  Carson Ritchie, “The Guns of New Orleans,” The History Teacher 2, no. 4 (May 1969): 13.
15  Ibid., 10-12.  
16  J. C. A. Stagg, Mr. Madison’s War: Politics, Diplomacy, and Warfare in the Early American 
Republic, 1783-1830 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 498. 
17  Ibid., 501. 
18  Howe, 15-16. 
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characterization of the Battle of New Orleans, looking anew at primary 
sources to discover what role many diverse peoples had in the battle. 
Prompted by the Civil Rights Movement, African-American historian 
Donald E. Everett asserted in a groundbreaking 1955 journal article that 
a battalion composed of free black New Orleans residents played an 
important role in Jackson’s victory. According to Everett, the free black 
troops provided Jackson much-needed manpower and showed more skill 
and courage in battle than white soldiers. Everett views the Battle of New 
Orleans as a very early example of racial equality because Jackson granted 
free black troops the same pay and provisions as white soldiers, as well as 
promising respect for their service within his ranks.19 However, writing 
a few decades after Everett, historian Robert Remini called attention to 
another aspect of the African-American experience in his book Andrew 
Jackson and The Course of American Empire. Remini argues that free black 
troops played only a minor role in the Battle of New Orleans and instead 
states that the unpaid, forced labor of black slaves who built fortifications 
for Jackson decided the American victory. Indeed, Remini equates the 
role of slaves in the Battle of New Orleans to the South’s rise on the basis 
of slave labor and thereby infers unwillingness among Americans to 
acknowledge the wrongs that coexist with past national triumphs.20
Another facet of the historiography of the Battle of New Orleans 
involves the question of whether the Creole population, with only two 
years experience of statehood, was dedicated to the American cause and, 
by extension, Jackson’s leadership. The dominant interpretation presumes 
that while Creoles may not have openly engaged in treason, they did not 
19  Donald E. Everett, “Emigres and Militiamen: Free Persons of Color in New Orleans, 1803-
1815,” Journal of Negro History 38, no. 4 (October 1953): 395-398.
20  Robert V. Remini, Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Empire, 1767-1821 (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1977), 273. 
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enthusiastically support Jackson’s efforts to defend their city. As Charles 
Brooks observes in The Siege of New Orleans, Jackson “carried from New 
Orleans more than the memory of a great military victory; he carried the 
experience of trying to govern a strong-willed people.”21 Even Donald 
Hickey, author of the preeminent modern account of the War of 1812, 
concludes that Creoles “radiated disloyalty and defeatism.”22 In contrast, 
Paul Gelpi, Jr. poses a challenge to the prevailing consensus about the 
non-Anglo-American population’s allegiance. He asserts that the Battle of 
New Orleans served as the climax of a “process of Americanization that 
Louisiana’s Creole community underwent.”23 Examining the Battalion 
d’Orleans, an all-volunteer militia unit composed solely of New Orleans 
Creoles, Gelpi determined that, although many contemporary Americans 
identified Creoles as a security threat, the battalion demonstrated 
Creole patriotism, defending the city itself and hence enabling Jackson 
to concentrate on the vital periphery.24 Interestingly, Joseph Tregle 
reinterprets the question of Creole loyalty into a question of Jackson’s 
own paranoia; in effect, Tregle argues the battle was a cross-cultural clash 
within American society.25 He states that “New Orleans was entirely 
outside the general’s experience…and he was convinced that from these 
exotic people, native and foreign alike, one could only expect difficulty 
and most likely treachery.”26 
Perhaps the most colorful category of Battle of New Orleans his-
toriography is that of the Baratarian pirates’ role in defeating the British. 
21  Brooks, 270. 
22  Hickey, The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict, 206. 
23  Paul D. Gelpi, Jr., “Mr. Jefferson’s Creoles: The Battalion d’Orléans and the 
Americanization of Creole Louisiana, 1803-1815,” Louisiana History: The Journal of the Louisiana 
Historical Association 48, no. 3 (Summer 2007): 297. 
24  Ibid., 297-312. 
25  Joseph G. Tregle, “Andrew Jackson and the Continuing Battle of New Orleans,” Journal of 
the Early Republic 1, no. 4 (Winter 1981): 373-378. 
26  Ibid., 375.  
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In recent decades, the view of the majority of historians has been that Jean 
Laffite and his pirate crew were second only to Jackson in saving the nation 
from British subjugation. This interpretation was first advanced by Jane Lu-
cas De Grummond in her 1961 monograph, The Baratarians and the Battle of 
New Orleans. Drawing on a journal supposedly written by Lafitte, De Grum-
mond declared that the pirates provided vital arms, men, and information 
to Jackson, which afforded him a strategic edge over the British.27 In assent 
with De Grummond, military historian Wilburt Brown confirms that “it is 
possible that Jackson might have defended the city successfully without the 
aid of the Baratarians, but it is probable that he could not have done so if 
Lafitte and his men had accepted British offers.”28 A decidedly positive as-
sessment of the pirates’ contribution is found in Donald Hickey’s The War of 
1812, in which he verifies their invaluable artillery skill and familiarity with 
local topography and concludes that “Jean Lafitte the Baratarian leader, got 
along so well with Jackson that he became the general’s unofficial aide-de-
camp.”29 Recently, however, Robert Vogel has offered a revisionist concept 
of the pirates’ pivotal role. First, Vogel maintains that Jackson grudgingly 
accepted the pirates’ help, actually referring to them as “hellish banditti.” 
Upon critical review of primary documents, namely district court case files 
and military disbursement records, Vogel found that the Baratarians did 
not give large quantities of either guns or ammunition; in addition, only 
about fifty pirates – not hundreds as formerly alleged – fought with Jackson 
on January 8, 1815.30 Lastly, Vogel objects to claims of the pirates’ patriot-
ic motivation in joining Jackson. He insists that “a more rational explana-
27  Jane Lucas De Grummond, The Baratarians and the Battle of New Orleans (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1961), 18-21.
28  Brown, 31. 
29  Hickey, The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict, 207. 
30  Robert C. Vogel, “Jean Laffite, the Baratarians, and the Battle of New Orleans: A 
Reappraisal,” Louisiana History: The Journal of the Louisiana Historical Association 41, no. 3 
(Summer 2000): 264-271.
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tion would be that the Bartarians came to the aid of Jackson because they 
concluded it was to their advantage to do so as underworld businessmen” 
who were deterred by British and Spanish naval surveillance of the Gulf of 
Mexico.31
 Currently, the historiography of the Battle of New Orleans 
is experiencing a renewal of interest and challenging the status quo 
of military history, male history, and glorified history. In fact, one of 
the foremost trends in this historiography today has been to question 
the heroism of Andrew Jackson in the battle, with several historians 
branding him a military despot instead of national savior. Typical of 
earlier historians, Robert Remini admitted Jackson’s implementation of 
martial law prior to the battle and his continuation of it weeks after the 
battle ended was not justified. Remini states that “Jackson established a 
police state with no other authority but his own. He clearly overreached 
himself.”32 Yet, Remini also excuses Jackson’s martial law, arguing that his 
“total sense of duty” compelled him to continue martial law.33 In contrast, 
Matthew Warshaeur conclusively labels Jackson a military despot. He 
stresses that Jackson’s “cancellation of the civil government touched 
on one of the most fundamental notions of American freedom: that the 
military shall remain subordinate to civil authority. Martial law in New 
Orleans was a classic republican battle between liberty and power.”34 
Warshaeur emphasizes the absence of a precedent in America for 
suspending habeas corpus and contends that Jackson’s implementation 
of martial law in New Orleans had long-term consequences, instilling 
31  Ibid., 275. 
32  Remini, Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Empire, 311.  
33  Ibid., 312. 
34  Matthew Warshauer, “The Battle of New Orleans Reconsidered: Andrew Jackson and 
Martial Law,” Louisiana History: The Journal of the Louisiana Historical Association 39, no. 3 
(Summer 1998): 262. 
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in Jackson a “sense of unlimited authority. Indeed, such attributes were 
exceedingly apparent in later episodes, such as Jackson’s invasion of 
Florida in 1819 and his later war on the Bank of the United States.”35 
Like Warshaeur, Joseph Tregle condemns Jackson’s martial law in New 
Orleans, but claims that the greatest impact of Jackson’s unjustified actions 
was seen in the presidential election of 1828. In the campaign, Tregle says, 
Jackson’s opponents’ most powerful weapon was the image of him as 
disrespectful of constitutional and legal precedents with New Orleans as 
proof positive.36
 Finally, Battle of New Orleans historiography has recently 
developed cultural and female perspectives, though not prolifically. 
For example, music historian Charles Kinzer explores the role played 
by free blacks who composed the First Battalion of Free Men of Color’s 
unit band. He finds that, during the battle itself, the band played to 
sustain troop morale and performed such patriotic songs as “Yankee 
Doodle” and, for Creole troops, “The Marseillaise.” Kinzer believes that 
members of the free black battalion’s band should not only be recognized 
as the originators of a tradition of American military music, but also as 
the founders of New Orleans’ own distinct musical heritage.37 On the 
other hand, historians Catherine Allgor and Robert Remini investigate 
American women’s primary function in commemorating the Battle of New 
Orleans. Within the larger framework of evaluating women’s political 
roles in the newly established national capital, Allgor relates that in 1828 
Louisa Catherine Adams, wife of presidential candidate John Quincy 
Adams, commemorated the victory of her husband’s arch-rival at New 
35  Ibid., 291. 
36  Tregle, 383. 
37  Charles E. Kinzer, “The Band of Music of the First Battalion of Free Men of Color and the 
Siege of New Orleans, 1814-1815,” American Music 10, no. 3 (Autumn 1992): 348-362. 
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Orleans by means of a grand ball. Allgor asserts that by honoring Jackson, 
John Quincy Adams would “appear to rise above personal interest in 
celebrating a national hero.”38 Yet, since it was thought unseemly to 
actively campaign for the presidency, Louisa Catherine Adams would 
actually be the center of attention, “the representative of the house, her 
husband, her family, and all the political freight associated with the 
event.”39 Similarly, Robert Remini establishes the key role of New Orleans 
women in celebrating Jackson’s victory in the days after the battle, 
describing a scene of young women dressed as “Liberty” and all of the 
current states and territories at a thanksgiving mass.40
 In summary, despite revisionist works, the significance of the 
Battle of New Orleans as a defining moment of national self-confidence 
remains as the prevailing consensus among today’s American historians. 
While consensus exists as to the broad meaning of the battle, much debate 
is focused on the future direction of history about this topic. Author of 
the standard work on the War of 1812, historian Donald Hickey argues 
that since the 1980s the Battle of New Orleans has been better served by 
historians, but their attention has still been disproportionately directed 
toward military and political history rather than the homefront, which 
contains greater potential for new knowledge.41 Future analysis of the 
battle should step beyond traditional constraints and take an in-depth 
look at the human dimension within the topic. A thorough survey of 
women’s role in the war, akin to Drew Gilpin Faust’s equivalent Civil 
War study, is needed, especially in order to answer the question of Creole 
38  Catherine Allgor, Parlor Politics: In Which the Ladies of Washington Help Build a City and a 
Government (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2000), 177. 
39  Ibid., 180.  
40  Remini, Battle of New Orleans, 187-188. 
41  Donald R. Hickey, “The War of 1812: Still A Forgotten Conflict?,” Journal of Military 
History 65, no. 3 (July 2001): 757, 765. 
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women’s unique experience. Likewise, analysis of Native Americans’ role 
in the battle is incomplete, failing to examine how their participation was 
later denied in order to disqualify their citizenship and property rights. 
Moreover, analogous to the marring of Jackson’s legacy by his presidential 
policy of Indian removal, it is foreseeable that the Battle of New Orleans 
will assume the same myth-busting role in connection to him. Ultimately, 
future research should consider New Orleans itself. In January 1815, 
the city had a brief history as part of the United States and contained a 
heterogeneous ethnic citizenry – Americans, English, Spanish, French, 
Haitians, slaves, and free blacks. The process by which such different and 
often competing factions were reconciled and united, both physically in 
arms and psychologically in common patriotic cause, is truly what makes 
the Battle of New Orleans distinctive. 
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Communists on the Brain: 
U.S. Intervention in the  
Dominican Republic
William Jarrod Smitherman
I
With the free Republics of Latin America, I have always felt—and my country has 
always felt—very special ties of interest and affection…Together we share and 
shape the destiny of the new world.1
On April 24, 1965, violence erupted in the Dominican Republic. This small 
Caribbean nation was no stranger to violence or political upheaval. Only 
four years before, it had witnessed the assassination of Raphael Trujillo, 
leader of the oppressive regime in power since 1930. Juan Bosch, who 
was elected President in 1962, lasted only seven months in office before 
being overthrown himself. In the wake of Bosch’s departure, a military 
triumvirate became the ruling authority in the Dominican Republic. That 
governing body also soon lost support, and in April 1965, various groups 
opposed to Donald Reid Cabral, head of the Triumvirate, staged a revolt, 
ostensibly to restore the deposed Juan Bosch to power.
 The Dominican Republic is located approximately eight hundred 
miles from the coast of the United States. Partly because of this proximity, 
America has had a long history of intervening in Dominican affairs. 
However, after the adoption of the Good Neighbor Policy by the Franklin 
Roosevelt administration, the U.S. had avoided direct intervention in 
Dominican affairs. But only three days after the revolt began, President 
1  Lyndon Johnson, “State of the Union Address, January 4, 1965.” Public Papers of the 
Presidents of the United States, Book I. (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1966), 3.
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Lyndon Johnson ordered U.S. troops to land there. At first, the number of 
American soldiers was small. On April 28, 1965, there were only about 500 
U.S. troops on the island under the guise of a rescue mission to evacuate 
American citizens, embassy officials, and other foreign nationals from 
what the administration called a “grave situation.”2 Less than a week 
later, however, there were twenty-three thousand U.S. soldiers stationed 
there, and Johnson had decided intervention was necessary to prevent a 
communist takeover. 
The Dominican Revolt of 1965 created a crisis of American policy 
by revealing the incompatibility of the Good Neighbor Policy with 
the Monroe Doctrine and the Containment Policy in Latin America. In 
practice, the U.S. had abandoned the Good Neighbor Policy, but continued 
to proclaim its adherence. To save face and preserve some semblance of 
following its own policies, the administration was forced to play a verbal 
shell game to justify its decisions. The situation in the Dominican Republic 
was not a total failure of policy as some have suggested.3 Nor was it 
the fault of the embassy.4 American policy in the Dominican Republic 
was at a crossroads created by the Cold War climate, not because the 
administration did not know what to do, but because it needed to carry 
out actions that could be justified by contradictory policies—America 
needed to intervene without being regarded as interventionists.
The Monroe Doctrine has served as a cornerstone of American 
foreign policy in Latin America since it was first adopted in 1823. It rejects 
the legitimacy of European influence in Latin American nations. As 
2  Lyndon Johnson, “The President’s News Conference of April 27, 1965,” Public Papers of the 
Presidents of the United States, Book I, 451.
3  Theodore Draper, The Dominican Revolt: A Case Study in American Policy. (New York: 
Commentary, 1968), 5; Piero Gleijeses, The Dominican Crisis: The 1965 Constitutionalist Revolt 
and American Intervention, trans. Lawrence Lipson, (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1978), 177-178.
4  Draper, The Dominican Revolt, 5.
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originally constructed, the policy was meant to prevent former European 
colonial masters from reasserting control over Latin American countries 
that had gained independence and to prevent foreign nations from 
“gain[ing] a foothold in adjoining territories.”5 Of course, the Monroe 
Doctrine appealed to U.S. self-interest. Ignoring the autonomy of Latin 
American countries, the doctrine “presumes that Latin American and 
Caribbean people neither have the right, nor…the critical faculties to opt 
rationally and intelligently for an economic or political system not molded 
on that of the United States.”6 Rather, America has considered this side 
of the Atlantic to be its domain, and thus the doctrine has provided the 
justification for U.S. intervention in Latin America throughout history.7
Eventually, Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy superseded this 
activism, and non-intervention became the preferred policy for a brief 
period. Post-World War II conditions, however, intensified international 
tensions and occasioned a new general foreign policy. Initially created to 
prevent the spread of communism in Europe, the policy of containment 
became the guiding principle of Cold War foreign policy. The Cold 
War policy of containing communism, however, contradicted the Good 
Neighbor Policy being employed in Latin America. It is through this Cold 
War Containment lens that the U.S. response to events in the Dominican 
Republic must be viewed.
The primary failure of U.S. policy was that a clear and specific 
policy toward the Dominican Republic and the particular conditions 
which existed within it was nonexistent. The U.S. lacked a policy that 
could rectify the incompatibility of broad U.S. policy objectives. Embassy 
5  James L. Dietz, “Destabilization and Intervention in Latin America and the Caribbean,” 
Latin American Perspectives 11, no. 3 (Summer 1984): 3.
6  Dietz, “Destabilization and Intervention in Latin America and the Caribbean,” 5; William 
Kamman, “U.S.-Latin American Relations.” OAH Magazine of History 7, no. 2 (Fall 1992): 21.
7  Dietz, “Destabilization and Intervention in Latin America and the Caribbean,” 4.
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officials had warned of the dangers of these shortcomings well before 
the 1965 revolt. In 1964, the embassy warned the State Department 
that, “it is time we sat down to map out a program for the Dominican 
Republic which is geared to developments that are occurring there.”8 The 
report further stated that events in the Dominican Republic could lead 
to “deterioration in political and economic conditions which could lead 
to a Castro-type takeover.” It was important that the United States “not 
simply react to the situation as it develops,” but rather have a plan in 
place to prevent such an occurrence or limit its success.9 The warning went 
unheeded, and when the situation fell apart, America’s response seemed 
reactionary, frenzied, and inconsistent. The administration was constantly 
changing the direction of public discourse to keep up with changing 
events and justify policy decisions.
II
The American nations cannot, must not, and will not permit the establishment 
of another Communist government in the Western Hemisphere. This was the 
unanimous view of all the American nations when, in January 1962, they 
declared, and I quote: “The principles of communism are incompatible with the 
principles of the inter-American system.” That is what our beloved President 
John F. Kennedy meant when, less than a week before his death, he told us: “We 
in this hemisphere must also use every resource at our command to prevent the 
establishment of another Cuba in this hemisphere.”10
The biggest influence on America’s policy toward the Dominican 
Republic was an event that had occurred elsewhere in the Caribbean six 
years earlier. America’s primary focus in policy toward the Dominican 
8  “Memorandum from the Presidents Special Assistant (Dungan) to the Assistant Secretary 
of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann), February 6, 1964,” Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1964-1968 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005), XXXII: 7.
9 Ibid., 8.
10  Lyndon Johnson, “Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Situation 
in the Dominican Republic, May 2, 1965,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 
Book I, 472.
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Republic was in the context of preventing a “second Cuba,” a fear that 
was somewhat exaggerated but not entirely fallacious.11 Theodore Draper 
states that from the beginning “the U.S., on the basis of ambiguous 
evidence, assumed…that the revolution was communist dominated, 
or would certainly become so.”12 Actually, U.S. assumptions about 
communism in the Dominican Republic were in existence long before 
the beginning of the revolt. Upon taking office, President Johnson 
proclaimed that “The communists are hard at work to dominate the less 
developed nations of…Latin America,” and numerous reports indicated 
an inclination for policy makers to be suspicious of a communist plot.13 
This assumption was part of a long term Cold War mentality, 
and fears of communist expansion dominated foreign policy decisions. 
Long before the 1965 revolt, intelligence officials warned that “Castro 
will probably supply [subversive leftist leaders] clandestinely with 
small amounts of material aid, and they may attract the support of other 
Dominican elements, including erstwhile moderates.” While evidence at 
that time was deficient, the report stated that “over the longer run, the 
present limited threat of insurgency could increase sharply.”14 Conditions 
in the Dominican Republic did little to alleviate these concerns. The 
Dominican people “are seething with unrest and frustration…The poor 
and unemployed … appear to be steadily drifting leftward in their 
11  Abraham Lowenthal, The Dominican Intervention. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1972), 26, 153; Jerome Slater, Intervention and Negotiation: The United States and Dominican 
Intervention (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), x; Jonathan Hartlyn, “The Dominican 
Republic: The Legacy of Intermittent Engagement,” in, Exporting Democracy, ed. Abraham 
Lowenthal (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 76. Lowenthal, “The 
United States and the Dominican Republic to 1965: Background to Intervention.” Caribbean 
Studies 10, no. 2 (July 1970): 49-50.
12  Draper, The Dominican Revolt, 65.
13  Lyndon Johnson, “Special Message to Congress on Foreign Aid, January 14, 1965.” Public 
Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Book I, 44.
14  “Special National Intelligence Estimate 86.2-64, January 17, 1964,” FRUS, 1964-1968, 
XXXII: 1, 5-7.
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sympathies. They are, of course, on [the] receiving end of [a] heavy stream 
of radio and word of mouth propaganda from [the] extreme left.”15 Even 
when not germane to the issue at hand, officials were so focused on 
preventing a second Cuba that they saw communism everywhere. “Point 
is, rumors, whether or not based on fact, have caused [a] split in armed 
forces unity—a very effective Communist [strategy],” stated one report on 
the discord in the Dominican armed forces.16 When the revolt began, and 
it appeared that some of the opposition factions had ties to the extreme 
left, conditions seemed to fit into the American policy paradigm perfectly. 
James Dietz states:
The post-Second World War foreign power obsession has been, 
of course, the need to contain the spread of communism and 
socialism—systems that, in this view, expand only under the 
direction of Moscow or Peking, or Havana…and that do so 
only by infiltrating other governments either through hard line 
agents under international party discipline, or through the more 
dangers avenue of fellow travelers and innocent and naive liberals 
[i.e. Bosch] who unwittingly serve the international communist 
conspiracy by favoring communist goals like agrarian reform, 
anti-poverty programs, rights of unions to organize, political and 
human rights, income redistribution, and the like.17
Since the ascension of the Triumvirate, the “basic thrust of U.S. 
policy toward the Dominican Republic … remained the same: to prevent 
any threat to U.S. security by promoting immediate stability and guarding 
against ‘Castro-Communist’ gains.”18 The failure to prevent a communist 
takeover in Cuba was a huge black eye for America. With that defeat 
at the forefront of their minds, administration officials’ perceptions of 
reality became skewed to the point of paranoia. Every situation was 
15  “Telegram from the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State, May 
21, 1964,” FRUS, 1964-1968, XXXII: 12-13.
16  “Telegram from the Joint Army/Navy/Air Force Attaches to the Chief of Naval 
Operations (McDonald), August 26, 1964,” FRUS, 1964-1968, XXXII: 36.
17  Dietz, “Destabilization and Intervention in Latin America and the Caribbean,” 4-5.
18  Lowenthal, The Dominican Intervention, 30.
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seen through “red” glasses, and officials read much communism into 
the situation. Bruises from the Cuban Revolution not only influenced 
America’s approach to the Dominican Republic, it also shaped how the 
U.S. would intervene. The failure of the Bay of Pigs incident weighed 
heavily on Johnson and his advisors as they considered the direct role of 
American forces in the Dominican Republic.19 Officials were very cautious 
about how the military should be involved. Certainly there would need 
to be evidence to justify intervention, and intervention should not have 
appeared unilateral. Regardless, officials recognized that, whatever action 
was taken, “we shall be misunderstood, and we shall be attacked by those 
who want revolution immediately and by those who want no changes at 
all.”20
 Critics of intervention have been outspoken in their assertion that 
the administration’s painting of the rebels as communistic was “one of 
the most cynical deceptions of our time.”21 The communist threat, they 
argued, was invented by those seeking to retain power, as a means to 
enlist the United States to prop up their crumbling regime.22 Theodore 
Draper argues that to interpret events as being orchestrated by Castro 
was inane. Castroites, “flushed with a lighting victory over the entire 
Dominican military” would not have missed the “golden opportunity 
to wage a holy war of ‘national liberation’ against direct U.S. military 
intervention.”23 The assertion, however, “that the whole affair was a 
hoax or cover up is…incorrect.” There was sufficient evidence to warrant 
19  Ibid., 107.
20  “Telegram from the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State, May 
21, 1964,” FRUS, 1964-1968, XXXII: 18.
21  Draper, The Dominican Revolt, 28. See also Frank Moya Pons, The Dominican Republic: A 
National History (Princeton, NJ: Markus Weiner, 1998).
22  Piero Gleijeses, The Dominican Crisis, 179.
23  Draper, The Dominican Revolt, 112-113.
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U.S. suspicions of communist involvement.24 Although the extent of 
communist infiltration could not be ascertained, American officials had 
no doubt that “a modest number of hard-core Communist leaders in 
Santo Domingo [had] managed by superior training and tactics to win for 
themselves a position of considerable influence in the revolt.”25 One month 
after American soldiers arrived, Johnson affirmed that “a well-trained, 
disciplined band of Communists was prevented from destroying the 
hopes of Dominican democracy.”26 He conveniently ignored that the only 
democratically elected leader of the Dominican Republic was prevented 
from returning to power by the U.S. intervention.
 Reports from intelligence agents, embassy officials, and other 
observers confirmed the presence of communist operatives. Consistent 
with the idea that the “high motives [of the initial revolt had] been 
misused by a small band of conspirators who receive their directions from 
abroad,” former ambassador John Bartlow Martin reported that rebels 
had distributed weapons to the populace, including a large number of 
communists. 27 Intelligence agents witnessed known communist operatives 
participating in the rebel movement.28 Administration officials reported 
that armed bands of communists were roaming the streets at night and 
terrorizing citizens, even firing on the American Embassy while the 
Ambassador was contacting Washington via telephone from under a 
desk.29 These statements served a number of purposes. First, they provided 
24  Slater, Intervention and Negotiation, 35-36.
25  Memorandum Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency, May 7, 1965, FRUS, 1964-
1968, XXXII: 139.
26  “Commencement Address at Baylor University, May 28, 1965,” Public Papers of the 
Presidents of the United States, Book I, 594.
27  “Radio and Television Report to the American People…, May 2, 1965,” 472.
28  John Bartlow Martin, Overtaken by Events: The Dominican Crisis from the Fall of Trujillo to 
the Civil War, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966), 647, 650, 673.
29  Telephone Conversation Between the Undersecretary of State of Economic Affairs (Mann) 
and President Johnson, April 27, 1965, FRUS, 1964-1968, XXXII: 63; Lyndon Johnson, “The 
Presidents News Conference of June 1, 1965.” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 
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the necessary justification for sending troops. Second, the frightening and 
bloody tales helped sway American public opinion to support further 
U.S. actions. Finally, these stories motivated Congress to loosen its purse 
strings and fund these and other military operations intended to prevent 
the spread of communism around the world. Johnson told Congress 
that “each Member…who supports this request [for additional military 
appropriations in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic] is voting to 
continue our effort to try to halt Communist aggression.”30
 Continued intelligence operations and observations after the 
initial American deployment yielded further evidence of communist 
involvement, and the embassy increasingly emphasized the signs of 
communist influence. Even writers critical of intervention admit that there 
was communist involvement in the revolt.31 While communist operatives 
may have been participating, even constituting an important element in 
the Constitutionalist camp, there was very little evidence “linking any 
Communist country to the planning, organization, or direction of the 
movement.”32 Ambassador Martin had no doubt that there was a danger 
of communist takeover. His reports paint a much more violent picture 
than reported in historical accounts of journalists. He corroborated reports 
that many men with known communist ties were active at rebel strong 
points and also reported that communist operatives knew that they 
would not succeed if the American military intervened and discussed 
withdrawing from overt participation to obscure their involvement.33
Book II (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1966), 617.
30 Lyndon Johnson, “Remarks to Committee Members on the Need for Additional 
Appropriations for Military Purposes in Viet-Nam and the Dominican Republic, May 4, 
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 At the very least, what started out as a legitimate attempt 
to establish democracy was “superseded by…evil forces.” Johnson 
maintained that “Communist leaders, many of them trained in Cuba, 
seeing a chance to increase disorder, to gain a foothold, [had] joined the 
revolution.”34 American intentions in the Dominican Republic were “in 
keeping with the principles of the inter-American system…to prevent 
another Communist state in this hemisphere.”35 Of course, as time 
progressed, further evidence of communist involvement was scarce, 
putting Johnson on the defensive, yet again. The President was forced 
to back away from some of the bold pronouncements.36 Responding to 
reporters’ inquiries, President Johnson said:
I will say that the threat was greater before 21,000 Americans 
arrived there. It always is. The Communists did not, in our 
judgment, originate this revolution, but they joined it and they 
participated in it. They were active in it, and in a good many 
places they were in charge of it…We think that following the 
action that this nation took—it served a very good purpose and 
some of the men who had originally participated in the revolution, 
and had to take asylum, retuned and more moderate forces took 
leadership—the Communist elements have not been so active, 
although their presence is still noted hour by hour.37
Historian Abraham Lowenthal agrees that as long as U.S. troops were 
present, the danger of communist takeover was dramatically reduced.38
34  “Radio and Television Report to the American People…, May 2, 1965,” 471.
35  Ibid., 473.
36  Draper, The Dominican Revolt, 138.
37  “The President’s News Conference of June 1, 1965,” 613-614.
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III
We are going to have to really set up that government down there, run it, and 
stabilize it some way or another. This Bosch is no good.39
 
To complicate matters, America was somewhat unsure about which side 
to support. From one perspective, the U.S. should have supported the 
return of the legitimately elected Juan Bosch. They chose not to do so, 
however. Thus America once again found itself at the crossroads of two 
incompatible policies—protecting and promoting democracy throughout 
Latin America and preventing the spread of communism there as well. 
Much of the U.S. response stemmed from a distrust of former President 
Juan Bosch.40 Bosch was elected President of the Dominican Republic in 
1962, but Americans interpreted his ascension as bringing “into office a 
Dominican regime … eager to assert its sovereignty.”41 Bosch, they felt, 
would be less likely to succumb to American influence. While the U.S. had 
supported the Bosch regime during its brief tenure, it did so cautiously, 
suspicious of Bosch’s ties to leftists. Before his overthrow, American 
officials expressed concerns about Bosch’s commitment to American 
principles. Ambassador Bennett stated that, “my own feeling is that Bosch 
is basically anti-American.”42 
Despite his legitimacy, America failed to support Bosch in 1963. 
Instead, America allowed a regime with a much stronger anti-communist 
stance to seize control.43 As early as January of 1964 intelligence officials 
pointed to Bosch’s reluctance to stand up to communist intrusions. In 
39  “Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs 
(Mann) and President Johnson, April 26, 1965,” FRUS, 1964-1968, XXXII: 62.
40  Slater, Intervention and Negotiation, 25.
41  Abraham Lowenthal, “The United States and the Dominican Republic to 1965,” 38.
42  “Letter from the Ambassador to the Dominican Republic (Bennett) to the Assistant 
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann), February 2, 1965,” FRUS, 1964-1968, 
XXXII: 54.
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their view, “Bosch reacted vigorously against Communists and Castroists 
only when he thought they posed direct challenges to his own position.”44 
Abraham Lowenthal states, “Since the fundamental American objective 
in the Dominican Republic was never really to help Bosch or even rule 
his country, but rather to prevent a ‘second Cuba,’ the U.S. government’s 
reaction when Bosch was overthrown was not surprising.”45
 The 1965 revolt began as an attempt to restore Bosch to power 
and was supported by a number of groups—many with communist 
inclinations—who banded together to oppose Reid.46 Already weary 
of Bosch and fearful of the spread of communism in Latin America, 
the U.S. was reluctant to support his return to power, and some 
officials intentionally cast aspersions that he and the communists were 
indistinguishable.47 Reported communist involvement in the revolt 
only served to increase American concern about Bosch. There was some 
question as to whether Bosch had “sold out to the Communists before 
the revolt…[or whether] the revolt was co-opted by communist agents.”48 
Though he was living under American protection in Puerto Rico, “America 
came to treat Bosch’s party as if it had a permanent burden of proof that it 
was not seeking or even accepting Castro-Communist support.”49
 Whether Bosch was directly involved with a communist plot was 
undetermined, but American officials still expressed doubts about him. 
Even if he wasn’t privy to communist plots, American officials did not 
“think that [he] understands the Communist danger … [W]e are afraid…
that if he gets back in, he will have so many [communists] around him; 
44  “Special National Intelligence Estimate 86.2-64, January 17, 1964,” FRUS, 1964-1968, 
XXXII: 2. 
45  Lowenthal, “The United States and the Dominican Republic to 1965,” 52.
46  Slater, Intervention and Negotiation, 19-20.
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48  Ibid., 133.
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and they are so much smarter than he is, that before you know it, they’d 
begin to take over.”50 As far as America was concerned, Bosch would 
be used and discarded by the Communist operatives once the revolt 
successfully overthrew the Triumvirate.51 At the same time, despite 
America’s inclination to support Reid Cabral, it was clear that he would 
not come out on top of the revolt. Officially, the United States made a 
“strong effort to avoid tying ourselves too directly to … any one group,” 
all-the-while working behind the scenes to support a military junta.52
IV
In those early terrible hours, we did what we had to do. Remembering Simon 
Bolivar’s admonition that “to hesitate is destruction,” as your President I did 
what I had to do.53
From the beginning, the administration had been sensitive to the 
principle of non-intervention. The official line of American policy had 
to be expressed in such a way as to simultaneously meet multiple goals 
without revealing their incompatibilities. Johnson needed to intervene in 
the Dominican Republic without having the appearance of meddling in 
the nation’s affairs. In truth, however, the United States had abandoned 
the principle of non-intervention long before 1965.54 America had 
intervened in Latin American affairs a number of times since the adoption 
of the Good Neighbor Policy—the policy of containment trumped 
non-intervention every time.55 Statements made by the administration 
50  “Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs 
(Mann) and President Johnson, April 27, 1965,” 65.
51  “Transcript of Teleconference Between the Department of State and the Embassy in the 
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and U.S. actions elsewhere in the world gave clues as to the nature 
of American behavior toward the Dominican Republic had any crisis 
developed. President Johnson left little doubt as to American intentions 
four months before the revolt in his State of the Union Address: “We are 
prepared to live as good neighbors with all, but we cannot be indifferent 
to acts deigned to injure our interest, our citizens, or our establishments 
abroad.”56 
Despite claims to the contrary, behind closed doors U.S. officials 
made no effort to deceive themselves. They were “quite open on the phone 
about their right to promote military, diplomatic, and political victories…
while pretending to be neutral on all of these fronts.”57 America had, and 
would continue to, exert influence over the situation. Carefully watching 
the situation, officials hoped that a military junta would emerge to put 
down any communist elements, but expressed concerns that “there are 
only a few Dominicans qualified to help run the government. When 
you are that thin it does not take much to upset everything.”58 Embassy 
officials evaluated the potential victors in the dispute, deciding which one 
would be in America’s best interest: “If we are to influence Dominicans…
and counter leftist efforts to poison the popular mind, we must lose not 
time.”59 When Under Secretary of State Mann suggested that the U.S. 
support Balaguer, a former cohort of Trujillo, President Johnson replied, 
“Well, try to do it. Try to do it some way.”60 Of course, this ran counter to 
56 “State of the Union Address, January 4, 1965,” 1.
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Johnson’s public pronouncement that “We support no single man or any 
single group of men in the Dominican Republic.”61
There is evidence that the U.S. even orchestrated the Dominican 
request for assistance. While American officials strongly suspected 
communist involvement, evidence was insufficient to warrant an invasion. 
When Dominican Air Force Colonel Pedro Benoit emphasized the 
communist flavor of the revolt, perhaps playing to U.S. concerns that the 
Dominican Republic could become the next Cuba, he was “instructed 
what to say in order to get the U.S. troops that he wanted.”62 Instead of 
emphasizing communist gains, American officials requested that the 
colonel rephrase his request to stress that American lives were in danger. 
By the time the appropriately worded request made it to American 
officials, U.S. troops were already ashore.63
None of these facts mean that the U.S. abandoned the concept 
of or appearance of non-intervention. Even when planning intervention, 
officials were sensitive to the façade of non-intervention, and worked 
hard to portray the response as positively as possible. After news of the 
revolt, Johnson stated that, “We profoundly deplore the violence and 
disorder in the Dominican Republic. The situation is grave and we are 
following it closely. It is our hope that order can be promptly restored and 
that a peaceful settlement of the internal problems can be found.”64 Early 
statements such as these recognized the need not to appear meddlesome 
and denied aspirations to send an occupying force, but cautiously 
tested the waters. Once the decision had been made to intervene, official 
61  “Radio and Television Report to the American People…, May 2, 1965,” 473.
62  Lowenthal, The Dominican Intervention, 84-85, 102; Draper, The Dominican Revolt, 120.
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statements were preemptively defensive. When addressing the American 
people, Johnson assured them that “even though we are deeply saddened 
by bloodshed and violence…, we had no desire to interfere in the affairs 
of a sister republic … On Wednesday afternoon, there was no longer any 
choice for the man who is your President.”65
To justify intervention, Johnson needed a valid cause. At first, the 
U.S. simply called for a cease fire and ordered the evacuation American 
citizens.66 The first wave of troops was necessary to protect Americans and 
facilitate evacuations. As proof of the necessity for U.S. troop presence, 
President Johnson affirmed to the American people that there was an 
immediate danger.67 Dominican officials had informed the American 
Embassy that “the governmental authorities could no longer protect 
us…Only an immediate landing of American forces could safeguard 
and protect the lives of thousands of Americans and thousands of other 
citizens of some 30 other countries.”68 If the U.S. were truly committed to 
non-intervention, however, the active involvement of American troops 
would be unnecessary following the evacuations of over 6,500 people 
from forty-six countries.69 To justify U.S. presence, American statements 
took a new direction, justifying U.S. occupation on the basis of preventing 
the spread of Communism. However, these statements only cautiously 
moved away from non-interventionism: “Neither we nor any other nation 
in this hemisphere can or should take it upon itself to ever interfere with 
65  “Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Situation in the Dominican 
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the affairs of [the Dominican Republic] or any other country.”70 Despite 
this admonition, Johnson asserted that intervention could become 
necessary, “only—repeat—only when the object is the establishment of a 
communistic dictatorship … So ... it is our mutual responsibility to help 
the people of the Dominican Republic toward the day when they can 
freely choose the path of liberty and justice and progress.”71 
Ever on the defensive, President Johnson constantly denied 
that American actions were imperialist or aggressive: “We are not the 
aggressor in the Dominican Republic. Forces came in there and overthrew 
that government and became aligned with evil persons who had been 
trained in overthrowing governments and…establishing Communist 
control and we have resisted that control and we have sought to 
protect our citizens against what would have taken place.”72 Not only 
were American interests at stake, but so was the future of “our sister 
Republics…and the values of all the American Republics.”73 In response to 
reporters’ questions during the subsequent occupation of the Dominican 
Republic, Johnson stated, “We didn’t start that. We didn’t intervene … We 
were not the perpetrators. But … we …took the necessary precautions.”74
A central element in this stance was to iterate that intervention 
had the sanction of numerous Latin American nations. The Organization 
of American States (OAS) was critical in this effort: “Prior to our 
intervention, we consulted and discussed the gravity of the situation there 
with 14 Latin American nations.”75 In truth, the OAS was a virtual puppet 
organization completely dominated by the United States, but its sanction 
70  “Radio and Television Report to the American People…, May 2, 1965,” 472-473.
71  Ibid., 473.
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at least gave the appearance of multilateral support.76 The administration 
constantly drew upon language that suggested the operations had the 
sanction of the region at large. “For the first time in history,” President 
Johnson told students at Baylor University, “the Organization of 
American States has created and sent to the soil of an American nation an 
international peace-keeping military force.”77 The purpose of this force 
was to fend off forces that threatened “the principles of the inter-American 
system.”78 America was not intervening in Dominican affairs so much as 
it was fulfilling its commitment to preserve “the right of all of the free 
people of this hemisphere to choose their own course without falling prey 
to international conspiracy from any quarter.”79
The administration itself seemed unsure about why the United 
States was in the Dominican Republic. At times, President Johnson 
insisted that “99 percent of our reason for going in there was to…
provide protections for these American lives”80 But at the same news 
conference, the President also stated that “the principles of communism 
are incompatible with the principles of our inter-American system,” 
suggesting that containment was the motive.81 Were American troops in 
the Dominican Republic to prevent the spread of communism or to protect 
American citizens? It depends upon which policy was being called upon. 
Preventing the spread of communism was compatible with the Monroe 
Doctrine and Containment, but contrary to non-interventionism. Using 
American troops to protect American lives and facilitate the evacuation 
76  Dietz, “Destabilization and Intervention in Latin America and the Caribbean,” 6; 
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would be permissible under the Good Neighbor Policy, but could not 
explain why soldiers were there after evacuations were complete. This 
awkward stance created an environment where President Johnson felt 
it necessary to make outrageous statements and would draw criticism 
from contemporary observers and modern historians who believe he 
deliberately misled the American people. Johnson reported that a number 
of “prime leaders in the rebel forces were men with a long history of 
communistic association… [and] had been trained by Communist forces.” 
Additionally, the President reported that there was widespread violence 
in the streets and severe damage to several embassies.82 Intervention was 
necessary “to stop the wholesale killing of hundreds and even thousands 
of Dominicans.”83
When Theodore Draper states that, “There is no doubt that 
the threat of Communism rather than danger to American lives was 
[Johnson’s] primary reason for recommending military intervention,” 
he intends the statement to be a criticism—Johnson deliberately misled 
the American people by exaggerating the influence of communists 
as an excuse to intervene. 84 But intervention based on the expansion 
of communism was justifiable in and of its own right. Draper fails to 
recognize that, although the administration did make exaggerated claims, 
there was significant, albeit circumstantial, evidence of communist 
involvement. America had committed many more troops in Korea and 
Vietnam—two nations much farther from American borders—based upon 
the policy of containment, and intervention was all the more necessary 
given the Dominican Republic’s proximity to the United States. 
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V
In the dark mist of conflict and violence, revolution and confusion, it is not easy to 
find clear and unclouded truth.85
Historical interpretations of U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic 
in 1965 can be grouped into two categories. The first are stalwart 
supporters of U.S. actions as a justified measure to contain the spread of 
communism. The second group can be considered outspoken critics of 
a neo-imperialistic attempt by the U.S. to influence a tiny nation on its 
periphery which it deemed incapable of self-government.86 Neither of 
these viewpoints provides an accurate and unbiased evaluation of the 
events. Each side assumes a conspiratorial element, either carried out by 
the U.S. government or by communist operatives. Evidence of either is 
scant.
 Ultimately, Dominican intervention was “the natural consequence 
of the attitudes and assumptions with which American officials generally 
approached the Dominican Republic.”87 In the climate of the Cold War, 
American concerns about the spread of communism were in a heightened 
state. Conditions in the Dominican Republic were ripe for a communist 
uprising, and movements that smacked of socialism were not unknown 
there. When the revolt began, numerous organizations joined, many of 
which had expressed socialist ideas. The very leader whom the rebels 
wanted to reinstate had been suspected of being soft on communism. 
Under these circumstances, the slightest evidence of communist plot was 
taken as undeniable proof. This “gap between Dominican realities and 
American perceptions” determined the path that the U.S. would take.88 
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86  Slater, Intervention and Negotiation, 191; Lowenthal, The Dominican Intervention, 132-135.
87  Lowenthal, The Dominican Intervention, 150.
88  Lowenthal, The Dominican Intervention, 34.
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American actions were coherent, logical, and consistent with the policy 
of containment and the Monroe Doctrine.89 The U.S. could not risk delay. 
To quote President Johnson out of context, “In this situation delay itself 
would be decision—the decision to risk and lose the lives of thousands of 
Americans and thousands of innocent people from all lands.”90
 But sending troops into an independent “sister Republic” 
based on such flimsy evidence was unacceptable. Such behavior was 
discordant with the principles of the Good Neighbor Policy. To rectify 
this, U.S. officials orchestrated a statement to the effect that American 
lives were in danger from Dominican officials whose status as true 
representatives of the Dominican government was questionable at best. 
This statement provided justification for the initial deployment, putting 
American resources in position for further operations and buying time 
for the administration to jump through the verbal hurdles created by 
incompatible policy statements.
Intervention in 1965 should not have been surprising to anyone 
familiar with the long-term diplomatic relationship between the U.S. and 
Dominican Republic.91 In the long history of U.S.-Dominican relations, 
intervention was the rule rather than the exception. “Throughout almost 
two centuries of United States-Latin American relations, one must 
conclude that the U.S. has exercised political and economic dominance…
Latin American states usually have been in a subordinate and dependent 
role. Cold War years have seen strong reaction to real and alleged 
communist penetration.”92 The absurd attempt to maintain the image of 
adherence to the Good Neighbor Policy complicated matters, and the 
89  Gleijeses, The Dominican Revolt, 182.
90  “Radio and Television Report to the American People…, May 2, 1965,” 471.
91  Lowenthal, The Dominican Intervention, 7, 15.
92  Kamman, “U.S.-Latin American Relations,” 25.
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inaccuracies of President Johnson’s public pronouncements have served 
as fodder for his critics. In the attempt to appear to be a Good Neighbor, 
the administration was forced to make bold and, at times, inaccurate 
statements. 
Despite efforts to spin the information to fit into policy molds, 
the U.S. decision to intervene stemmed directly from a fear of communist 
takeover. Ultimately, anti-communist stability was more important than 
democracy or non-interventionism in the Dominican Republic.93 The 
men responsible for the United States’ response to the Dominican crisis 
“believed themselves [to be] engaged in an international struggle against 
Communism, and…had just committed themselves to an expanded war in 
Asia [on that basis.]”94 
One rebel participant downplayed America’s concern about 
communist elements in the Dominican revolt. American diplomats, said 
General Caamaño, “have Communists on the brain.”95 It is true that 
many of the reports of communist activities were exaggerated by the 
administration at the time, but these embellishments have had the effect of 
discrediting communist involvement altogether. Since it is known that the 
administration overstated the facts, it has been assumed that the existence 
of communist operatives was fabricated. This is a misinterpretation. 
The exaggerations were not totally fictitious. The facts were embellished 
because the evidence at hand was circumstantial. The CIA, in a document 
that is still predominantly classified, asserted that “the prospect at the time 
of U.S. intervention clearly was one in which a movement increasingly 
under the influence of Castroites and other Communists was threatening 
93  Slater, Intervention and Negotiation, 31; Gleijeses, The Dominican Crisis, 284.
94  Lowenthal, The Dominican Intervention, 152.
95  General Francisco Caamaño, quoted in Draper, The Dominican Revolt, 90. Caamaño’s 
dismissal of the idea that communists were involved in the revolt should be subject to some 
scrutiny, as Caamaño later fled to Cuba to lead a guerilla group.
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to gain the ascendancy in the Dominican Republic.”96 Of the writers 
who have commentated on the matter, those who generally distrust this 
assertion are either journalists or rebel participants. The journalists lacked 
access to internal information and based much of their interpretation 
on interviews conducted with rebels. Rebel participants seething with 
discontent, whose efforts were thwarted by the U.S. intervention, have 
been reluctant to admit the extent of communist involvement, as that 
might mar the noble effort to restore a constitutional leader that they 
portrayed.97 American officials who have written on the subject, such 
as Ambassador Martin, on the other hand, had access to documentary 
evidence that has since been declared confidential, but have much to lose 
by admitting any transgressions on the part of the United States. Perhaps 
the truth can only be ascertained when all documents have been released, 
but until then, historians must make do with the evidence available.
96  “Memorandum Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency, May 7, 1965,” 139.
97  See Pons, The Dominican Republic.
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Mary Beth Norton. In the Devil’s Snare: The Salem Witchcraft Crisis of 1692 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002). 
In the Devil’s Snare explores the realm of the late 17th Century in which New 
England was turned upside down from accusations of witchcraft, Indian 
wars, and strange phenomenon. Mary Beth Norton draws from primary 
documents to expound on typical New England society, the conflicts 
among the masses, the examination of accused witches, and their resolves. 
 Norton places importance on attitudes towards women and how 
Salem politics eventually led to bewitchment of women and men. What 
is noted is the first-reported witchcraft activity from Samuel Parris, a 
reverend of Salem Village, Massachusetts, whose daughters began to 
experience fits of unusual behavior in 1691-1692. This behavior was said 
to have been illustrated by Parris’s slave Tituba who had recited stories 
of voodoo and witchcraft to the young girls. After this scores of women 
and girls were being accused of afflicting harm on innocent citizens and 
witnessing apparitions of witches (3). Word spread throughout Salem 
Village through friends and neighbors, as there were no newspapers 
in circulation at the time. To aid understanding of the trials, inference 
is used for thoughts or perceived actions throughout the book (6).
 The females accused resided in Salem Village and Andover and 
ranged “in age from eleven to twenty, several of them servants” (4). They 
performed tasks such as cooking and doing laundry, but there was a 
drawback. The domestic work of 17th century women gave men an outlet 
for blame if something went wrong on a family’s property. For instance, 
if livestock or children suddenly became ill, women were automatically 
at fault but would not be silent with their cries of innocence (6). Thus 
women could be “more malicious…and full of revenge,” enabling them 
to “fit instruments of the Divell [sic]” (32). The story of Eve demonstrates 
why women were deemed more susceptible to Satan’s constraints and 
forced the afflicted to torture victims by sometimes violent means. While 
these theologies and events took place in other parts of New England, 
what set Massachusetts apart is the Indian wars that took place and 
English responses to these conflicts that influenced the witchcraft crisis.
 Norton’s main theme is presented chronologically beginning 
with King Phillip’s War (1675-1678). The struggle for land and 
missionizing Christians set off repercussions for Wabanaki peoples 
that led to bloodshed from both Native Americans and English 
settlers (83). The Wabanakis attacked villages in populous areas of 
New England, thus their actions and behavior did not go unnoticed. 
The mention in confessions of accused witches of a “black 
man” ties witchcraft to the appearance of an Indian. “On numerous 
occasions seventeenth-century colonists employed the word ‘black’ to 
mean ‘Indian.’” During Sarah Osborn’s trial, a Massachusetts colonist, 
an apparition of “a thing like an indian [sic] all black” came to her (58). 
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Fear had risen “of the devil’s impending war against New England” 
(59). “The fear of Indians that pervaded the region thus included 
not just apprehensions of death or captivity but also of torture and 
dismemberment. In light of the perceived alliance between Satan and 
the Wabanakis, such suffused dread could easily have been vocalized in 
what became the commonplace description of the devil’s threats to ‘tear 
[the afflicted] to pieces’ if they do not comply with the demands” (136).
A second Indian war erupted in 1688, again caused by land disputes 
(94). What stunned New Englanders was the fall of heavily fortified 
Falmouth, which led residents to flee to other settlements and ultimately fight 
a war of attrition against the Wabanakis (110). Three years later, Wabanakis 
sacked York, Maine right after Parris’s daughters began having fits. 
A larger portion of In the Devil’s Snare concentrates on the Native 
American influence on trials that ultimately executed 14 women and 5 men 
and heard 54 confessions (4). The interrogations “had a single purpose: to 
elicit a confession of guilt” (25). One magistrate, John Hathorne, asked the first 
accused witch, Sarah Good, “What evil spirit have you familiarity with?” His 
next question was, “Have you made no contract with the devil?” Sarah Good 
denied both of the questions, but confessions proved how intense and painful 
torture was on the victims (26). Bridget Bishop, a New England resident, 
was accused of witchcraft and afflicted women by striking them down and 
they mimicked the movements of her body which caused great pain (206).
Bishop also confessed to making victims sign their names to 
Satan’s book. The allusion to Satan’s book originated from Tituba’s tales 
and became “an object that, in many guises, was eventually to appear 
in numerous statements by both accusers and confessors” (52). One 
can assume Satan’s book symbolizes a score card Satan can use to keep 
track of whom to afflict and have afflicted, as well as prove the cunning 
power to Christians that Satan can override the graciousness of God.
Norton analyzes the role George Burroughs played in the entire 
affair. Burroughs was born in Virginia and settled as the minister for the 
church of Salem Village in 1680, making his occupation one for which 
people respected and followed him (123-5). He also preached in “Bla[ck] 
Poynt” in 1686 (129). Burroughs was “being Suspected for a confederacy 
with the devil in opressing [sic] of Sundry about Salem.” Burroughs 
tormented a young woman named Ann Putnam Jr. and murdered his 
two wives along with some of his children. He appeared to Ann after 
he “grevously” [sic] tormented her by “futilely pressing her to write in 
his book” (149). This encounter parallels others’ accounts from women 
who Burroughs appeared to. During his trial, Abigail and Deliverance 
Hobbs, Sarah Churchwell, Mary Warren, and Bridget Bishop confessed 
to receiving threats from him and experienced physical harm (195).
Mary Warren’s testimony against Burroughs helped hammer 
the nail in the coffin. “After chocking her ‘almost to death,’ she revealed, 
Burroughs’s apparition ‘sound[ed] a Trumpett [sic] and Immediately I saw 
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severall [sic] com [sic] to him.’” They had “readily responded to Burroughs’s 
signal, making it absolutely clear that he was their leader” (245-6). In 
addition, Burroughs “produced nothing but ‘Tergiversations, Contradictions, 
and Falshoods’ in his attempt to defend himself” (250). The judge sentenced 
Burroughs to hang, and he died ironically declaring himself innocent (256).
The last woman to be accused was in 1693 when Margaret 
Rule “described the devil as ‘a short and Black Man,’” and “suffered 
from pinches and pinpricks that left her black and blue, and 
contorted her body into strange shapes.” Her pastor claimed the 
spirits soon left her, saying, “Go and the Devil go with you, we can do 
no more.” There were then no more afflictions in New England (293).
The purpose of this book is to give readers a history of the Salem 
Witchcraft Trials and the explain factors that may have influenced the 
afflictions and confessions. Norton achieves this objective brilliantly 
and legitimately through many cited examples and gives readers the 
opportunity to reach into the minds of the people who survived (or did 
not survive) the conflict. In addition, Norton explores politics, religious 
aspects, and social aspects of the crisis. The religious aspects are interesting 
because each accused witch was asked to recite the Lord’s Prayer as a 
standing of innocence, and if they were not able to, they were pegged as 
guilty and claimed they were overcome by “these wicked ones” (171).
The organization makes the book easily legible, and the 
subject matter allows for clarity of arguments from intelligent 
research. The amount of research compliments the arguments 
and gives a wonderful overall picture of the witchcraft crisis. 
In the Devil’s Snare is an important contribution to the field of 
women’s studies as well as 17th Century New England culture for future 
studies. This is the most complete and thorough account of the witchcraft 
crisis and is a highly recommended read, though mainly for adult audiences. 
Tess Evans
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Norman Tyler. Historic Preservation: An Introduction to its, History, Principals, 
and Practice: Second Edition (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009).
 Norman Tyler provides the reader with a wide range of topics 
related to the preservation of historic sites in Historic Preservation: An 
Introduction to its, History, Principals, and Practice. The book follows a 
basic pattern and can essentially be divided up by topics. The first three 
chapters give an introduction to the field of preservation. Chapters four 
through nine give a detailed account of the process of designation which 
includes chapters on the economics and legalities related to the field. 
Finally, Tyler discusses ways to work with conservationists and efforts to 
link preservation with tourism. The book operates as a primer on historic 
issues. It is an informative reference book that provides vital information 
for students and historic district commissioners as well as local officials and 
leaders. Though the scope of the book can be overwhelming to the novice, 
the book is also an effective textbook for introductory preservation courses. 
The first section of Tyler’s work covers basic preservation 
philosophies, a history of the movement in the United States, and a 
discussion on architectural styles. Tyler gives a good analogy to explain 
his view of what the focus of preservation should be. He argues that sites 
should be looked at as verbs rather than nouns. Sites cannot be viewed as 
static and stuck in the time that they are meant to commemorate. Instead 
they should tell dynamic stories by illustrating the historic context of 
the site. Although he becomes repetitious in his passionate argument of 
this point, his “nouns and verbs” analogy is easy to understand and apt. 
Tyler also provides a good overview of the philosophies that 
govern the attitudes toward preservation in America. He discusses not only 
the views of Viollet-le-Duc and Ruskin but also those of other societies. 
While he gives an introduction to these ideas, I felt that he just stopped 
at the end of the chapter. I would have like to have read how these 
philosophies affected the preservation movement in America. He does 
return to these ideas later in the book but I was left wanting on this topic. 
Tyler discusses the history of the preservation movement 
in great detail throughout chapter two. He provides a great deal of 
information about the institutions, legislation, and processes involved 
in preservation. This chapter is a great introduction to the preservation 
movement but becomes bogged down in detail. This topic could have 
filled an entire book on its own. Tyler does a good job of providing 
an overview and the lack of depth on the subject encourages me 
to learn more on my own. Perhaps in that way he was successful. 
Chapter three traces the evolution of architectural styles in America. 
Tyler also provides a very important discussion about Contextualism.  As a 
novice in the field of architecture, I feel that I profited from reading this catalog 
of architectural styles. I have found myself looking at every home and trying 
to figure out which styles it incorporates. Equally important is the discussion 
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about the importance of maintaining the context of a site. For a beginner like 
me, this chapter is the most informative and important one of the entire book.
The second section, which covers chapters four through nine, 
encompasses the bulk of this book. The reader is given a detailed glimpse of 
the entire preservation process. Every aspect of creating a historic district, 
from the history of several districts to the process of setting one up and 
the philosophies governing them, is meticulously discussed. I feel that this 
section provides the novice with a true sense of the daunting task that awaits a 
preservationist. Honestly, I found myself feeling overwhelmed while reading 
this section, particularly the chapters on the economic and legal issues. 
This section moves from the theoretical to the practical seamlessly. 
I came away not only knowing why preservation is important, but also 
with an idea of how the process works. This section is a resource that 
can be useful throughout my career. I can envision having this book on 
the shelf and reaching for it over and over again. Tyler gives the novice 
preservationist several case studies that provide real-world examples and 
an honest view of the issues that we will face. It is too much information 
to swallow in one reading. While the detail is necessary and beneficial, 
I feel that it is only useful as a reference. The section requires the reader 
to revisit it many times to gain all of the knowledge that it contains.
Sadly, by the time that the reader makes it to chapter ten, they 
may feel exhausted. Again, this chapter is best suited to be reference 
material. It is a section that one would come back to if they were involved 
in something that was relatable or if they were writing a paper or proposal. 
Tyler rallies the reader to keep up with trends in sustainable technologies 
and procedures. This is an important aspect of this chapter. We as 
preservationists have to have an understanding of green technologies that 
limit wasted resources. These technologies should be incorporated into 
restoration efforts because they not only save the environment but also 
money. Tyler uses case studies that show how this partnership can be 
mutually beneficial to conservationists and preservationists. He gives the 
reader practical examples that will be beneficial throughout their careers. 
Chapter eleven discusses a topic that I am growingly passionate 
about. Tyler describes the important link between preservation and 
tourism. As Tyler states, preservation efforts can be an important form of 
tourism that draws money and visitors to the site and community. I feel 
that too many sites fail to realize that in order to be sustainable they must 
find sources of revenue that rise above fifty cent donations and mailers 
to “friends of.” Heritage corridors and areas can be vital tools that focus 
the efforts and financial power of several different historic sites and 
municipalities. Rather than working independently, communities in a 
region can work together to create these areas. These corridors and areas 
can provide struggling regions with an important and sustainable industry. 
Many historically significant areas, such as the Rust-Belt states and urban 
areas like Detroit would benefit immensely from growing these kinds of 
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attractive sites. This chapter not only raises these philosophical issues but 
also provides examples of where they have been put into practice. I wish 
that more time would have been spent on this topic, but again, Tyler raised 
my interest in the subject and has caused me to want to work to learn more. 
Historic Preservation as a textbook and introduction to historic 
preservation is an overwhelming success. It provides the reader with 
everything that they need to be aware of before embarking on a career in 
this field. It also succeeds in the fact that it makes you want to learn more. 
The only issues that arise come from the scope of the book. It is a great deal 
of information to digest in one reading. However, when used as a reference 
it shines. I would have liked to have had more of a sense of Tyler’s own 
feelings about the issues that he raised but that would have been a different 
book entirely. I would recommend this book to every novice preservationist 
and to instructors teaching an introductory course in preservation.
Wesley Garmon
Joseph Crespino. In Search of Another Country: Mississippi and the 
Conservative Counterrevolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2007).
In 1967, Samuel Hill published his provocative work, Southern Churches in 
Crisis, with its intriguing argument for Southern religious exceptionalism. In 
the book, Hill posits that the central theme of popular Southern religion was a 
focus on fundamentalism and revivalism while eschewing the concern over 
social issues that pervaded national Christian institutions. Historians have 
since dismantled much of Hill’s argument, but the central thesis has recently 
seen a revival of sorts from the most unlikely of places. Joseph Crespino, 
along with fellow scholar Matthew Lassiter, has recently called for an end to 
Southern exceptionalism as an analytical framework in their work The Myth 
of Southern Exceptionalism. Overall, Crespino’s In Search of Another Country 
makes an anti-exceptionalist argument, but the author’s work includes 
elements that are surprisingly similar to Hill’s decades old narrative.
 Crespino challenges several notions about white reaction to the 
civil rights movement, as well as the creation of modern conservativism 
in the United States. The author argues that the Southern strategy thesis, 
best exemplified by Dan T. Carter’s The Politics of Rage, oversimplifies the 
profound shifts taking place in the South. While white racism did play 
a role in the formation of the neo-conservative coalition, for Crespino, 
it is only part of a far more complicated story. Religious beliefs and 
anti-statism became entangled with racist backlash to civil rights, and 
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this binding together of separate conservative phenomena brought 
Mississippi and the rest of the South into national political prominence.
 Crespino analyzes the growing national importance of 
Mississippi in a number of areas. First, the author is most interested in 
the subtle ways race affected later political developments in the South. 
By analyzing Mississippi’s political positioning in Presidential races, 
Crespino demonstrates how Mississippi transformed from a state that 
voted overwhelmingly for one of the biggest losers in modern Presidential 
elections, Barry Goldwater, to a state fully in step with the conservative 
tide that swept Ronald Reagan into office. In Presidential politics, 
Mississippians tapped into a broader, nationwide conservativism by 
deemphasizing race and further articulating other aspects of conservative 
ideology, namely anti-communism and anti-statism. Crespino argues 
that the first sign that things were shifting significantly occurred during 
the Presidential election of 1964. The Mississippi Freedom Democratic 
Party (MFDP) made inroads at the national Democratic convention to 
seat African American delegates. Many segregationist Democrats were 
already thinking of supporting conservative GOP candidate Barry 
Goldwater because he opposed the 1964 Civil Rights Act that Lyndon 
Johnson had signed into law. The fledgling Mississippi Republicans saw 
their opportunity to make huge strides in the state, and the work of the 
MFDP finally pushed the Democratic segregationists to the other side.  In 
the election of 1964, with the rest of the nation voting overwhelmingly for 
Lyndon Johnson, Mississippi, the staunchest of Democratic states, voted 
for Republican Barry Goldwater because of his racial conservatism. But 
Mississippians and other Southerners would not remain isolated politically 
for long. Once ignored by Presidential candidates, Mississippians would 
soon find new recognition as their conservative ideals, especially limited 
government intervention, met a growing conservative trend across the 
nation. Furthermore, Crespino argues that the culmination of the South’s 
rise to national political prominence came not as the foundation for 
Nixon’s Southern strategy but during Reagan’s Presidential campaign.
  Second, Crespino reviews the importance of conservative 
Christianity to Mississippians and their interaction with the rest of the 
United States. While Christian reaction to the civil rights movement of the 
1960s was mixed, one thing white Mississippi Christians began agreeing 
on was that liberal Christianity threatened many of their fundamentalist 
beliefs. Religious adherents and clerics from many different traditions 
descended upon Mississippi to bring about racial change, both in their 
churches and the state’s society at large. Mississippi Christians, influenced 
by their fundamentalist ideology, believed that these ministers and lay 
people were fostering a new Christian liberalism that deemphasized one’s 
spiritual state while refocusing on social issues. While Mississippians 
reacted against specific Christian organizations at times, such as the 
National Council of Churches, more often they responded by aiming 
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their ire in a different direction: education. Crespino argues that Christian 
Mississippians created private Christian academies, at least in part, to offset 
the influence of liberal Christianity on their children. Because the federal 
government viewed these schools, labeled “segregation academies,” as 
an attempt to stymie school desegregation, a battle developed between 
the IRS and the academies over the schools’ tax-exempt status. Through 
the 1970s, Mississippi schools had to prove that they did not racially 
discriminate in order to receive a tax exemption, which many failed to 
do. By the 1980s, however, Mississippians had succeeded in turning 
national sentiment their way by making the issue a matter of separation of 
church and state rather than a racial issue. Reagan returned the Christian 
segregation academies’ tax-exempt status by eliminating the IRS rule. 
 Other reviewers have compared this work to Kevin Kruse’s White 
Flight, a book that looks at the development of segregation in Atlanta’s 
suburbs. There are significant differences, however, between the two. 
Crespino presents a more even-handed view of those whites that practiced 
strategic accommodation. Kruse’s historical agents are ardent, even violent, 
segregationists who learn that putting on a submissive face could be the 
best tool to maintain power. Kruse is far more skeptical, believing that the 
rhetoric of religious freedom and anti-statism was a mere façade covering 
white moderates’ true goal of continued racial segregation. Crespino’s 
analysis is more accepting of white moderates’ own beliefs, especially 
religious beliefs. In Crespino’s view, some whites truly did set up Christian 
schools because of concerns over liberal Christianity rather than race.
 While Crespino’s book is certainly an important study of more 
recent developments in the South, it does have some flaws. The author 
largely favors analysis on the national level rather than the local. Crespino 
never considers the development of Christian schools through the lens of 
boards of education or local teachers. The same is true of politics. While 
Mississippians are busy casting ballots for Goldwater and Reagan, one is 
left wondering what is the state of local politics? Is the GOP making inroads 
on the state or county level? But perhaps the book’s biggest flaw reveals 
why the author does not often peer into the complexities of local matters. 
 Ultimately, the author wants to place Mississippi at the center of 
the neo-conservatives’ rise to power in the 80s. The strategy was simple: 
deemphasize radical racial hatred in favor of an accommodationist, anti-
statist conservativism. Southerners jettisoned explicitly racial politics for 
the subtle, de facto racism of general white America. In this way, Crespino’s 
work fits neatly into the growing body of historiography calling for the 
end of Southern exceptionalism. In light of this overarching attack on 
Southern distinctiveness, Crespino’s choice of private Christian academies 
as one of the battlegrounds for the meaning of American and Christian 
conservativism is peculiar, mainly because it reflects one of the most 
staunchly exceptionalist theses in American religious history: Sam Hill’s 
central theme of Southern religion. Crespino agrees that Mississippi’s 
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private Christian schools were in some ways deserving of the label 
“segregation academies,” but he also wants the reader to take seriously the 
parents’ argument that their children were attending such schools in order 
to combat the influence of a secularizing society and liberal Christianity 
without reference to racial conflict. In other words, Crespino argues that one 
of the main ideological thrusts of the South’s inclusion in the conservative 
coalition, a backlash against liberalism, was contingent upon the peculiar 
nature of Southern religious belief. Reduced to its simplest formulation, 
Southern exceptionalism died because of Southern religious exceptionalism. 
Herein lies the problem with the Crespino/Lassiter argument. It is easy to 
see the destruction of Southern exceptionalism on the surface of general 
nationwide developments, but once one delves into more specific local 
events, the exceptional nature of Southern society and culture reveals itself.
  Though Crespino may miss the mark when it comes to explaining 
specific causalities by ignoring local interests, his book is still significant 
for shedding light on the growing national importance of the South. 
Mississippians did construct a strategy of strategic accommodation to 
recruit non-Southerners to their side as well as binding racism in subtle 
ways with other conservative values. Crespino tells a complicated story. 
One cannot simply say that Southerners found a way to circumvent the 
system and adhere to their racist beliefs. While this is true for some, 
others had religious or anti-statist ideologies that superseded issues of 
race. Crespino shows that the ways in which these ideas became linked 
have had a lasting impact on modern politics that exists to this day.
Garrett Spivey        
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INSTITUTIONAL
CONTRIBUTION
“This wanton laceration of an  
affectionate heart:” 
A Glimpse into Courtship and 
Courtship Advice Literature in the 
Early Republic
On a spring day in June of 1795 Charles Porter Phelps traveled to church 
in Newburyport, Massachusetts to see the ordination of a new minister. 
Beside Charles in his chaise sat Jane Greenleaf. Charles and Jane joined 
friends and family at the church to celebrate the ordination. After the 
ceremony concluded Charles took Jane home instead of joining the rest 
of the group who department for the residence of the High Sheriff of the 
County for a celebration. According to Charles’ autobiography, as soon 
as he left Jane at her home he experienced a rush of emotions, dejection 
and anguish being two of the most prominent of his feelings. Later that 
evening, with a heavy heart and an even heavier conscience, Charles 
set out for the house of another young woman. He was admitted into 
the home of Theophilus Parsons (the man with whom Charles had read 
law) by Parsons’ niece, Sarah. Sarah was Charles’ betrothed and the 
cousin of Jane Greenleaf. While Sarah had seen first-hand the events that 
had transpired earlier in the day at the ordination, which she attended 
with her uncle’s family, she met Charles with a placid countenance. 
Remembering the event many years later, Charles recorded the reception 
he received: “There was no crimination – not a complaint even – not an 
unkind or hasty word escaped from her lips – not a feature of her face 
betrayed the slightest tinge of angry emotion.”1 However, Sarah’s calm 
1 Charles Porter Phelps autobiography, Porter Phelps Huntington Family Papers (Box 10, 
Folder 21), Archives and Special Collections, Amherst College Library, 18. 
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exterior hid a deeply hurt heart. As a result of Charles’ indiscretion Sarah 
ended the relationship. He left Newburyport the next day to return to 
Boston and his law practice. In his autobiography, Charles described his 
emotional state during this time of pain and confusion: 
No pen can describe the feelings, I endured for several succeeding 
days, - the World was all a blank – and changing only a word in 
the stanza of a then favorite song, I adopted entirely its sentiment 
and fully recognized its force…The next day I returned to Boston, 
but with little relish either for love or law. What was the cause 
or motive for this wanton laceration of an affectionate heart, 
this cruel attack upon the peace and happiness of her, whom I 
best loved, or the gratuitous self-infliction of unmitigated evil 
on myself, did at the time and for more than a half a century 
since has surpassed all my reasoning to explain or fully even 
comprehend.2
He had hurt the woman whom he had courted and loved for many years 
without understanding his own reasons for doing so. 
 Charles Porter Phelps was born as Moses Porter Phelps in Hadley, 
Massachusetts in 1772 to Elizabeth and Charles Phelps. Raised alongside 
his sister Elizabeth on Forty Acres, the family farm in Hadley, Charles 
displayed little desire to become a farmer. Instead, from a very young age, 
Charles demonstrated a desire study law as his father had done. Charles 
Phelps Senior was a prosperous attorney and politician. As a young 
man, Charles received instruction from Reverend Joseph Lyman of the 
neighboring community of Hatfield, Massachusetts to prepare him for 
university. In 1787, at the age of 15, Charles moved to Cambridge to attend 
Harvard. Upon the completion of his degree in 1791 Charles moved to the 
town of Newburyport, 40 miles to the north of Boston. In Newburyport 
Charles studied law with Theophilus Parsons, a very well known and 
respected attorney who would sit as the Chief Justice of the Massachusetts 
Superior Court from 1806 to 1813. It was while living with the Parson 
2  Charles Porter Phelps autobiography, 18-19.
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family that Charles had met Sarah, Theophilus’ niece, who resided with 
Theophilus’ family. The two began courting in 1792, three years before 
Charles made his fatal (or so he thought) mistake.3
 For many months after his last visit with Sarah Charles struggled 
to move on with his life in Boston. He half-heartedly practiced law, which 
he had belatedly discovered he rather disliked after years of training for 
his career. He tried to forget Sarah, but to no avail. Finally rumors began 
to circulate around Boston to forced him to seriously consider his future. 
With an ever increasingly jealous heart, Charles heard stories of Sarah 
and the various men who pursued her affections. These rumors finally 
prodded Charles into action and he decided to find an excuse to return to 
Newburyport to make a last ditch effort to regain the heart and affections 
of Sarah Parsons.
 In 1796 Charles found away to return to Newburyport without 
raising too many questions about his motives. He traveled with his mother 
who wished to visit some of her friends. While there, Charles requested 
an “interview” with Sarah so that he could try to sway her affections back 
in his direction. Sarah agreed to hear Charles’ petition. He returned to the 
house that had last been the site of his rejection and laid his heart bare to 
Sarah with great success:
The interview was less brief than our last one, tho it seemed to 
me but a fleeting moment, - yet it was long enough to restore 
and confirm the confidence which I had foolishly forfeited, and 
to obliterate many unwelcome memories of a sad and sorrowful 
year.4  
The love Charles had for Sarah was unwavering after the regrettable 
incident involving Jane Greenleaf and his joy at being welcomed back into 
3  Porter Phelps Huntington Papers, 1698-1968: “Description of Collection,” Archives and 
Special Collections, Amherst College Library.
4  Charles Porter Phelps autobiography, 22.
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Sarah’s heart is one of clearest emotions in his autobiography. The couple 
reunited, once again pledging fidelity to one another. 
 The saga of Sarah and Charles, as recorded in Charles’ 
autobiography, reveals much about courtship among the emerging 
middle class during the period of the Early Republic.5 As part of the 
provincial middle class of New England, Sarah and Charles both had 
certain standards that they were expected to adhere to, particularly when 
it came to their behaviors both publically and privately. In New England 
especially, where literacy had long been prized as a means to salvation, 
men and women of the emerging middle class often turned to a growing 
body of advice literature to help them along the road to civility.6 This 
literature, originally imported from England, was increasingly authored 
by Americans in the post-Revolutionary period, covered everything from 
how to speak properly, to how to cut meat properly, from how to write 
formal letters, to how one should greet friends and acquaintances in 
formal settings. One of the most popular subgenres of conduct literature 
instructed men and women in the art of courtship. Authors of courtship 
advice literature dissected gaffes like those Charles committed during his 
and Sarah’s eight-year courtship and instructed their readers in methods 
to remedy situations like the one Charles found himself enmeshed 
in during 1795 and 1796. The rise in the numbers and availability of 
courtship manuals coincided with a loosening of parental controls over 
courtship and an increase in social mobility, which to authors of advice 
literature could spell disaster for those unaware of the implications of 
these serious shifts. Advice literature in the Early Republic also reflected 
a slowly growing recognition of the power women could wield during 
5  Catherine E. Kelly, In the New England Fashion, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 6.
6  Gordon Wood, Revolutionary Characters (New York: Penguin, 2007), 13. 
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courtship. Additionally, this literature encouraged the open and honest 
expression of emotions on the part of male suitors, whom authors felt 
sometimes revealed too little about their motives during courtship. 
Charles knew that when he had taken Jane Greenleaf to church he had 
committed “an uprovoked outrage…against the common courtesies of 
social life,” the lessons of which were recorded in the pages of eighteenth 
and nineteenth century courtship manuals.7
Sarah Davenport Parsons lived in a time when women appeared, 
at least on the surface, to have little control over their destinies. They 
rarely received an education equal to that of a man like Charles Porter 
Phelps and they had very few opportunities to create a life economically 
independent from some level of male control. Women could neither 
pursue men without seeming unladylike (to put it mildly), nor could 
they make a proposal of marriage. Advice literature and societal 
conventions encouraged women to hold back from expressing their true 
emotions during courtship in order to preserve their reputations should 
the courtship end without marriage. However, the case of Sarah and 
Charles revealed an important gap in the power structure of the late 
1700s and early 1800s, one that authors of courtship advice literature 
more frequently drew attention to in the years following the Revolution. 
When Charles violated Sarah’s trust, she chose to end the relationship for 
almost a year. When Charles could not stand the separation any longer 
and approached her to plead his case one last time, it was Sarah again 
who made the decision about the fate of their relationship, not Charles. In 
a very serious way Sarah actually controlled the future of her relationship 
with Charles – a power that justifiably made many men nervous, 
especially who were used to controlling their own affairs.
7  Charles Porter Phelps autobiography, 19. 
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 Authors of courtship advice literature understood that many 
middling women in the Early Republic possessed this power and they 
sought to illustrate the ways in which it might be appropriately used 
and contained. In the following set of letters from John Trumbull’s 1796 
manual The Lover’s Instructor, the future of the fictional couple was 
threatened by a breach of proper behavior. The young woman wrote to 
her suitor, asking for an explanation of why he had ignored her presence 
at a gathering, paying attention to a Miss Peacock instead. Unlike Sarah, 
this fictional woman gave her suitor a chance to justify his behavior, but 
like Sarah, this young woman could have chosen to end the relationship 
based on her discovery of an infidelity, real or imagined:
 Sir,
The sincerity and freedom with which I have at all times laid open 
my heart to you, ought to have some weight in my claim to have 
a return of the same confidence. But I have reason to fear that the 
best men do not always act as they ought: I write to you what it 
would be impossible to speak; but before I see you, I desire you 
will either explain your conduct last night or confess that you 
have used me not as I have deserved of you.
It is in vain to deny you took pains to recommend 
yourself to Miss Peacock; your earnestness of discourse also 
shewed me that you were no stranger. I desire to know, Sir, what 
sort of acquaintance you can wish to have with another person of 
character, who made me believe that you wish to be married to 
me? I write very plainly to you, because I expect a plain answer. 
I am not apt to be suspicious, but this was too particular; and I 
must be either blind or indifferent to overlook it. Sir, I am neither, 
tho’ perhaps it would be better for me if I were one or the other. 
The gentleman in question responded with the following thoughts on the 
event in question:
 My dearest Nanny, 
I CANNOT conceive what can have put it in your thoughts to be 
suspicious of me, while heart and soul you know are truly yours, 
and whose whole thoughts and wishes are but on you. Sweet 
quarreler, you know this: what afternoon have I spent from you? 
Or, who did you ever see me speak to without distaste, when it 
Institutional Contributions 207
prevents my talking with you?
You know how very often you have cautioned me not 
to speak to you before your uncle; and you know he was there. 
But you do well to abuse me for being too obedient to your 
commands; for I promise you, you shall never get any other cause. 
I thought it most prudent to be seen talking with another, when 
it was my business not so much as to look at you. Miss Peacock 
is a very old acquaintance. She knows my perfect devotion to 
you, and she very well knew all that civility and earnestness of 
discourse about nothing, was pretended. I write to you before 
I come, because you command me; but I will make you ask my 
pardon in a few minutes for robbing me but of those few which 
might have been spent with you, and which it has taken to write 
this letter…
Here the suitor argues he was not at fault in talking with Miss Peacock, 
claiming was only the circumstances that drove him to pay more attention 
to Miss Peacock than his dearest Nanny. If Nanny had not chosen to 
believe his story then the courtship would have ended under a cloud of 
suspicion, as did that of Charles and Sarah. 
The main goal of authors in writing pieces like the above was 
to instruct women on how to defend themselves from potential ruin at 
the hands of a man who clearly would not make a good match for life. 
Authors recognized that  “it is extremely difficult, to detect malevolence 
amidst the assiduities of courtship, and to distinguish the man under 
than almost inscrutable disguise the lover” and that giving women tools 
to protect themselves was essential.8 While Charles felt that the “the 
most plausible – tho still perhaps not entirely satisfactory explanation 
of the affair may possibly been found in a somewhat peculiar trait of 
[his] mind and character,” stemming from “a morbid and depressing 
sensitiveness” that had always been a part of his psyche, as well as “a 
strong, tho somewhat singular, proclivity to self-depreciation, and a 
8   “Adventurer No. 30” in The London Magazine and Monthly Chronologer, (February 17, 1753), 
697. The piece also appeared in The Matrimonial Preceptor in London in 1765 and in the 1829 
American edition. 
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tendency, at least, to magnify, if not multiply [his] deficiencies”, other 
men may have had darker motives when they courted and abandoned 
women.9 Authors of advice literature advised women to move slowly and 
cautiously through the ritual of courtship, not revealing too much of their 
innermost emotions as particular groups of men might take advantage of 
a woman whose emotions were so evident and easily manipulated. British 
and American seduction novels like The Coquette (1797) and Charlotte 
Temple (1791), both popular around the time Charles broke Sarah’s 
heart, demonstrate what could happen to women whose affections were 
bestowed in an open and unrestrained way on an undeserving man. At 
least Charles had not tried to unwontedly seduce Sarah but he had gained 
her affections and then broken her trust as the rakish men did in these 
novels. In the end Sarah does not die a fallen woman in a roadside tavern 
like Eliza Wharton, the main character in The Coquette because Charles is 
no Major Sanford. Nor does she die friendless, the mother of a small child, 
alone in a foreign country like Charlotte Temple. But like both of these 
women, she risked her future if she placed her trust in the hands of the 
wrong man. Charles’ infidelity suggested to Sarah that he was indeed the 
wrong man for her, and unlike the doomed heroines of the two novels, 
she took steps to protect herself from a potentially unhappy and uncertain 
future. 
 Authors of advice literature found many ways to encourage 
women to protect themselves from over-exuberant (and perhaps false) 
suitors. In the following conversation taken from The Lover’s Instructor, 
the man’s plea for affection calls to mind Charles’ appeal to Sarah after 
his disastrous error. Like Sarah, the woman in the imaginary conversation 
keeps a “placid countenance,” refusing to rise to the bait of the suitor’s 
9  Charles Porter Phelps autobiography, 19.
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seductive words:
Man:...I have long been broiling on the flames or ardent affection 
towards your dear self, and never had the opportunity of 
happiness to discover my loves before this time…it would 
absolutely break my heart [if she rejected him]
Maid: Men’s hearts are not so soon broke.
 Man: Have you never heard of any that died for love?
 Maid: Some of my own sex.10
The imagined conversation continues along this same line, the man telling 
the woman not to doubt that he loves her deeply and truly, to which 
she replies cuttingly, “I cannot but doubt it” and that men always prove 
faithless. She holds herself distant from his flattery, compliments, and 
pleas to turn over her heart to his care. Like Sarah, this fictional character 
recognized the risks inherent in letting a man control her heart until she 
understood his true intentions. Once Sarah was convinced of Charles’ 
remorse and his true devotion to her, she allowed him back into her heart 
and life. But until that point, she held him at a distance, protecting herself 
from any further heartache.
 The courtship of Sarah and Charles illustrates another theme 
evident in courtship advice literature that helped women protect 
themselves and their reputations during courtship. While parental power 
over courtship in some American circles had been on the decline since 
before the American Revolution, authors of advice literature recognized 
that family and friends still played an enormous role in making matches. 
While parents were cautioned that exerting too strong of a hand during 
courtship could ruin their relationship with their children, few authors 
imagined a world where courtship occurred in a vacuum. Rational 
Enlightenment philosophies may have led Benjamin Franklin to argue 
that “no parental Authority, that is repugnant to the Dictates of Reason 
10  B. Gomez, A New Academy of Compliments (New York, 1799), 37. Early American imprints. 
1st series; no. 48941.
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and Virtue or (which is the same Thing) the moral Happiness of our 
Natures, is any ways binding on Children” well before the philosophers 
of the American Revolution associated too much parental power during 
courtship with the tyranny of a king over his subjects.11 However, despite 
this growing freedom from parental control, both men and women still 
relied on friends and family for support and advice during the often-
tumultuous period of courtship. Family and friends also had the power to 
influence the courtships of those close to them. Letters exchanged between 
Sarah and Charles’ sister Elizabeth Phelps show how friends could try to 
sway one another towards choosing a favored suitor. Even when Charles 
and Sarah reunited after their falling out, Elizabeth continued to push 
and prod Sarah to marry Charles. At the close of every letter she wrote to 
Sarah, Elizabeth said something to the effect of “My friend, I look forward 
to the time when I may call you by a more endearing title”.12 Elizabeth 
also urged her brother to seal his relationships with Sarah, including 
comments like “I should like to know if you ever intend to get married 
– for I shall want to come to Boston again – in the course of a few years 
perhaps – and I had almost determined not to go till you had given me 
a home there – which I shall take advantage of” at the conclusion of her 
letters to him.13  
 The story of Charles and Sarah, with its attendant highs and lows, 
is just one of thousands of similar tales of love and heartbreak recorded in 
diaries and letters in the Early Republic. Coupled with the ever-growing 
11  Benjamin Franklin, Reflections on Courtship and Marriage in Two Letters to a Friend. Wherein 
a Practible Plan in laid down for Obtaining and Securing Conjugal Felicity (Philadelphia: Printed 
and Sold by B. Franklin, 1746), 28. Early American imprints. First series; no. 25501.
12  Elizabeth Whiting Phelps Huntington to Sarah Parsons, October 18, 1797, Porter Phelps 
Huntington Papers (Box 12, Folder 17), Archives and Special Collections, Amherst College 
Library. 
13  Elizabeth Whiting Phelps Huntington to Sarah Parsons, March 19, 1798, Porter Phelps 
Huntington Papers (Box 12, Folder 14), Archives and Special Collections, Amherst College 
Library.
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amount of courtship advice literature, it is clear that authors tried to make 
readers aware of just how much was at stake during the tumultuous time 
of courtship. Had Charles truly thought through his actions as purveyors 
of advice suggested, he would have never taken Jane Greenleaf to church, 
he would have never broken Sarah’s heart and he would not have spent 
a year alone and miserable in Boston. Authors of advice literature warned 
their readers through letter templates, imaginary conversations, essays 
and novels just how treacherous this time could be. A woman could find 
herself cast out from polite society if a suitor succeeded in corrupting 
her morals. A man could find himself denied access to she whom he 
most loved for a violation of the strict code of conduct surrounding 
courtship. The story of Charles and Sarah also underscores the slowly 
changing notions of female power in post-Revolutionary society. While 
women were denied equal standing as citizens, both politically and 
economically, they were given an increasingly large role in policing virtue 
and in controlling their own moral destinies, especially when it came to 
marriage, which created a bit of tension as men struggled to comprehend 
this changing power. These changes did not occur overnight, nor were all 
women allowed to participate in this newly defined role (especially poor 
women and women of color)
The story of Charles and Sarah, then, is not only a love story, but 
a brief snapshot of slow changes to a highly gendered world. Change 
did not come quickly (as change rarely does) as the popularity of pieces 
of advice from courtship literature well past its prime demonstrates. For 
example “On Choosing a Husband” was first published in London in 
1766, but the editor of the American magazine Ladies Port Folio thought the 
advice remained pertinent to readers in 1820. The advice is also apropos to 
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our own discussion as it instructed young women to avoid the attentions 
of inappropriate young men: 
The chief things to be regarded in the choice of a husband, are a 
virtuous disposition, a good understanding, an even temper, an 
easy fortune, and an agreeable person. Ask any lady, if she would 
either receive, or recommend to her friend’s acquaintance, a 
husband without these accomplishments, and her answer will be 
– None but a fool, or a mad woman would; yet, how many of the 
fair sex throw themselves away, upon what the speculative world 
calls PRETTY FELLOWS, who want courage, honour, sincerity, 
and every amiable virtue? How many are sacrificed to the riches 
of an illiterate drone, or an old debauchee?14 
In addition, the long-popular advice of James Fordyce, the British 
theologian, also demonstrates change to courtship advice, when it came, 
came slowly and advice remained relevant for decades. Fordyce first 
published his Sermons to Young Women in England in 1766, but American 
printings in 1787, 1796, 1809, and 1818, suggest the lasting power of his 
advice (and the reluctance to break ties with Britain in the wake of the 
Revolution). Like the author of “On Choosing a Husband” Fordyce’s 
advice warned young women that seeking the true character of a suitor 
was the fundamental goal of courtship and that all women should be sure 
to avoid being trapped in a marriage to a rake:
That he who has been formerly a rake may, after all, prove a very 
tolerable husband, as the world goes, I have said already, that I do 
not dispute. But, I would ask in the next place, is this commonly 
to be expected? Is there no danger that such a man will be 
tempted by the power of long habit to return to his old ways; or 
that the insatiable love of variety, which he has indulged so freely, 
will some time or other, lead him astray, from the finest woman 
in the world? Will not the very idea of a restraint, which he could 
never brook while single, make him only the more impatient of it 
when married? Will he have the better opinion of his wife’s virtue, 
that he has conversed, chiefly, with women who had none, and 
with men amongst whom it was a favorite system, that the sex 
are all alike? But it is a painful topic. Let the women who are so 
14  Anonymous, “On Choosing a Husband,” in The Ladies Portfolio, Vol. 1, Issue 7 (February 
12, 1820), 50.
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connected make the best of their condition…15 
Many publishers felt that the advice Fordyce shared with young women 
about the dangers of marrying a rake was just as relevant in 1818 as it was 
in 1766. Countless other examples of advice literature, including Reflections 
on Courtship and Marriage, by Benjamin Franklin, were published over 
and over again, clearly demonstrating that when change to courtship and 
advice literature came, it did not come quickly, nor did it come without 
attendant anxiety about women’s growing power. 
In the end, Charles and Sarah made it through the tumultuous 
time of their courtship. In 1799, on the eve of his marriage to Sarah, 
Charles left Boston and the practice of law because he could not generate 
enough profits to cover his expenses and that of his soon-to-be wife. He 
returned to the family farm in Hadley and worked on alterations to the 
farmhouse to make it large enough for two families, as he planned to 
bring Sarah to Hadley after they were married. This was not to be; Charles 
and Sarah moved to Boston some months after their marriage where 
Charles formed a business partnership with Edward Rand. The mercantile 
business partnership was cut short, however, when Rand was killed in a 
duel. Charles continued to run the business until 1816. During this time 
he also began his political career as a member of the State Legislature. 
In 1815 Charles decided he would build a house on his tract of land on 
the family farm in Hadley. Unfortunately, Sarah never saw the house, 
as she fell ill with typhus during the families move to Hadley, and died. 
Charles married her cousin Charlotte who had assisted with the five 
Phelps children after Sarah’s death in 1820. Many of the Phelps children 
died young, only two living to adulthood out of nine from his first two 
15  James Fordyce, D.D., Sermons to Young Women, First Boston Edition (Boston, printed by 
Thomas Hall for S. Hall, Thomas and Andrews, J. White, D. West, E. Larkin, W.P. Blake, J. 
West, and J. Nancrede, 1796), 67. Early American imprints. 1st series; no. 30435.
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marriages. During this period, Charles continued to be elected to the 
State Legislature, and he returned to the practice of law. Charlotte died in 
1830, and Charles married for the third and final time in 1833, to Elizabeth 
Judkins.16 His second and third marriages do not figure largely into the 
story Charles told in his autobiography – Sarah clearly remained his one 
true love well after her death. 
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16  Porter Phelps Huntington Papers, 1698-1968: “Description of Collection,” Archives and 
Special Collections, Amherst College Library.
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